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FOREWORD
We enter into military service with the belief that joining the profession of arms means 
being part of something greater than ourselves. Being part of something greater requires 
each member of the profession to grow individually, improving every day to be better. 
This pattern of seeking growth is at the very core of the most successful professionals, 
including their contributions to the profession of arms.
When we join our first unit, we learn the basic and necessary skills required of us to 
contribute immediately to the team. This is not only important for our teammates, who 
count on us, but critical to our intrinsic desire as individuals to believe we are contribut-
ing to something greater. As our journey continues, we evolve into full members of the 
profession of arms, to the point at which we must take responsibility not only for our 
own continued growth but, more importantly, for the growth of others as well. We do 
this as leaders who mentor and coach, not just by our ideas and words but, critically, by 
our deeds.
Commanders must go a step further and develop a framework for the growth and 
development of their subordinates, in addition to continuing to lead by example. That is 
to say, commanders must set the conditions for the team to learn. Commanders use mis-
takes as teaching tools, and they must set conditions for learning that foster risk taking 
(within appropriate bounds) to promote innovation.
We often approach our physical development this way, by practicing reps and sets, 
working to failure, and achieving new personal records. Like physical muscle, moral 
muscle must be built, and it can deteriorate if not exercised. But that moral muscle must 
never atrophy, because the values of the profession represent one way to look at the 
character of its professionals. At the most strategic level, I would say that the American 
people expect us to fight to win—and to win the fight ethically.
Each Service has its own unique core values, but there is some overlap among them; 
what the Services truly have in common is trust as the coin of the realm. Doing the right 
thing is one way we earn trust from our subordinates, peers, and leaders. We place such 
a paramount emphasis on trust because members of the profession of arms are truly 
most effective within high-trust organizations. The actions of the professionals who earn 
the trust of their fellow servicemembers are the way we outwardly display our organi-
zational values, while the character of our professionals in earning that trust is the way 
we measure whether those professionals have evolved and internalized the values of the 
profession—or are behaving only because they are being observed.
LES2 - Demy.indb   9 11/29/18   9:10 AM
x ethics and the twenty-first-century military professional
The earning of trust and the demonstrating of character are important internally, 
within the profession, but are most important externally, in earning the trust of the 
American people, which our profession desperately needs if we are to be effective and 
sustaining. We need the trust of the American people to fill our ranks; we want parents 
to feel proud and confident sending their sons and daughters to join us.
All of this points to how critical the relationship is between a profession and its prac-
titioners in the hearts and minds of its people, and with that comes an understanding 
that members of a profession must be loyal to their profession. We readily see evidence 
of this relationship in combat and in times of adversity, so we naturally understand that 
relationship. But we also must ask what the profession owes its professionals.
The profession owes development through growth, challenge, and support. For devel-
opment to occur, we must develop a common language to use in thinking about our 
roles in, and our relationship with, the profession of arms. A common language can help 
strengthen and build the linkages that people make to connect with and understand oth-
ers, and that understanding leads to trust.
This collection of articles helps to serve as a platform to develop our common lan-
guage, and to think deeply about ethics in this young century. I sincerely hope it helps 
you think about what you will write and share that contributes to the advancement of 
the profession—because that is the right thing to do.
Rear Admiral Peg Klein, USN (Ret.)
Dean of the College of Leadership and Ethics
U.S. Naval War College
LES2 - Demy.indb   10 11/29/18   9:10 AM
INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade there has been a concerted effort in the United States Navy and 
at the Naval War College to strengthen the Navy and the profession of arms. In 2017, 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations released the Navy Leader Development 
Framework to provide a Navy-wide structure to support comprehensive and enduring 
leader development. In commitment to the improvement of individual and team compe-
tence and character, each community within the Navy was tasked with developing a plan 
for implementation within that community.
The College has pursued this strengthening of the profession via directed studies, 
curriculum revisions, conferences, the establishment of the College of Operational and 
Strategic Leadership (and now the College of Leadership and Ethics), and publications. 
This volume constitutes part of the last-named effort.
Except for one essay (“Ethics in the U.S. Navy”), the individual writings were pub-
lished originally as articles in the Naval War College Review. They are gathered here to 
enable readers to access them in a single volume. (They are presented in their original 
form, so the authors’ identifications do not reflect current military rank or service 
status.)
Values have consequences. This is true in one’s personal life, and it is true in one’s 
professional life as well. The chapters in this book reflect the renewed emphasis on pro-
fessional ethics that has arisen and taken hold across the branches of the U.S. military in 
the twenty-first century, and notably in the Navy. They provide readers a strong presen-
tation on military ethics. They show that, as with every profession, there are standards 
that must be upheld—and questions that must be asked and answered afresh—whenever 
new policies are implemented and new technologies introduced.
Uniquely, the profession of arms recognizes that its members never can rest on 
the laurels of previous leaders or the victories of prior wars. The nineteenth-century 
Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted in his classic text Vom 
Kriege (On War) that “theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the 
realm of moral values.” Yet it is precisely when that realm intersects with the experience 
of actual warfare that military professionals are called on to maintain the high level of 
trust given to them by the citizens of their nations. They must be as ethical as they are 
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competent. America’s citizens expect members of the military profession to lead and 
operate with a strong ethical compass. When they do so, they strengthen the nation; 
when they fail to do so, they steer their profession and themselves toward rocks and 
shoals.
Timothy J. Demy, PhD
Professor of Military Ethics
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MORAL, ETHICAL, AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION OF 
SOLDIERS AND UNITS FOR COMBAT 
Brigadier General H. R. McMaster, U.S. Army 
I want to begin by thanking you for volunteering to serve our nation and humankind in 
time of war. We are engaged, as previous generations were engaged, against enemies who 
pose a great threat to all civilized peoples. As those generations defeated Nazi fascism, 
Japanese imperialism, and communist totalitarianism, we will defeat these enemies, who 
cynically use a perverted interpretation of religion to incite hatred and violence. 
The murder of more than three thousand of our fellow Americans on September 
11, 2001, is etched indelibly in all of our memories. Since those attacks, our nation has 
been at war with those who believe that there are no innocent Americans. It is those of 
you who have volunteered for military service in time of war who will continue to stand 
between terrorists who murder innocents—including children—as they do almost every 
day in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen—and those whom 
those terrorists would victimize. 
As the recent attempt to commit mass murder on a flight bound for Detroit reminds 
us, battlegrounds overseas are inexorably connected to our own security. Our enemies 
seek to enlist masses of ignorant, disaffected young people with a sophisticated cam-
paign of propaganda and disinformation. They work within and across borders. 
And our fight against this networked movement is unprecedented, for several rea-
sons. It is a new kind of threat because of the enemy’s ability to communicate and mobi-
lize resources globally. Moreover, the enemy employs mass murder of innocent civilians 
as its principal tactic. We recognize that if these terrorists and murderers were to gain 
access to weapons of mass destruction, attacks such as those on September 11th and 
those against innocents elsewhere would pale in comparison. 
As President Obama observed in Oslo on 10 December 2009, “To say that force 
may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism—it is a recognition of history; the 
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imperfections of man and the limits of reason.” He observed that “a non-violent move-
ment could not have stopped Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s 
leaders to lay down their arms.” America, he observed, has used its military power in 
places like the Balkans and today in Haiti “because we seek a better future for our chil-
dren and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ 
children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.”1 I firmly believe that the 
servicemen and -women here today are both warriors and humanitarians. 
The Army’s recently published Capstone Concept is a document that describes the 
Army’s vision of future armed conflict. It identifies a continuing need for “cohesive 
teams and resilient soldiers who are capable of overcoming the enduring psychological 
and moral challenges of combat.”2
I would like to focus my remarks on military leaders’ connected responsibilities of 
ensuring moral and ethical conduct in war while also preparing our soldiers psycho-
logically for the extraordinary demands of combat. It is likely that you will be called on 
to advise your commanders in that connection, and I thought that I might share some 
thoughts on the moral and ethical preparation of soldiers and units for the challenges 
they are likely to face in combat. 
Prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, much of the debate over the nature of 
future armed conflict focused on the importance of emerging technologies. Many 
believed that these technologies would completely transform war. They called this a 
“revolution in military affairs.” New communications, information, surveillance, and 
precision-strike technologies would permit technologically advanced military forces to 
wage war rapidly, decisively, and efficiently. We were seduced by technology. 
Yet this ahistorical definition of armed conflict divorced war from its political 
nature. It tried to simplify the problem of future war to a targeting effort. All we had 
to do was target the enemies’ conventional forces—which, conveniently, looked just 
like ours. This approach did little to prepare us for the challenges we subsequently 
faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely of the British 
army observed, 
for many military professionals, warfare—the practice of war, and warfighting—com-
bat, were synonymous, thereby misleading themselves that there was no more to the 
practice of war than combat. True, some armed forces found themselves involved in 
other operations. . . . But these missions were largely considered by many military 
establishments to be aberrations—Operations Other Than War, as they came to be 
known in British and American doctrine—distractions from the “real thing”: large 
scale, hi-tech, inter-state conflict.3 
The lack of intellectual preparation limited military effectiveness and made it harder 
for our leaders and forces to adapt to the reality of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But 
our military is a learning institution, and we adapted to the demands of the conflicts 
after the removal of the Taliban and Hussein regimes. The U.S. military undertook a 
range of adaptations, from improving our military education and training to refining 
our tactics, to investigating abuses and other failures. These adaptations derived, in part, 
from a better appreciation for the political complexity of the wars we were in—and the 
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complexity of war in general. Many of these lessons were formalized in the December 
2006 publication of a counterinsurgency manual. This manual was meant to provide the 
doctrinal foundation for education, training, and operations.4 Our forces have adapted, 
and leaders have ensured ethical conduct. Every day, our soldiers take risks and make 
sacrifices to protect innocents. 
The orthodoxy of the revolution in military affairs had conflated warfare and 
warfighting. It had dehumanized our understanding of war, ignored critical continuities 
in warfare, and exaggerated the effect of technology on the nature of armed conflict. As 
John Keegan observed in The Face of Battle, his classic 1976 study of combat across five 
centuries, the human dimension of war exhibits a high degree of continuity: 
What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to recon-
cile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of 
some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is there-
fore always a study of fear and usually of courage, always of leadership, usually of 
obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes of insubordination; always of anxiety, 
sometimes of elation or catharsis; always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation 
and misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes of vision; always of vio- 
lence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion; above all, it is always a 
study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration—for it is toward the disintegra-
tion of human groups that battle is directed.5 
Keegan was obviously sensitive to the social and psychological dimensions of com-
bat, but he argued against turning the study of war over to sociologists or psychologists. 
Keegan contended that understanding war and warriors required an interdisciplinary 
approach and a “long historical perspective.” 
If you take away one thing from our discussion tonight, I ask you to embrace your 
duty to study, as a complement to your expertise in the law of war and operational law, 
the history, literature, psychology, and philosophy of war and warfare, as well as memoirs 
and accounts of combat experiences. It is our duty as leaders to develop our own under-
standings of our profession and the character of armed conflict. But I would also like to 
talk with you about how you might help your commanders ensure your troopers’ ethical 
conduct in war and steel your units against the disintegration that Keegan observes can 
occur under the extraordinary physical and psychological strains of combat. 
Because our enemy is unscrupulous, some argue for a relaxation of ethical and moral 
standards and the use of force with less discrimination, because the ends—the defeat of 
the enemy—justify the means employed.6 To think this way would be a grave mistake. 
The war in which we are engaged demands that we retain the moral high ground despite 
the depravity of our enemies. 
Ensuring ethical conduct goes beyond the law of war and must include a consid-
eration of our values—our ethos. Prior to the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
ethical training in preparation for combat was centered on the law of war. The law of 
war codifies the principal tenets of just-war theory, especially jus in bello principles of 
discrimination and proportionality. Training covered the Geneva Conventions and the 
relevant articles of the U.S. military’s Uniform Code of Military Justice. As Christopher 
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Coker observes in The Warrior Ethos, however, individual and institutional values are 
more important than legal constraints on immoral behavior; legal contracts are often 
observed only as long as others honor them or as long as they are enforced.7 Experience 
in Afghanistan and Iraq inspired the U.S. military to emphasize values training as the 
principal means of ensuring moral and ethical conduct in combat. 
Utilitarianism and the thinking of philosopher John Stuart Mill would have us focus  
on achieving good consequences in this conflict. As the Army and Marine Corps 
counterinsurgency (COIN) manual points out, the insurgent often hopes to provoke 
the excessive or indiscriminate use of force.8 We are fighting this war on two battle-
grounds—intelligence and perception. We must—locally in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
broadly in the war on terror—be able to separate terrorists and insurgents from the 
population. This means treating people with respect and building relationships with 
people that lead to trust. And this trust leads to intelligence about the enemy. We have 
to counter what is a very sophisticated enemy propaganda and disinformation campaign 
and clarify our true intentions—not just with words but with our deeds. This is par-
ticularly difficult because the enemy seeks to place the onus of indiscriminate warfare 
on us by provoking overreactions, denying us positive contact with the population, and 
blaming his own murderous attacks on us. You know the line: if Americans were not in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, we would not have detonated this car bomb at this funeral, in the 
marketplace, at the mosque, etc. 
Immanuel Kant would say that it is your duty to ensure ethical and moral conduct in 
this war. Kant would have us treat people as ends, not means—the essence of the ethics 
of respect. Indeed, today’s wars are contests for the trust and allegiance of the people. 
Moral and ethical conduct despite the brutality of this enemy will permit us to defeat 
enemies whose primary sources of strength are coercion and the stoking of hatreds 
based on ignorance. 
This might sound a bit theoretical to you, so I would like to talk to you about your 
specific components of ensuring moral and ethical conduct despite the uncertain, com-
plex, and dangerous environments in which our forces are operating. 
Breakdowns in discipline that result in immoral or unethical conduct in war can 
often be traced to four factors. (If you are looking for a case study that illuminates these 
factors, I recommend that you read Jim Frederick’s recently published Black Hearts).9 
• Ignorance—concerning the mission or the environment or a failure to understand 
or internalize the warrior ethos or professional military ethic. This results in the 
breaking of the covenant, the sacred trust that binds soldiers to our society and to 
each other. 
• Uncertainty. Ignorance causes uncertainty, and uncertainty can lead to mistakes, 
mistakes that can harm civilians unnecessarily. Warfare will always remain firmly 
in the realm of uncertainty, but leaders must strive to reduce uncertainty for their 
troopers and units. 
• Fear. Uncertainty combines with the persistent danger inherent in combat to 
instill fear in individuals and units. Leaders must strive not only to reduce uncer-
tainty for their troopers but also to build confident units. Confidence serves as a 
bulwark against fear and fear’s corrosive effect on morale, discipline, and combat 
effectiveness. 
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• Combat trauma. Rage is often a result of combat trauma. Fear experienced over 
time or in a traumatic experience can lead to combat trauma, and combat trauma 
often manifests itself in rage and actions that compromise the mission. 
The counterinsurgency manual recognizes that ensuring moral conduct during 
counterinsurgency operations is particularly difficult, because “the environment that 
fosters insurgency is characterized by violence, immorality, distrust, and deceit.” The 
COIN manual directs leaders to “work proactively to establish and maintain the proper 
ethical climate of their organizations” and to “ensure that the trying counterinsurgency 
environment does not undermine the values of their Soldiers and Marines.” Soldiers and 
marines “must remain faithful to basic American, Army, and Marine Corps standards 
of proper behavior and respect for the sanctity of life.”10 To inoculate soldiers and units 
against the four aforementioned causes of moral and ethical breakdowns, leaders should 
make a concerted effort in four areas: 
• Applied ethics or values-based instruction 
• Training that replicates as closely as possible situations that soldiers are likely to 
encounter 
• Education about cultures and historical experiences of the peoples among whom 
the wars are being fought 
• Leadership that strives to set the example, keep soldiers informed, and manage 
combat stress. 
Applied Ethics and Values-Based Instruction 
Our Army’s values aim, in part, to inform soldiers about the covenant between them, 
our institution, and society.11 The service’s seven values of loyalty, duty, respect, self-
less service, honor, integrity, and personal courage are consistent with Aristotelian 
virtue as well as the ancient philosophy of Cicero and the modern philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant. It is easy, for example, to identify the similarity between the Army’s 
definition of respect as beginning “with a fundamental understanding that all peo-
ple possess worth as human beings” and Cicero’s exhortation in On Duties that “we 
must exercise a respectfulness towards men, both towards the best of them and also 
towards the rest.”12 The U.S. Army’s values have obvious implications for moral con-
duct in counterinsurgency, especially in connection with the treatment of civilians 
and captured enemy. 
Applied ethics indoctrination for new soldiers is perhaps even more important 
today than in the past, because of the need to differentiate between societal and mili-
tary professional views on the use of violence. In much of the media to which young 
soldiers are exposed—such as action films, video games, and “gangsta rap” music—
violence appears justifiable as a means of advancing personal interests or demonstrat-
ing individual prowess.13 In contrast, the law of war, like the military’s code of honor, 
justifies violence only against combatants. 
A way to offset or counter this societal pressure is found in the collective nature 
of Army ethics training. This is immensely important. Soldiers must understand 
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that our Army and their fellow soldiers expect them to exhibit a higher sense of 
honor than that to which they are exposed in popular culture. As Christopher Coker 
observed, “In a world of honor the individual discovers his true identity in his roles 
and [that] to turn away from the roles is to turn away from oneself.”14 Particularly 
important is the soldier’s recognition that he or she is expected to take risks and 
make sacrifices to accomplish the mission, protect fellow soldiers, or safeguard inno-
cents. Use of force that reduces risk to the soldier but places either the mission or 
innocents at risk must be seen as inconsistent with the military’s code of honor and 
professional ethic.15 
Values education can ring hollow unless it is pursued in a way that provides context 
and demonstrates relevance. While we emphasize ethical behavior as an end, we must also 
stress the utilitarian basis for sustaining the highest moral standards. Showing soldiers the 
enemy’s propaganda helps emphasize the importance of ethical behavior in countering 
disinformation. Respectful treatment, addressing grievances, and building trust with the 
population ought to be viewed as essential means toward achieving success in counterin-
surgency operations. 
Historical examples and case studies of how excesses or abuse in the pursuit of tactical 
expediency have corrupted the moral character of units and undermined strategic objec-
tives are particularly poignant. You might consider using films like The Battle of Algiers 
(1966) to inspire discussions on topics such as torture, insurgent strategy, terrorist tactics, 
and propaganda. 
Training 
Applied ethics education, however, cannot steel soldiers and units against the disin-
tegration that can occur under the stress of combat. Training our new troopers and 
integrating them into cohesive, confident teams must be your first priority as leaders. 
Tough realistic training builds confidence and cohesion that serve as “psychological 
protection” and bulwarks against fear and psychological stress in battle. As Keegan 
observed, much of the stress that soldiers experience in combat stems from “uncer-
tainty and doubt.” Training endeavors to replicate the conditions of combat as closely as 
possible and to reduce thereby soldiers’ uncertainty about the situations they are likely 
to encounter. 
Units experiencing the confusion and intensity of battle for the first time in actual 
combat are susceptible to fear. Fear can cause inaction or, in a counterinsurgency 
environment, might lead to an overreaction that harms innocents and undermines the 
counterinsurgent’s mission. In her book Stoic Warriors, Nancy Sherman quotes Seneca 
to emphasize the importance of training as a form of “bulletproofing” soldiers against 
the debilitating effects of fear and combat stress: “A large part of the evil consists in its 
novelty,” but “if evil has been pondered beforehand the blow is gentle when it comes.”16 
We must base training scenarios directly on recent experiences of units in Afghanistan 
or Iraq and conduct training consistent with Aristotle’s observation that virtues are 
formed by repetition. Repetitive training under challenging and realistic conditions pre-
pares units to respond immediately and together to encounters with the enemy, using 
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battle drills—rehearsed responses to a predictable set of circumstances. Demonstrating 
their ability to fight and operate together as a team will build the confidence and cohe-
sion necessary to suppress fear and help soldiers and units cope with combat stress 
while preserving their professionalism and moral character. 
Soldiers trained exclusively for conventional combat operations may be predisposed 
toward responding with all available firepower upon contact with the enemy. Such a 
reaction in a counterinsurgency environment, however, might result in the unneces-
sary loss of innocent life and run counter to the overall aim of operations. In training, 
we should still evaluate units on their ability to overwhelm the enemy but also evalu-
ate them on how well they protect innocents and apply firepower with discipline and 
discrimination. 
Our training should include civilian role-players to replicate as closely as possible the 
ethnic, religious, and tribal landscapes of the areas in which units will operate. As in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the enemy in these exercises blends into the population. When role 
players are not available, cultural experts should train soldiers to play the role of civil-
ians while their fellow soldiers are trained and evaluated. Using soldiers as civilian role-
players has a secondary benefit: it is very useful for soldiers to view their own force from 
the perspective of the civilian population. Exercises that include civilian role-players 
help soldiers understand better the importance of restraint and respectful, professional 
conduct. Role players and soldiers come together at the end of the exercise for an “after-
action review” to identify lessons and consider how the unit might apply those lessons to 
future training and operations. 
Cultural and Historical Training 
Because unfamiliarity with cultures can compound the stress associated with physical 
danger, ensuring that soldiers are familiar with the history and culture of the region in 
which they are operating is critical for sustaining combat effectiveness and promoting 
respectful treatment of the population. Use professional reading programs; discuss books 
and articles with your soldiers. Use lectures and film. Excellent documentaries are avail-
able on the history of Islam, as well as on the history of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Cultural training has practical applications. An understanding of ethnic, cultural, and 
tribal dynamics allows soldiers to evaluate sources of information and anticipate poten-
tial consequences of their actions. Leaders who have a basic understanding of history 
and culture can also recognize and counter the enemy’s misrepresentation of history for 
propaganda purposes. 
Perhaps most important, education and training that include history and culture 
promote moral conduct by generating empathy for the population. The COIN manual 
describes “genuine compassion and empathy for the populace” as an “effective weapon 
against insurgents.”17 If soldiers understand the population’s experience, feelings of 
confusion and frustration might be supplanted by concern and compassion. As Roman 
emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius observed, “Respect becomes concrete 
through empathy.” Cicero reminds us that a soldier’s respect must extend to the enemy 
and civilians: “We ought to revere, to guard and to preserve the common affection and 
fellowship of the whole of humankind.” 
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Leaders must also learn history to evaluate themselves and place contemporary 
operations in the context of previous experience. Examining previous counterinsurgency 
experiences allows leaders to ask questions about contemporary missions, avoid some of 
the mistakes of the past, recognize opportunities, and identify effective techniques. 
A critical examination of history also allows soldiers to understand the fundamentals 
of counterinsurgency theory and thereby equips them to make better decisions in what 
are highly decentralized operations. Soldiers need to recognize that the population must 
be the focus of the counterinsurgent’s effort and that the population’s perceptions—of 
their government, the counterinsurgent forces, and the insurgents—are of paramount 
importance. This highlights the need for soldiers to treat the population respectfully and 
to clarify their intentions through their deeds and conduct. 
While it is important that all soldiers possess basic cultural knowledge, it is also 
important that leaders and units have access to cultural expertise. Soldiers often share 
what they learn with other members of their team. So sending even just a few soldiers 
from each platoon or company to language or cultural training can have a broad positive 
effect on the organization. In a counterinsurgency environment, cultural expertise, such 
as “human terrain teams,” can help units distinguish between reconcilable and irrecon-
cilable groups through an analysis of each group’s fears and aspirations.18 
Ultimately, the counterinsurgent hopes to reduce violence and achieve enduring secu-
rity by mediating between factions that are willing to resolve differences through politics 
rather than violence.19 Cultural expertise contributes to the ethical conduct of war by 
helping soldiers and units understand their environment. This richer understanding can 
help them determine how to apply force discriminately and to identify opportunities to 
resolve conflict, short of force. 
Combat Stress 
Education or indoctrination in professional military ethics and tough, realistic train-
ing are important. However, they are insufficient to preserve moral character under the 
intense emotional and psychological pressures of combat. Soldiers and units must also 
be prepared to cope with the stress of continuous operations in a counterinsurgency 
environment; combat stress often leads to unprofessional or immoral behavior.20 
Counterinsurgency operations can be even more stressful than more conventional 
wars. Control of stress is a command responsibility. Leaders must be familiar with 
grief counseling and “grief work.” Grieving our losses must be valued, not stigma-
tized. Understand how to “communalize” grief so units can get through difficult times 
together. 
Watch soldier behavior carefully to identify warning signs. These include social dis-
connection, distractibility, suspiciousness toward friends, irrationality, and inconsistency. 
If units experience losses, get them combat-stress counseling. Watch for soldiers who 
become “revenge driven,” as they can break down the discipline of the unit and do sig-
nificant damage to the mission and their fellow troopers. Commitment to fellow troop-
ers and mission must be the motivating factor in battle—not rage. 
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Additionally, soldiers’ knowledge that they have behaved in a professional, disci-
plined, moral manner when confronting the enemy is one of the most important fac-
tors in preventing post-traumatic stress and various dysfunctions that come with it. 
Developing and maintaining unit cohesion is critical in preventing disorders associated 
with combat stress and combat trauma. As Jonathan Shay notes, “What a returning sol-
dier needs most when leaving war is not a mental health professional but a living com-
munity to whom his experience matters.” 
Military education is thin on the psychological dynamics of combat, perhaps because 
its importance becomes obvious only in wartime. You might read and discuss such 
books as J. Glenn Gray’s The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (Bison Books, 1998), 
Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character 
(Simon and Schuster, 1995), and David Grossman and Loren Christensen’s On Combat: 
The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (Warrior Science, 
3rd ed., 2008). 
Leadership 
Common to all of these efforts to preserve the moral character of soldiers and units is 
leadership. Lack of effective leadership has often caused combat trauma. Sun Tzu had 
it right 2,500 years ago, in his classic The Art of War—“Leadership is a matter of intel-
ligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and sternness.” Humaneness in the face 
of the ambiguous and difficult situations we are facing today and will face tomorrow 
will permit soldiers to remain psychologically ready, and it must be an area that our 
leaders focus on. Sternness involves ensuring that leaders are in positions of leadership. 
Emphasize leader development but do not hesitate to remove those who do not enjoy the 
trust or confidence of their troopers. 
Effective communication is vital. Explain to troopers the importance of their mis-
sion (the stakes) and make sure that they understand the higher commander’s intent 
and concept for defeating the enemy and accomplishing the mission. A key part of the 
psychological well-being of soldiers is a sense of agency, or control; preserving discipline 
and moral conduct in combat depends in large measure on it.21 It is vital that troopers 
understand how the risks they take and sacrifices they make contribute to the achieve-
ment of objectives worthy of those risks and sacrifices. Ultimately, positive feedback in 
the form of success in combat reinforces ethical and moral conduct. 
Senior commanders must establish the right climate and send a simple, clear mes-
sage continuously to their troopers: “Every time you treat a civilian disrespectfully, you 
are working for the enemy.” It is, however, junior officers and noncommissioned officers 
who will enforce standards of moral conduct. Preparing leaders at the squad, platoon, 
and company levels for that responsibility is vitally important. 
In Black Hearts, a headquarters company commander commenting on the cause of 
the horrible rape and murder of civilians south of Baghdad said the following: “Clearly a 
lot of what happened can be attributed to a leadership failure. And I’m not talking about 
just at the platoon level. I’m talking about platoon, company, battalion. Even I feel in 
some way indirectly responsible for what happened out there. I mean, we were all part of 
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the team. We just let it go. And we let it go, and go, and go. . . . We failed those guys by 
letting them be out there like that without a plan.” 
It is the warrior ethos that permits soldiers to see themselves “as part of an ongoing 
historical community,” a community that sustains itself through “sacred trust” and a cov-
enant that binds them to one another and to the society they serve. The warrior ethos 
forms the basis for this covenant. It is composed of such values as honor, duty, courage, 
loyalty, and self-sacrifice. The warrior ethos is important because it makes military units 
effective and because it makes war “less inhumane.” 
As our commander in chief observed in Oslo, “Make no mistake: Evil does exist in 
the world.” Your advice and leadership will help our forces remain true to our values as 
we fight brutal and murderous enemies who pose a grave threat to all civilized people. I 
am proud to serve alongside you. My thanks to you and your families for your invaluable 
service to our nation in time of war. 
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THE NAVY’S MORAL COMPASS
Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct 
Captain Mark F. Light, U.S. Navy
The supreme quality for leadership is unquestionably integrity. Without it, no 
real success is possible.
Dwight David Eisenhower 
The U.S. Navy has an integrity problem in the ranks of its commanding officers (COs). 
Consider these headlines: “Cruiser CO Relieved for ‘Cruelty.’”1 “CO Fired, Charged with 
Solicitation.”2 “CO of Attack Sub Fired for ‘Drunkenness.’”3 These are just a few cases 
in a recent deluge of early reliefs of “skippers.” In 2010, twenty-three Navy COs were 
relieved of command and “detached for cause,” an enormous increase over previous 
years. The trend continues: twenty-one commanding officers were fired in 2011 as of 
the end of October.4 Even more worrisome is the fact that a large and increasing per-
centage of those dismissals are due to personal misconduct, such as sexual harassment, 
drunkenness, and fraternization. Although (as far as we can tell) over 97 percent of the 
Navy’s commanding officers conduct themselves honorably, the increasing number of 
those who do not raises concerns that the Navy must address. Alarms should be sound-
ing at the highest levels of Navy leadership, but a review of recent literature reveals only 
a trickle of discussion on the subject of personal misconduct by military commanders. 
Instead of calling the service to action, a Navy spokesman said in January 2011 that there 
was “no indication that the reliefs are the result of any systemic problem.”5 
The premise of this article is that this is a systemic problem, that although the num-
ber of offenders is low, it is too high. The excessive (and increasing) number of COs 
fired for personal misconduct is symptomatic of cultural issues within the Navy and of a 
confusing ethical context in society, combined with a failure to set effectively and uphold 
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an ethical standard within the service. The Navy needs to make adjustments in priority, 
policy, training, and personnel processes in order to stem the tide of personal miscon-
duct by leaders. As a new Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ends the first year of his 
tour of command, this article opens the door for debate and reexamination of the Navy’s 
policies, standards for command, and ethical foundations. 
While the percentage of misconduct seems small, the impact is of such a magnitude 
that this issue absolutely must be addressed, and the Navy has demonstrated that it can 
remedy this type of problem. Consider that in 2003 the Navy’s aviation mishap rate was 
1.89 mishaps per hundred thousand hours flown and had hovered around that value for 
several years after decades of steady improvement. At that time the secretary of defense 
directed that we reduce the mishap rate by 50 percent, because even that small figure 
included numerous costly mishaps that could and should have been prevented.6 At the 
secretary’s direction, Navy leadership undertook a fundamental effort to improve avia-
tion safety. By 2010 the priority and emphasis given by the leadership had dropped the 
rate to 0.94 mishaps per hundred thousand flight hours, saving millions of dollars and 
dozens of lives.7 Similarly, today the number of COs fired for personal misconduct is 
too high, and we can and must do better—but doing so will require that Navy leadership 
makes it a priority.
The Data: Background
This article is based on data provided to the author by the Career Progression Division 
of the Naval Personnel Command. The data included administrative information and 
causes for dismissal of all commanding officers who were relieved while in command 
from 1999 through 2010 and for whom “detachment for cause” (DFC) procedures had 
been initiated and approved. Because of the administrative burden of the DFC process, 
senior leaders may choose not to implement it after a CO has been fired, if the situa-
tion does not require the specific funding and personnel adjustments for which formal 
detachment for cause provides.8 The actual number of COs fired, then, is significantly 
larger than the DFC numbers cited here, but no comprehensive records exist of firings 
for which DFCs are not processed. The data also listed several officers in command posi-
tions with ranks of lieutenant commander (O-4) and below, which are excluded from 
this analysis. This article is intended to address character failures in more senior leaders 
who have had sufficient time in service to understand clearly the standards of command 
and in whom the Navy had opportunity to identify the potential for these failures of 
character before their consideration for command. 
There exists a significant gap in the data concerning causes for dismissal. The sum-
mary information provided to the author indicated causes for dismissal by the categories 
used by the Navy’s Military Personnel Manual: misconduct, a significant event, unsatis-
factory performance over time, or loss of confidence in the officer’s ability to command.9 
In the 101 DFCs evaluated, every submission cited either “loss of confidence” or a “sig-
nificant event,” with not one case citing misconduct or poor performance over time. In 
some cases an explanation amplified the category assignment; open-source information 
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provided clarification in additional cases.10 Ultimately the causes for approximately 20 
percent of the dismissals for cause cannot be effectively determined from the data and 
are omitted from the analysis, but the trends are clear enough that valid conclusions may 
be drawn notwithstanding.
Although published literature on the subject is scarce, as noted, this is not the first 
study. In 2004, the Naval Inspector General (IG) conducted an in-depth review of COs 
fired between 1999 and 2004. The IG team had access to and analyzed information con-
cerning all COs fired in that period, whether DFCs had been processed or not, and so 
produced a more statistically complete picture of the situation over that period.11 That 
study is valuable today as a source of amplifying information and is used below as a basis 
for comparison. 
The Data: Numerical Analysis
Figure 1 presents the total number of DFCs from 1999 through 2010, “broken out” 
between professional causes (e.g., ship groundings or failed inspections) and personal 
misconduct (such as fraternization or alcohol incidents). For the purpose of this analysis, 
such ethical violations as cruelty and abusive leadership were grouped with the personal-
misconduct causes, whereas more generalized leadership failures, such as poor command 
climate or ineffective leadership, were classified as professional. The superimposed 
linear-regression trend lines make clear that while the rate of CO dismissals for cause for 
professional reasons is rising only slightly, there is a marked and increasing trend in the 
number of reliefs for personal and ethical causes. 
Figure 2 breaks out dismissals for cause of commanding officers due to personal 
misconduct by community within the Navy: surface, aviation, submarine, and other 
(including special warfare, Medical or Supply Corps, human resources, etc.). Each case 
is categorized by the community of the officer, as opposed to that of the command from 
which he or she was fired. For instance, an aviator serving as CO of a ship when relieved 
was grouped with the aviation community. 
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For context, officers from the aviation and surface communities each hold about 25 
percent of the total number of O-5 and O-6 (commander and captain) commands in 
the Navy, submariners about half as many. The remaining 37 percent are held by officers 
of other communities. The data seem to indicate that the surface and submarine com-
munities are largely responsible for the significant spike in 2010, when the number of 
surface DFCs for personal misconduct was nearly an order of magnitude above that for 
any previous year. As for the aviation community, although it does not show an obvious 
increasing trend, it is responsible for the largest total number of dismissals for cause and 
the largest percentage of commanding officers fired.
Figure 3 presents commanding-officer DFCs for personal misconduct by rank. About 
45 percent of Navy CO billets are for O-6s. Notably, the number of DFCs is as great for 
captains, who are generally in their second or third command tours, as for commanders, 
even though there are fewer billets in the higher rank. 
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
8
6
4
2
0
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
8
6
4
2
0
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
8
6
4
2
0
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
8
6
4
2
0
Other
Surface Submarine
Aviation
Calendar Year
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
FC
s
Calendar Year
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
FC
s
Calendar Year
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
FC
s
Calendar Year
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
FC
s
Figure 2. CO DFCs: Personal/Ethical Causes, by Community
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
FC
s
10
8
6
4
2
0
CAPT
CDR
Linear (CAPT)
Linear (CDR)
Calendar Year
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Figure 3. CO DFCs: Personal/Ethical Causes, by Rank
LES2 - Demy.indb   18 11/29/18   9:10 AM
light 19
Figure 4 compares CO DFCs with respect to shore-duty and sea-duty billets. About 
62 percent of Navy CO billets are shore duty, involving nondeploying commands based 
ashore. The sea commands are either deploying shore-based units or vessels. Both have 
similar trend lines and raw numbers. Since there are fewer sea-duty billets, the similar 
totals mean that the percentage of commanding officers fired from sea-duty billets for 
personal misconduct is higher than that for COs on shore duty. 
We have noted that not all commanding officers fired are administratively “dismissed 
for cause.” Before proceeding, it is worth discussing the actual relationship between the 
two numbers. The 2004 Naval IG study listed seventy-eight COs fired between 1999 and 
2004;12 the DFC data used for this article include only thirty-seven for that period. The 
difference is partly explained by the scopes of the studies—the IG study included O-3 
(lieutenant) and O-4 commanding officers and officers in charge (typically of very small 
units), who were specifically excluded from this analysis. Beyond that, the difference 
between the study results reflects that between the number of fired COs and the number 
processed for DFC. 
Despite the differences, this article points to trends that are consistent with the data 
from the earlier study. The Naval Inspector General reported that 36 percent of early 
reliefs occurred due to personal misconduct; this article records 42 percent of DFCs for 
the same reason, with an increase over the time span covered.13 Further, the studies are 
consistent with regard to the contribution of the various communities to early reliefs due 
to misconduct, with aviation being the most prolific and the submarine force the least. So 
while the numbers differ, a consistent and logical argument emerges that a significant and 
increasing number of COs in the Navy are being fired for personal and ethical failures. 
Academic Analysis
It is fundamental to understand that the COs fired for misconduct knew their actions 
were out of line. The IG report states that in “nearly every case, the officers relieved 
for personal behavior clearly knew the rules.”14 Interviews with active and retired flag 
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
FC
s
10
8
6
4
2
0
Sea Duty
Shore Duty
Linear (Sea Duty)
Linear (Shore Duty)
Calendar Year
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Figure 4. CO DFCs: Personal/Ethical Causes, by Duty Type
LES2 - Demy.indb   19 11/29/18   9:10 AM
20 ethics and the twenty-first-century military professional
officers reveal the same. Interviews likewise indicate that the COs who were fired did 
not feel that the rules did not apply to them. Instead, either they believed they would 
not be caught, that Navy leadership would not hold them accountable, or that their mis-
conduct was worth risking their career, or they chose simply to ignore the consequences 
entirely. All of these logic trains are flawed, and that lack of judgment in our leaders is 
of concern in itself. But the basic issue is this: Why are detachments for cause due to 
misconduct by Navy leaders increasing, and how can we encourage future generations of 
leaders to reverse the unsettling trend?
One contributor to the barrage of incidents of CO misconduct is the fact that the per-
sonal and professional standards by which commanding officers are judged have become 
stricter in recent years. This fact was highlighted by Kevin Eyer, a retired Navy captain 
and former Surface Warfare Officer, who cites a litany of cases in the 1980s in which 
abusive use of power and even alcohol-related arrests were ignored as long as the officers 
involved were effective in terms of accomplishing the mission.15 Few familiar with the 
Navy over the past twenty years are likely to dispute the point that actions once over-
looked are today grounds for DFC. 
Is it right that the standards have changed? Yes, because the mission of today’s Navy 
demands tighter standards. Captain Eyer notes that he drew his examples from the years 
of the Cold War;16 the mission of the Navy then was to be prepared to defeat the Soviets at 
sea and maintain freedom of navigation around the world. Today, the Navy’s missions go 
far beyond those objectives in complexity, including engagement, partnership, security, and 
unprecedented levels of deterrence.17 Modern technology, instant communications, and a 
twenty-four-hour news day are among the tools the Navy uses to leverage its global pres-
ence in support of those missions. But that same technology vastly increases the potential 
strategic impact of lapses in integrity by our ship captains and squadron commanders. 
Our credibility as a Navy and a nation suffers when our military leaders behave 
in ways contrary to the nation’s interests. One of the enduring U.S. national interests 
is “respect for universal values at home and around the world.”18 The most recent 
Barrett National Values Assessment for the United States identified honesty, compas-
sion, respect, and responsibility/accountability as among the qualities most valued by 
Americans.19 Drunk driving, adultery, fraud, and cruelty are not in line with these inter-
ests or values, and such behavior jeopardizes our legitimacy as we endeavor to promote 
our values around the world. Thus misconduct by a commanding officer is a mission 
failure, and offending individuals are rightfully being held accountable. 
As standards of behavior for COs have been raised, so has the likelihood of violators 
being caught. In years past, allegations of wrongdoing often remained mere allegations, 
because words alone are generally not sufficient to indict anyone, let alone a command-
ing officer. However, e-mails, security cameras, cell-phone cameras, electronic records of 
calls and texts, and “smart phones” with web access have changed the landscape dramati-
cally. As Eyer points out, subordinates have a plethora of means to document and report 
perceived offenses of their skippers.20 Furthermore, that same technology has made it 
increasingly difficult to deal with such transgressions quietly and privately; it is just as 
easy to post incriminating evidence on YouTube as to send it to the officer’s superior. 
Commanding officers who violate the trust bestowed on them can expect technology to 
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allow them to be caught and held accountable, often in the public eye. So why do some 
take the risk? 
Some psychologists contend that people’s actions may be products of their environ-
ment, and their research focuses on the extent an individual’s behavior can be linked to 
outside situations.21 Philip Zimbardo is among the camp that believes the environment 
can cause otherwise good people to become evil; he claims that the model explains the 
abuses of Abu Ghraib prisoners at the hands of American soldiers.22 Others cite the 
“Bathsheba Syndrome” (named for the object of biblical king David’s affection whose 
husband David sent to the front lines to be killed so the king could have her as his 
own), which is receiving attention in academic and Navy circles for its lesson that many 
can be susceptible to the temptations that accompany power and authority.23 Is there 
a link between the culture and environment of command in the Navy and undesirable 
behavior? 
There are clearly cultural factors that work against the service’s efforts to improve 
behavior, to raise and enforce standards of commanding-officer conduct. Historically, 
the captain of a Navy ship had to be strong and independent to maintain order among 
the crew in hostile environments and to execute missions far from home with only tenu-
ous communications with superiors. Navy regulations state that “the responsibility of the 
commanding officer for his or her command is absolute” and that “the authority of the 
commanding officer is commensurate with his or her responsibility.”24 As Lord Acton 
said in the late nineteenth century, “All power tends to corrupt and absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely.”25 The absolute authority bestowed on commanding officers by regula-
tion could conceivably breed toxic leadership traits and cruelty. The data indicate signs 
of abusive leadership—three DFCs between 1999 and 2010 were due to cruelty or abu-
sive leadership by the commanding officer—but abuse of power falls well short of fully 
explaining the broader trend of increasing misconduct.
Tradition suggests other possible explanations. The culture of the Navy is steeped 
in tales of behavior that does not fit the model to which we aspire today: drunkenness, 
bar fights, gender biases, womanizing—the list goes on. Sailors were expected to “let off 
steam” when their ships came into port, and they did. If this article were being written 
in the 1980s, there would be a fair argument that our culture promotes the behavior 
for which skippers today are being fired. But in the decades that followed, standards of 
acceptable behavior Navy-wide changed, along with standards for COs. Alcohol was 
deglamorized, and alcohol-related incidents became career ending for officers. Hazing 
ceased to be acceptable; ceremonies that had involved humiliation, degradation, and 
discomfort (chief petty officer initiations, “Crossing the Line” ceremonies) were trans-
formed into events that built esprit de corps without hurting bodies, emotions, or spirits. 
Aviation stunts and joyriding (“flat-hatting”) were no longer acceptable. Commanding 
officers were held accountable for violations of the new standards in their units. But the 
behavioral standards now in place are in competition with long-standing cultural norms; 
they increase personal accountability without addressing the cultural or character defi-
ciencies that underlie unacceptable behavior. Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman 
exemplified this smoldering cultural legacy in his lament over the death of naval avia-
tion culture.26 Furthermore, the extensive social media feedback in support of his posi-
tion from current naval officers demonstrates the power underlying his traditional 
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sentiments. The result is a small but steady tradition-fed stream of misconduct at all lev-
els—misconduct that is more likely than it once was to be detected, more harmful to the 
Navy’s mission, and more likely to make headlines when it involves a CO. 
Another relevant aspect of Navy culture is intolerance for mistakes. A recent article, 
noting that as a junior officer the celebrated Chester Nimitz ran a ship aground, postu-
lated that the future fleet admiral would not have gone far in today’s Navy, with its risk 
aversion and intolerance for errors.27 That writer obviously believes Navy leadership has 
gone too far recently in punishing errors, both professional and personal. Intolerance 
for professional mistakes is beyond the scope of this project, and we have already stated 
that personal misconduct on the part of Navy leaders must not be accepted. But the 
zero-defect mentality may cause behavioral problems in junior officers to be hidden 
or covered up, reducing the opportunity for correction, mentoring, development, and 
instruction in ethical standards. 
In addition to the culture of the service as a whole, each community within the Navy 
has its own convictions and subculture. Aviators are perceived by others as cowboys, 
rule breakers, “Top Gun” officers’ club partiers, and flirts. The aviation community, as 
noted, has the highest number of CO DFCs for personal misconduct, on average 50 
percent higher than for surface warriors. The averages fit the stereotype and culture of 
traditional naval aviation (as cited by former secretary Lehman and discussed above), 
but questions arise when the trends are examined. The aviation DFC rate has a virtually 
horizontal trend line, while the surface and submarine communities show recent spikes. 
One explanation is that the 1991 Tailhook debacle hit the aviation community much 
harder and closer to home than it did the others, meaning that “airdale” misconduct 
peaked years ago, before the period encompassed by our data. If this is true, then the 
very policies that Mr. Lehman rejected as stifling appear to have had a positive effect on 
aviation command. The ultimate cause of the absence of a significant increasing trend in 
the aviation community is not obvious in the present data, and further study is in order. 
However, the naval aviation culture, as glamorized in movies and naval history (and ech-
oed by the former Secretary of the Navy) may continue to be attractive to people with 
adverse behavioral tendencies and may be conducive to unacceptable actions, despite the 
increased professionalism seen in the community in recent years.
On the other hand, surface officers are considered stoic and businesslike. Nonetheless, 
they are seen (at least by members of other communities) as high-strung and competi-
tive—it is often said that the surface subculture “eats its young.” Cultural traits in the 
surface community include public degradation and bullying.28 These factors could both 
reflect and produce abusive leadership, and such a stressful work environment might 
lead to alcohol abuse. But of the twelve surface CO dismissals for cause for personal or 
ethical reasons, only one was due to abusive leadership, and none cited alcohol-related 
incidents. Yet in 2010 the surface community exhibited the greatest increase in DFCs in 
the Navy. (The increase was largely in the category of sexual misconduct, which will be 
addressed shortly.) The argument that rising misconduct in the surface community is 
due to organizational culture or environment does not seem to hold much water.
The submarine community, finally, is quiet, intelligent, and secretive, and its offi- 
cers mirror the platforms they operate. It is not surprising that little information can 
be gleaned from the data in this study. It may be a testimony to the submariner culture 
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that the causes of nearly half of the CO DFCs in the undersea community could not be 
determined.
Organizational culture notwithstanding, the most prevalent cause of DFCs of com-
manding officers in every community has been sexual misconduct, including inap-
propriate relationships, fraternization, and sexual harassment. Some have written that 
this phenomenon is a product of the Navy’s environment, that such failures are to be 
expected in the seagoing community, where men and women are now confined in close 
quarters for months at a time.29 Mixed-gender crews certainly present significant leader-
ship challenges. Consider the commanding officer fired after nine chief petty officers 
aboard his ship were found to be having sexual relationships with junior sailors under 
their charge, although that CO did not know about the relationships.30 But though fired 
for ineffective leadership, he personally maintained the higher moral ground and did not 
fall to the temptation of an inappropriate relationship of his own, which is why he is not 
numbered with the personal DFCs. 
The problem is not mixed-gender crews. Of the forty-two personal CO DFCs in this 
study, twenty (48 percent) involved sexual misconduct. Fewer than half involved COs of 
shipboard commands. Of those, one involved a relationship between a submarine CO 
and an officer in the Army—clearly not a product of integrated crews. The propensity 
for sexual misconduct is obviously widespread, but not because men and women deploy 
together. Whether on a ship with a mixed crew or ashore, commanding officers must 
keep their relationships in line with the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial prohibiting adultery and fraternization.31 
Failure to do so (like any other misconduct) is a violation not only of the law but of the 
character that each commanding officer is entrusted with maintaining.
We should explore the concept of character further. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf 
highlighted the importance of character (but fell short of defining it) when he said, 
“Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be with-
out one, be without strategy.”32 The Josephson Institute lists as “the six pillars of charac-
ter” trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship.33 Closely 
related to character is ethics, the set of “standards of behavior that tell us how human 
beings ought to act in the many situations in which they find themselves.”34 Intuitively, 
one who exemplifies the pillars of character is likely to act in conformance with how a 
person “ought to act”—in other words, ethically. Ethics is not religion, nor is it adher-
ence to law or cultural norms.35 It is about doing the right thing. 
Ethical decisions must be based on a standard of right and wrong, and finding con-
sensus for such a standard is especially difficult in today’s society.36 A high-ranking 
officer in the Navy’s chaplain community notes that while Navy standards have always 
been high, today’s social ethical context is confusing. For example, the media glamorize 
wealth, fame, sexual promiscuity, and self-satisfaction, while the Navy is attempting to 
promote better behavior. News agencies jump on any hint of misconduct in leadership 
but just as fervently scream foul when an institution’s standards seem too conservative 
or when they echo too closely religious tenets, of whatever faith. But in the midst of 
this confusion, the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics offers a simple question to test 
whether a given decision is ethical: “If I told someone I respect—or told a television 
audience—which option I have chosen, what would they say?”37 The will to ask such a 
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question, to embody the pillars of character even (especially?) when nobody is watch-
ing, and to allow one’s conduct to be driven by such ethical analysis is the foundation on 
which we want our leaders to be developed. 
Elevating the Character of Naval Leadership 
The Navy is holding commanding officers to a special behavioral standard, as well it 
should, but that alone will not solve the problem. Beyond merely holding COs account-
able for misconduct, leadership needs, in order to improve the quality of our command-
ing officer corps and our service, to take positive action to develop each officer’s moral 
compass and establish an ethical standard. 
Step One: Establish a Sense of Urgency 
Generating urgency has been called the first task in achieving transformational change 
in a large, complex organization.38 In my view, it requires acknowledgment of the prob-
lem, identification of the impacts, and elevation of the priority of the issue on the basis 
of a full understanding of those impacts. On the first point, the Navy has made an effort 
to be transparent and open, but it has fallen short of fully acknowledging the problem. 
Personal misconduct by COs exists in all branches of the military, but the headlines 
seem to be predominantly Navy. Clearly, Navy leaders have committed themselves to 
holding commanding officers publicly accountable for their actions, which is vastly pref-
erable to hiding them until a disgruntled subordinate posts a video online for the world 
to see. Unfortunately, beyond public firings, there has been no fundamental effort on 
the part of senior leadership to elevate the issue to a level that will produce meaningful 
change. This article, appearing as it does in the first year of the tenure of a new Chief of 
Naval Operations, is an effort to try to spark that sense of urgency. 
Step Two: Set the Standard
The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently released a memo emphasizing the need for 
all Department of Defense personnel to act ethically. “Fundamental values like integrity, 
impartiality, fairness, and respect must drive our actions, and these values must be rein-
forced by holding ourselves and each other accountable.”39 In the same vein, the Army 
has published a pamphlet, Army: Profession of Arms 2011, that explicitly stresses the 
need for adherence to an unfailing service ethical standard. It argues the necessity for 
all officers, especially leaders, to take the high moral ground in their discretionary judg-
ments. Furthermore, the Army Operating Concept of 2010 includes three pages of ethical 
and behavioral discussion and draws attention to the Army’s core values: loyalty, duty, 
respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.40 
There is no similar proclamation of ethical standards in Navy policy literature, and 
there is no parallel discussion in the Naval Operating Concept of 2010. The Navy’s core 
values—honor, courage, and commitment—are concise and easy to remember but make 
only implicit reference to ethical standards. If the Navy is to improve conduct from the 
top down, it must explicitly focus on the fundamental ethical standards that underlie the 
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behaviors it wants to promote. Unless we stress ethical standards, our efforts to change 
behavior will always fall short.
A retired four-star admiral, noting the reluctance of leaders to implement ethical 
standards specifically, suggested that there was concern that such efforts would be con-
strued as religious. But ethics are not religion. Another camp argues that the fact that 
character and ethics are “implicit” in the stated core values of the Navy is enough; one 
admiral observes, “You can’t have honor without integrity.” But if they make only implicit 
reference to character, we can expect only implicit compliance. A treatise on ethics in 
the Naval Operating Concept is unlikely to change a given officer’s behavior. But as one 
element of a Navy-wide campaign to emphasize character and set ethical standards for 
the officer corps, it might help create a shift in the mind-set and the culture as a whole, 
precisely what our service requires. Such a change will not occur unless the top level of 
Navy leadership makes ethical behavior a clear priority. 
Step Three: Improve the Metrics
The Bureau of Personnel’s Fitness Report and Counseling Record (NAVPERS 1610/2) 
is the Navy’s basic periodic evaluation—that is, the metric—for all officers in the grade 
of captain (O-6) and below. The effectiveness of the promotion and screening process is 
determined by whether the system correctly identifies officers worthy of selection—and 
perhaps more importantly, of nonselection. Our system needs improvement. Many of 
the COs fired for personal misconduct should never have been selected for command. 
Nine of the dismissals for cause cited in this study were due to alcohol-related incidents, 
and it is likely that previous supervisors of these officers were aware of their propensity 
to drink. At least sixteen DFCs were for inappropriate relationships, and while some 
of them may have been difficult to foresee, in many cases signs were likely present that 
should have been addressed. Behaviors such as cruelty, abuse of position for personal 
gain, solicitation of prostitution, and indecent exposure typically do not suddenly or 
without warning appear in an otherwise upstanding officer. Somebody knew, or should 
have known, but did not document the behavior adequately to prevent selection for 
command.
Part of the problem is the previously noted dearth of published policy on character 
and behavior in this era of ethical confusion. Further, there is almost a complete lack of 
focus on ethical training for naval officers. In twenty-two years of active Navy service, 
the only Navy training on ethics the author received was on fraud and financial abuse, 
and that used a very legalistic approach, with little actual discussion of ethics. The 
“standards of conduct” training for COs recently mandated by the CNO (in the wake 
of the firing of those involved in the “XO Movie Night” episode) is merely Scotch tape 
on the problem—a robust, durable, career-long emphasis is still not in place.41 Once 
an officer has been selected for command, it is too late to try to develop integrity and 
character. This absence of training for all officers to a set standard has led to a failure of 
leadership. Many commanding officers have shown misguided support to junior officers 
who display character flaws such as alcohol abuse or infidelity. “I did that when I was 
younger, so why should I punish them for doing the same thing?” seems to be the theme. 
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Ultimately, COs are charged with developing future COs. When character flaws 
become evident in the actions of their subordinates, commanding officers must actively 
engage the offenders. One of two responses is likely. If the junior officer admits fault, 
accepts responsibility, receives counseling, and makes corrections, the “teaching 
moment” will have been achieved. If, however, the officer disputes the details, argues, 
and deflects blame, there may be an intrinsic ethical void that must be documented. 
Rather than being friends or drinking buddies of the officers under their charge, COs 
must explicitly demand integrity from them—and mentor or document shortcomings 
appropriately. Otherwise they encourage the behavior we want to eliminate in those cho-
sen for command, which ensures the cycle will continue. 
Before throwing former supervisors under the bus for failing to document moral 
shortcomings that are doing such damage today, note that the fitness report does not 
facilitate such openness. The fitness-report system needs to be modified to measure 
explicitly what we want to see in future commanding officers. Some believe the system is 
completely broken and should be rebuilt from scratch. Some have recommended incor-
porating elements of a “360 degree” evaluation into the fitness report process—that is, 
feedback from the officer’s peers and subordinates in addition to evaluation by supervi-
sors.42 Mending all of the report’s faults is beyond the scope of this article, but some dis-
cussion on the evaluation process is worthwhile. 
Part of the fitness report’s problem is rooted in the zero-defect culture discussed ear-
lier. Even a slightly less than glowing fitness-report narrative can be career ending. It is 
very difficult for reporting seniors to make the best stand out without killing the  
runners-up, and it is extremely difficult for selection boards to determine who is best. 
The 360-degree evaluation, however, is not the answer. Its value is in the self-awareness it 
provides to officers, allowing them to compare their own views of themselves to those of 
seniors, peers, and subordinates; in the context of this article, there is no indication that  
a 360-degree format would more effectively identify officers predisposed toward personal 
conduct prejudicial to command. None of the flag officers interviewed for this study  
supported wholesale changes to the fitness report system, and all believed that the  
reporting senior is the correct person—not peers or subordinates—to evaluate the suit-
ability of officers for promotion and selection. However, something must be done in order 
to improve the fitness report’s utility in screening out adverse behavioral tendencies.
Fundamental problems with today’s fitness report system in identifying behavioral 
shortcomings are its lack of explicit evaluation with respect to ethical standards, the ten-
dency of senior officers to reward mission accomplishment and performance regardless 
of personal failures, and the fact that all officers from ensign to captain are evaluated 
on the same criteria. The fitness report grades seven quantitative performance traits: 
“Professional Expertise,” “Command or Organizational Climate/Equal Opportunity,” 
“Military Bearing/Character,” “Teamwork,” “Mission Accomplishment and Initiative,” 
“Leadership,” and “Tactical Performance.” Military bearing is the trait widely considered 
to be the category for documenting issues concerning physical fitness and body com-
position (i.e., body-mass index), although by regulation (and as indicated on the form 
itself) it also includes character, appearance, demeanor, conduct, physical standards, 
and adherence to Navy core values.43 The core values include honor, and honor (as the 
admiral quoted above noted) implies integrity. But should we have to dig three levels to 
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evaluate integrity, and should it be masked in the block regarded as concerning physical 
fitness? Not if we think it is important. In comparison, the Army’s Officer Evaluation 
Report requires input on all seven of the service’s core values as part of the character 
evaluation of the officer, including integrity and selfless service. Such specific evaluation 
of character is required to emphasize the priorities we desire in commanding officers. 
{LINE-SPACE}
Only a small percentage of commanding officers are being fired for personal miscon-
duct, but the number is too high, and it continues to grow. Like the aviation mishap 
rate in the early 2000s, the magnitude of this problem can be significantly reduced, but 
only through elevation of this issue as a standing concern by the highest levels of leader-
ship. While every flag officer interviewed for this article sees CO misconduct as an issue 
requiring attention, there does not seem to be consensus that it urgently demands trans-
formational change. I think it does.
As noted, the Navy has taken some steps. Behavioral standards for COs are tighter 
than ever. The Chief of Naval Operations has issued a personal message to all command-
ing officers outlining standards of conduct.44 A 360-degree evaluation has been included 
as part of the training process prior to assuming a command billet, as recommended by 
the 2004 Naval IG study.45 Unit command-climate evaluation results are visible at higher 
echelons of leadership. Finally, each session of the Navy Command Leadership School, 
attended by officers ordered to command billets, is addressed by senior flag officers on 
ethical behavior. But instead of waiting for officers to be screened for command before 
setting and enforcing standards, we need a fundamental, enduring shift and meaningful, 
career-long training on integrity and character. 
Several changes are recommended. First of all, leadership must elevate the priority of 
ethical behavior and emphasize the need for change—including the creation of a central 
database of every CO relieved of command owing to personal or professional failures 
(recording the specific cause for the dismissal as well as demographic data), to facilitate 
future tracking and analysis. Second, the Navy must undertake an explicit campaign to 
set standards of integrity and honorable behavior. Personal integrity should be at the 
forefront of the service’s human-capital strategy and must be reflected in policy at the 
highest levels. Consideration should be given to expanding the Navy’s core values to 
include explicit mention of character, or at least to a redoubling of efforts to develop 
the concept of honor in our service. “Honor, courage, commitment, and character” has 
a nice ring to it (though “integrity,” “humility,” “trustworthiness,” and numerous other, 
similar terms could work in the place of “character”). This campaign should include 
regular, lively, and meaningful emphasis on ethical behavior for all Navy personnel.
Finally, the officer fitness report, a powerful tool for embedding an organizational 
culture, should be modified in format and in concept to measure explicitly what lead-
ers want to see, specifically addressing character and integrity.46 This change should be 
accompanied by training for reporting seniors on ethical expectations and on the need 
to include every aspect of individuals, including personal integrity, when determining 
who is qualified for command. With this proposal, let the debate begin on the merits of 
this study, on its conclusions and recommendations, and on alternative methods of rais-
ing the bar of commanding officer behavior, integrity, and moral character. 
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REVISITING THE NAVY’S MORAL 
COMPASS
Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?
Captain Jason A. Vogt, U.S. Navy
Nobody trusts or has confidence in leaders who believe they cannot be held 
accountable for what they do.
Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., U.S. Navy 
The U.S. Navy continues to suffer from poor decision making among a small number 
of commanding officers (COs), as demonstrated by continued headlines: “Squadron 
Commander Relieved of Duty after Alleged Drunk Driving Incident”;1 “Amphib 
[amphibious force] CO Fired, Source Says Linked to Alleged Bribery Scheme”;2 “Sub 
Commander Relieved of Duty after Woman Alleges He Faked Death to End Affair”;3 
“Navy Investigates ex–Blue Angels Commander after Complaint He Allowed Sexual 
Harassment”;4 and “Navy Skipper Abdicated Command.”5 Since the publication in these 
pages in 2012 of Captain Mark F. Light’s “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” individual cases 
of Navy commanding officers making poor decisions of such kinds have continued to 
trouble Navy leadership.6 Considering that more than 2,350 Navy billets are designated 
as command positions, the infrequency of such events reflects the dedication of most 
commanding officers.7 In fact, as Vice Admiral Thomas Copeman, addressing the specif-
ics of a misconduct event as Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote 
in 2014, “In my experience [the violations] are beyond rare; they are . . . wholly unrepre-
sentative of the supremely talented men and women filling positions of leadership.”8 
While it involves overall a statistically low percentage of commanding officers, con-
tinued misbehavior reinforces Captain Light’s assessment that it is a potential integrity 
issue for the Navy. In the three years since the original article, substantial debate has 
occurred, and corrective actions have been taken by the Navy. Is it enough? Is it even 
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moving in the right direction? This article reviews Captain Light’s findings and updates 
his analysis with subsequent data; explains and assesses actions taken by Navy leader-
ship since 2011 to improve the quality of commanding officers; and explores additional 
variables in today’s debate on commanding officer behavior. Finally, the article presents 
recommendations to reduce future personal indiscretions by commanding officers.
The Moral Compass and Inspector General’s Report 2010
“The Navy’s Moral Compass” reviewed and analyzed data provided by the Career 
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command (NPC) on CO “detachments for 
cause” (DFCs) from 1999 through 2010.9 These data sorted firings into two broad cat-
egories (as resulting from professional or personal-conduct reasons), then broke down 
the latter by community (air, surface, submarine, etc.), rank, and duty type. Captain 
Light academically analyzed that material and concluded that the Navy had to accom-
plish three tasks to elevate the quality of the commanding officer corps and the character 
of naval leadership.10 
First, Navy leadership had to establish a sense of urgency, not just to deal with issues 
quickly (and publicly, to maintain transparency), but also to effect change that would 
preclude unscrupulous actions in the first place. Second, he argued, the Navy needed 
to set an ethical and moral standard (preferably in writing, as the Army did in Army: 
Profession of Arms and the Army Operating Concept of 2010) to help create a shift in the 
Navy mind-set and culture as a whole.11 Finally, the Navy had to improve the metrics, 
specifically the documentation, in periodic evaluations under the Bureau of Personnel’s 
Fitness Report and Counseling Rec ord, of potential moral shortcomings. Captain Light 
concluded with three recommendations, first that Navy leadership elevate the priority 
of ethical behavior, establishing a central database of reliefs of COs owing to personal 
or professional failures to facilitate tracking and analysis. Additionally, he urged them 
to undertake a campaign to set standards of integrity and honorable behavior. Lastly, he 
argued, the officer fitness report ought to be modified in format and concept to address 
character and integrity specifically.12
Concurrently with the original publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” the Navy 
Inspector General (IG) released a study on reliefs of commanding officers for cause.13 
Focusing on firings between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2010, the report determined 
the Navy’s overall commanding officer DFC firing rate to be low—approximately 1 per-
cent per year, with a small variance from year to year. It saw no correlation between CO 
DFCs and career paths, personality traits, accession sources, time in command, or year 
groups; however, it noted a preponderance of Navy-wide CO reliefs for personal miscon-
duct.14 In personal misconduct instances, it appears, fired COs either lacked the insight 
into their own motives and weaknesses that might have prevented unacceptable behavior 
or felt they had the power to conceal the misconduct (the “Bathsheba Syndrome”).15 
Furthermore, the study had found that implementation of four recommendations of a 
2004 Navy Inspector General DFC study had had no discernible impact on the DFC 
rate (though the recommendations themselves were valid and represented a solid 
foundation for long-term reduction).16 The 2010 report concluded with three further 
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recommendations. The first was to establish an officer leadership training continuum 
from accession through major command, a continuum under a single “owner,” to pro-
vide consistency in curriculum development and execution. Second, improved oversight 
by immediate superiors in command (ISICs) would better identify potential or ongoing 
issues earlier. Third, it recommended that the Navy enforce existing requirements for 
Command Climate Assessments and their executive summaries.17 
Actions and Reactions
Whether in response to the two 2010 publications or, as a matter of coincidence, to con-
tinued (and sometimes very public) CO failures, Navy leadership began taking steps in 
early 2011 to address the trend. Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command, recognized that the majority of detachments for cause of COs during his 
tenure had been for personal misconduct, a fact that he confronted in a memorandum to 
his subordinates and through his official Navy blog.18 This public acknowledgment was 
the first of several initiatives by senior Navy officials to instill more honor and integrity 
in the position of commanding officer.
The “Charge of Command”
By June 2011 Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), distrib-
uted a “Charge of Command”—a memorandum notifying current and prospective com-
manding officers of his expectation that each of them would meet the highest standards 
of personal and professional conduct while in command.19 Roughead’s memo addressed 
three essential principles he, as CNO, considered to constitute the heart and soul of 
command: authority, responsibility, and accountability. His document tied these prin-
ciples both to the tradition of naval command and to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which 
speaks to the standards of conduct by individuals in command.20 His successor, Admiral 
Jonathan W. Greenert, reissued and reinforced the Charge of Command, requiring serv-
ing and prospective commanding officers not only to review the memorandum but to 
sign it with their immediate superiors as a compact between Navy leadership and Navy 
commanders and commanding officers.21 This step created not only a counseling oppor-
tunity and mentoring tool but also a contract between the Navy and its commanding 
officers regarding personal conduct. 
The Command Qualification Program
Admiral Greenert further codified the process of setting standards and identifying future 
commanding officers by introducing a Command Qualification Program.22 Released in 
June 2012 with an implementation deadline of 1 September 2012, the governing instruc-
tion plainly set out policy, procedures, and basic, minimum standards for the qualifying 
and screening of naval officers for command. Until then individual communities had 
determined for themselves how to go about selecting their future commanding officers. 
This autonomy had resulted in sometimes widely varying criteria. Now, for the first time, 
the Navy applied minimum standards across all officer “designators” (e.g., unrestricted 
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line, Supply Corps) and required, among other things, that potential commanding offi-
cers be screened by an administrative board. In support of the Command Qualification 
Program, the Command Leadership School’s Command Course, required for prospec-
tive commanding officers, instituted a written test covering tenets of leadership, duties 
and responsibilities of commanding officers, and authorities as laid down in U.S. Navy 
Regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.23 
Admiral Greenert further approved a Navy Leader Development Strategy, to promote 
leader character development, emphasize ethics, and reinforce the service’s “core val-
ues.” The strategy called for a career-long continuum to develop leaders and for a focus 
on character development to help young officers prepare for command.24 The strategy 
led to the evolution of the Command Leadership School into the Naval Leadership 
and Ethics Center (NLEC).25 Aligned with the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode 
Island, NLEC now develops curriculum and performs assessment to instill the tenets 
of ethical leadership throughout the Navy; to develop and guide leaders with a strong 
sense of responsibility, authority, and accountability; and to impart commitment to the 
Navy’s core values and ethos to sailors.26 Vice Admiral Walter E. “Ted” Carter, Jr., now 
superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy but at the time a rear admiral and President 
of the Naval War College, described the establishment of NLEC as “an opportunity to 
take a more proactive approach in improving a culture of character development in con-
junction with continued command leader education” with a goal of “improved leader 
development.”27 With a consistent qualification program and a focus at NLEC on ethical 
and character expectations, clear standards and expectations are now set for current and 
future commanding officers.
Command Climate Assessments
Recent events have brought renewed rigor to the Defense and Navy Departments’ Equal 
Opportunity programs, specifically regarding race, gender, and sexual orientation and 
addressing issues ranging from hazing to harassment, assault, and fraternization. One 
measure of the program’s effectiveness is the Command Climate Assessment, a survey 
that should occur within ninety days after a new CO assumes command, with annual 
follow-up assessments during the command tour.28 The Navy’s use of the Command 
Climate Assessment to support its equal opportunity program goes back many years, 
with little change in responsibilities defined for the ISIC and commanding officer.29 
Unfortunately, over the years many commands did not fully execute the program, typi-
cally using the results largely for “internal consumption” and not making a priority to 
forward results to ISICs. This resulted in inconsistent application of lessons learned. Two 
developments have refocused the Equal Opportunity program and renewed interest in 
the Command Climate Assessment: the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and increased 
scrutiny on the military’s Sexual Assault Prevention & Response program. These issues 
have made the Command Climate Assessment a useful tool both within the unit and as 
a measure of that unit up the chain of command. 
While the Command Climate Assessment cannot alone identify CO wrongdoing  
or personal misconduct, it can warn the ISIC to pay close attention to individual 
commanding officers who may need assistance, guidance, or stricter oversight. Such 
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thoroughness by the ISIC would match the 2010 Navy Inspector General’s recommen-
dation that existing requirements for Command Climate Assessments be enforced.30 
Unfortunately, for a period after publication of the report there were no assessments at 
all; contractual issues with the company responsible for maintaining the servers involved 
prevented surveys for approximately six months in late 2012 and early 2013.31 With the 
resumption of surveys has come renewed Navy leadership emphasis: commands now 
must use a “triangulation” method, utilizing multiple sources of information (e.g., the 
surveys themselves, records reviews, and focus groups, interviews, and observations by 
command assessment teams).32 Renewed emphasis on ISIC involvement, to include  
follow-up reports on actions taken in response to assessments, should make the 
Command Climate Assessment a more useful tool in the future.
Reactions and Response
A consequence of the increasing importance of social media and “viral” networks is 
nearly immediate discussion of changes or potential changes in the way business is con-
ducted. This was the case with the Charge of Command; feedback varied from strong 
support to outright aversion. The Association of the United States Navy was quick to 
announce support: “Admiral Gary Roughead’s legacy to the nation will be an inspiration 
to the officers and leaders that will follow him.”33 Some blogs condemned the document, 
one calling the Charge of Command “a pathetic response to the real problem we have 
with COs being fired. Only a fonctionaire [sic] thinks that a bit of paper can substitute 
for solid leadership and a culture of honor and integrity—but that is the decision that 
has been made.”34 Military-interest publications such as Navy Times were quick to note 
each step to improve leadership, with requisite editorial comment. Meanwhile, each CO 
firing has continued to be a “front page” headline. Websites like SailorBob.com, a U.S. 
Naval Institute–sponsored professional forum for Surface Warfare Officers, now offer 
informal environments where members can discuss and argue about the directions taken 
by Navy leadership, debate the conclusions of various studies, and dissect each firing 
event.35 In this and other, similar forums hosted by naval warfare communities, virtual 
peer pressure offers an additional deterrent to misconduct while individual events and 
issues are deliberated. However, debate and opinion pieces do not sufficiently measure 
success. Continued analysis of commanding officer firings will be necessary to deter-
mine whether the adjustments that have been made are meaningful.
2011–2013 Data and Trend Analysis
The intention for this article was to update Captain Light’s data directly, by 
requesting DFC data for 2011 through 2013 from the source he used, the Career 
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command. However, owing to ongo-
ing official investigations and the ever-increasing scrutiny of CO firings, the data 
were not forthcoming. But comparable statistics can be collected from other sources, 
including the Freedom of Information Act. Moreover, as the topic of COs being 
removed from command has high visibility, firing events have been documented by 
not only Navy Times but numerous websites, chat rooms, and blogs.36 
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However, because not all firings result in formal detachments for cause, these 
data would be likely to identify more firings than are officially documented by the 
Navy, to which Captain Light’s work confined itself.37 It being understood that this 
difference in data sources leaves room for challenge, this research attempted to 
maintain consistency by retaining previously determined definitions and by consid-
ering all firings as potential DFCs. A list of fired commanding officers published by 
Navy Times, the most public data for 2011–13, was used as the baseline.38 A known 
disparity exists in data sets (for example, Navy Times reports seventeen firings for 
2010, NPC three), but to lessen its impact the analysis focused less on statistical spe-
cifics than on apparent trends potentially linked to Navy actions.39 
Figure 1 presents the total number of firings from 2010 through 2013. Firings 
occurring in 2010 were addressed in Captain Light’s article; the 2010 data are pro-
vided here only as a starting point. This analysis focuses on firings occurring after 
the publication of the Charge of Command. 
Using the definition of personal misconduct in the 2010 Inspector General 
report and previously established categories, removals were sorted by cause as “per-
sonal,” “professional,” or 
“unknown.”40 To make 
more specific the general 
caveats noted above, when 
NPC officially determines 
whether each removal in 
this data set is a detach-
ment for cause, several, 
those not found to be 
DFCs, may be removed. 
Additionally, when all 
now-pending Freedom of 
Information Act requests 
are resolved, a number 
will likely move from “unknown” to another category. Figure 2 breaks down firings 
for personal, professional, and unknown (or unpublished) reasons. It can be seen 
that the number of “unknowns” has increased in recent years. This is the result of 
a lack of detail provided in reasons for firing, often simply “loss of confidence [i.e., 
on the part of a superior] 
in ability to command.” 
It might be assumed that 
many firings categorized 
as “unknown” for lack of 
published circumstances 
were actually for profes-
sional reasons, for which 
the “sensational” per-
sonal failings that might 
produce detailed media 
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accounts would be absent. However, for this analysis, cases without those details 
remain “unknown.” 
Concentrating only on the firings for reasons identified as personal, the data 
trend downward from a high of thirteen in 2010 to only five in 2013. Six of the 
twelve firings during 2011 occurred after Admiral Roughead’s Charge of Command 
memorandum was published. Three of the six firings occurred within a month of 
publication, leaving room for debate whether offending actions had occurred before 
the Charge of Command was circulated. Breaking the data down by community (fig-
ure 3) does not reveal any trends or patterns, presumably because of the decreasing 
number of cases. As both Captain Light and the IG report found, no trends or pat-
terns are apparent in occurrences after the Charge of Command with respect to rank 
of the individual or whether an operational (at-sea) or shore command is involved. 
In every case involving personal failings, the transgression (misconduct, inappropri-
ate behavior, alcohol-related incident, etc.) was independent of professional require-
ments. Given the shrinking data set, therefore, it is necessary to investigate beyond 
community groups and explore individual cases for trends and linkages.
Since the Navy initiated 
steps to improve com-
manding officer account-
ability, the trend lines 
have appeared favorable 
in terms of the goal of 
reducing firings for per-
sonal misconduct. Though 
only a few years into the 
enterprise, the result is 
indicative of the effective-
ness of giving prospective 
commanding officers the 
message regarding expec-
tations of them while in 
command. Nevertheless, 
more than thirty Navy 
COs have been fired for 
personal misconduct since 
the Charge of Command was implemented. Why? This is a small number, consider-
ing the number of commands and commanding officers in the Navy, but the reasons 
why some individuals still do not “get it” merit further scrutiny. 
Previous reports asserted that organizational culture plays no role in CO mis-
conduct.41 Both the 2004 and 2010 Inspector General reports found no discernible 
correlations between career paths, personality traits, accession sources, time in com-
mand, or year groups (i.e., year of commissioning).42 However, in contrast to the 
shrinking overall number of firings per year and generally even distribution of fir-
ings across communities, one peak in recent data is worth noting as an outlier—the 
aviation electronic-warfare community, comprising Electronic Attack (VAQ) and 
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Fleet Air Reconnaissance (VQ) squadrons. The VAQ and VQ subcommunities  
account for approximately 10 percent of the Navy’s aviation squadrons.43 Since 
implementation of the Charge of Command this subculture has been responsible for 
half the aviation COs fired for misconduct (five of ten), 17 percent of all misconduct 
CO reliefs between 2011 and 2013, and the first Navy CO fired for misconduct in 
2014.44 
This anomaly could exist for any number of reasons. Given the relatively short 
time and small numbers involved Navy-wide, it may simply be an unfortunate coin-
cidence. Or there may be a cultural divergence that either was not present or went 
unrecognized during previous studies, some tendency that has developed out of 
the culture, training, and ethos of a group that is stationed, when not deployed, at 
one location (the Navy’s VAQ subcommunity and the VQ squadron where a firing 
occurred during the period reviewed are both based at Naval Air Station Whidbey 
Island, in Washington). Or possibly this is a niche that simply has not had enough 
time pass to absorb the new standards for commanding officers into its system. On 
the basis of standard patterns of rotations and promotions, the department heads 
who in 2011 witnessed their commanding officers signing (among the first to do 
so) the Charge of Command have not yet returned to be COs themselves. To know 
absolutely that every year group of every community understands and executes the 
Charge of Command may take between four and seven years—a period the Navy is 
just now entering. 
An instance that more obviously counters previous reports that organizational 
culture plays no role is that of the Blue Angels. Although the officer recently inves-
tigated for misconduct had already completed his tour in the squadron and was in a 
subsequent noncommand billet when his reassignment occurred, the causal events, 
described as his promoting a hostile work environment and tolerating sexual harass-
ment, had occurred during his tenure as CO.45 The investigation determined that 
while the CO was responsible, the organizational culture had devolved into some-
thing from a bygone era. Pornography, lewd comments, and raunchy pranks were 
widely condoned and tolerated, just “boys being boys,” all under the direct observa-
tion of the commanding officer.46 The inquiry resulted in not only the firing of the 
CO but a restructuring of the Blue Angels organization.47 
Nevertheless, neither organizational culture nor rationalization by individual 
members can excuse actions that are clearly and plainly labeled inappropriate by the 
Navy. With the implementation of the Charge of Command, misconduct by a com-
manding officer comes down to a conscious decision. None of those fired were in 
any doubt about what was right and wrong, not only in terms of Navy regulations  
but also, in the vast majority of cases, according to law, a moral code, or both. 
Mechanisms are in place—training for prospective COs by the Naval Leadership and 
Ethics Center, the Command Qualification Program, the Charge of Command, clear 
statements of the expectations for commanding officers and their immediate supe-
riors, and routine and standard Command Climate Assessments—to minimize com-
manding officer misconduct. But more can be done.
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A True, Long-Term, and Sustainable Solution
To have no commanding officers relieved for cause would not be an achievable goal; 
professional mishaps will occur that warrant holding a CO accountable. But it is not 
unrealistic to strive to eliminate reliefs due to misconduct or individual ethical failure. 
The positive actions described here are good first steps. But consistent enforcement of 
these topics and follow-up initiatives are necessary to avoid a long-term appearance 
that the Navy’s response was simply reactive, a “Band-Aid,” not a true, long-term, and 
sustainable solution. To continue to build on the gains already achieved, the following 
recommendations are offered.
Be Transparent and Consistent, Navy
When the Navy attempts to move forward, it often proves its own worst enemy. Two 
consecutive CNOs have placed the integrity of commanding officers high on their prior-
ity lists and set standards of performance. Yet the public assumption is that “Big Navy” 
has something to hide—because commanding officers are relieved without official state-
ment about whether the reasons were professional or personal. The ubiquitous “loss 
of confidence” leaves much to the imagination, particularly in a social-media and blog 
environment where the allegation of hiding details results in overall loss of confidence in 
the broader establishment. This lack of transparency is compounded each time a firing 
is not publicly acknowledged or officially tracked because it did not fit an administrative 
criterion (i.e., the financial parameters of a formal detachment for cause). 
The 2010 Inspector General report acknowledged several cases of commanding offi-
cers relieved early that it could have considered but did not because the DFC process 
had not been initiated.48 The IG investigation had no reliable way to determine how 
often COs had been detached early but quietly, as if their tours had been successful, 
when a DFC might have been more appropriate.49 Most conspicuously, in 2003 when a 
reported twenty-six commanding officers were relieved, only seven were listed by the 
Naval Personnel Command as DFCs.50 The combination of potentially inconsistent 
Navy data with Navy Personnel Command unwillingness to release a comprehensive list 
makes evident a lack of transparency concerning CO misconduct. 
The way to rise above what does or does not constitute a DFC is to call it what it 
is—a firing is a firing. Restricting official concern to reliefs that cost the Navy money 
will, in the long run, erode trust in the service and bring its integrity into question. The 
removal of commanding officers prior to projected rotation dates should be addressed 
by ISICs whether they occur for operational reasons or not.51 If a “no-cost DFC” cat-
egory is created, future studies will have a more comprehensive data set to analyze. The 
importance of dealing with all commanding officer firings was addressed in the 2004 IG 
report, though not in 2010. Such a complete listing might challenge the analysis of this 
article, but thereafter there would be a consistent basis for future analysis, discussion, 
and debate.
Compounding the appearance of a lack of transparency was the Navy’s accep- 
tance of the unavailability of Command Assessments for six months. Contractual and 
budget issues were allowed to disable a leadership tool. The 2010 Inspector General’s 
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report had stated, “Command climate assessments would be a better tool for com-
mands if there was a broader understanding throughout the fleet” of what assessments 
were and how to use them;52 not using them at all depreciated them in the eyes of the 
fleet. Additionally, the IG had found that in almost all the CO detachments for cause 
correct use of the assessments, especially accurate executive summaries, would have 
highlighted early for ISICs the behavior and command-climate problems.53 To have 
been denied the assessment process so soon after it had been identified as necessary 
was a mixed signal.
Progress toward transparency would also be achieved by a more thorough tracking 
system. In an age where baseball sabermetrics can track the actual (and even predict 
potential) performance of individual players in specific situations, the Navy ought to 
be able to track more closely the development of potential commanding officers and 
performance of current ones. Correlating data not only of firings but also leading to 
and during command tours—such as who had worked for whom over the years and 
what had been said by and about individuals in “360-degree” evaluations—might 
uncover linkages or trends not yet considered. No record now follows how subordi-
nates of COs relieved for misconduct fare in future positions or suggests whether there 
is any correlation to their own future misconduct. While developing such a capabil-
ity would be a herculean task, it would be within the mission of the Navy’s Human 
Resources community, specifically its Core Competencies of management and devel-
opment.54 Until such analysis is established and employed, public speculation, suspi-
cion, and scrutiny will continue.
Reexamine the Data
The Inspector General reports completed in 2004 and 2010 each took an objective 
look at the DFC process and came up with recommendations to address future com-
manding officer failings. For the reasons explained above, however, the picture the 
reports presented was incomplete. While it provided enough clarity for the CNO 
to determine that the Charge of Command, Command Qualification Program, and 
Command Climate Assessments were necessary, incompleteness of data may have the 
Navy chasing symptoms rather than a cure. It is time for another official Navy review 
of not just the DFC process but any and all removals of COs prior to their original 
rotation dates. A harder look at COs will produce a more complete understanding of 
the effectiveness of current and future initiatives to eliminate personal misconduct 
that results in firings.
Establish and Enforce Dissuasive (Monetary) Measures 
Despite any amount of training, formal setting of personal and professional expecta-
tions, or examples of colleagues who are relieved for their own misconduct, the risks 
may not be high enough to deter those on the edge. When a commanding officer is 
relieved for individual failures, the topic quickly appears in articles, comment sections 
of periodicals, blogs, and chat rooms. In almost every case someone offers a varia-
tion on the statement “Commander X may no longer be the commanding officer, but 
he will still get to retire with his twenty years, receive his full pension, get a lucrative 
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position outside the Navy, and other than some fleeting embarrassment he will receive 
no real punishment.” 
Command is the pinnacle of the military profession, and it is not a part-time job. It is 
not conducted only during business hours. As Admiral Roughead once said, command-
ers are duty bound to uphold strict behavioral standards, even when off duty.55 Whether 
a commanding officer’s misconduct is deliberate (driving under the influence of alcohol, 
bribery, fraternization, etc.) or results from failure to fulfill duties assigned or abdication 
of them (as occurred twice recently, with the Blue Angels and the guided-missile cruiser 
USS Cowpens), the commanding officer remains responsible.56 As in other professions, 
a leader must be held accountable when performance results in failure. In most profes-
sions failure often results in removal of professional position and credentials, pecuniary 
penalties, or both. Doctors who do not perform adequately risk the loss of their licenses 
and punitive judgments for malpractice. Lawyers can be disbarred or sanctioned for 
demonstrated inability. Even midshipmen are held accountable for failure once midway 
through their training; they owe time in service or, if they cannot complete their train-
ing, must reimburse the Navy for the education received.57 So what is the cost of the 
inability of a commanding officer to live up to the commitment he or she accepted by 
signing the Charge of Command? The Navy has often removed faltering leaders from 
authority but has not pursued financial compensation for the time, training, and trust 
invested in them.
It is time to debate the question. The Navy should create a postcommand screening 
board, charged with reviewing the details of individual firings. This board would be 
independent of the relieved individual’s chain of command and unrelated to any pend-
ing action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice resulting from misconduct. This 
board should have the power to recoup bonuses from or impose other financial penal-
ties on those who have made poor personal decisions while in command. This does not 
mean that every failed commanding officer would or should owe a financial debt to the 
Navy. For a purely professional failure, the balance might be restored by removal of the 
individual from the command; an objective review by this panel might find no further 
action necessary. But a personal failure, specifically misconduct, can be viewed as a 
breach of contract, an inability of the individual to abide by the Charge of Command. 
Many commanding officer positions are designated as meriting additional pay or 
bonuses; the financial penalty could be simply requiring the failed commander to return 
them.58 Bonuses received in command (e.g., training or specialty bonuses or flight, sea, 
nuclear, medical specialty, command-responsibility, or other critical-skills pay) could be 
considered insurance against poor decisions—refundable security deposits by the Navy. 
Each firing would have to be reviewed individually, as each commanding officer repre-
sents a different level of investment by the Navy in getting him or her to and through 
command. And just as the Navy holds a midshipman responsible for failing to complete 
the course of instruction leading to commission, so should the Navy hold responsible its 
commanding officers who fail to complete their command tours. For the more than 99 
percent of commanding officers who live within the Charge of Command and success-
fully complete their command tours the hazard is nonexistent. Individuals considering 
accepting the risk of misconduct may find in financial penalties the necessary motiva-
tion to choose better—motivation that previous initiatives have not supplied. And even 
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by preventing one firing, this option would take the Navy a step closer to eliminating 
misconduct among commanding officers.
Since publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass” the Navy has made progress to reduce 
commanding officer misconduct. Progress has been achieved not only by implementing 
new initiatives but also by ensuring that previously established guidelines are properly 
executed, resulting in a solid basis for further reducing commanding officer firings 
for misconduct in the future. Holding commanding officers to a consistent and higher 
standard is necessary if they are to achieve long-term success in the position, and until 
the number of misconduct cases is zero, the pressure must be sustained. The Navy must 
continue to strive for a high standard, improve transparency regarding its standards, 
continuously review data trends, and scrutinize those entrusted with command. And 
it must improve the process that identifies and tracks allegations when they arise—and 
then hold individuals accountable.
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MENTORING IN THE U.S. NAVY 
Experiences and Attitudes of Senior Navy Personnel
W. Brad Johnson and Gene R. Andersen 
The first operational definition of mentoring in organizations—offered by Kathy Kram 
in 1985—proposed that mentoring relationships facilitate an individual’s professional 
development through two distinct categories of “mentoring functions.”1 Career functions 
included sponsorship, exposure and visibility, coaching, protection, and provision of 
challenging assignments. Psychosocial functions included role modeling, acceptance and 
confirmation, counseling, and friendship. Considerable empirical evidence tends to sup-
port the importance of both career and psychosocial components to good mentorship.2 
Mentorships in any organizational environment tend to share the following characteris-
tics: positive emotional valence, increasing mutuality, a range of career and psychosocial 
functions, an intentional focus on the development of the mentee’s career and profes-
sional identity, and a generative interest on the part of the mentor in passing along a 
professional legacy.3 Excellent mentors are intentional about the mentor role. They select 
mentees thoughtfully, invest significant time and energy getting to know their mentees, 
and deliberately offer the career and support functions most relevant to their mentees’ 
unique developmental needs.4 
Deliberate mentorship features prominently in the Navy’s recently released Leader 
Development Strategy, a common framework for leader development Navy-wide.5 The 
strategy recognizes that people constitute the Navy’s most valuable strategic asset and 
that deliberate development of individual sailors and officers must become a top priority. 
Although mentoring is infused throughout the four core elements of the strategy (expe-
rience, education, training, and personal development), it is most explicit in the fourth 
element: “Personal development . . . includes performance evaluation, coaching, coun-
seling, and mentoring.”6 The architects of this Leader Development Strategy make it clear 
that effective mentor-leaders focus attention on the individual development of junior 
personnel. 
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In a 2010 article in the Naval War College Review, we summarized the empirical evi-
dence lending strong support to the benefits of mentoring relationships for junior per-
sons fortunate enough to experience them in any organizational context.7 An updated 
review confirms that mentoring matters. Hundreds of rigorous studies, meta-analyses, 
and other quantitative reviews make it clear that those who report having been mentored 
accrue a number of reliable benefits in comparison with those not mentored.8 Across 
disciplines and organizations, mentoring is consistently associated with greater work 
satisfaction and performance, higher retention, better physical health and self-esteem, 
positive work relationships, stronger organizational commitment, career motivation, 
professional competence, and career recognition and success.9 
Mentoring in the military is no exception.10 The few existing studies on the preva-
lence and efficacy of mentorship among active-duty personnel reveal that having a 
mentor while in uniform tends to bolster satisfaction with one’s military career, provides 
a range of important career and psychosocial advantages, and heightens the probabil-
ity that mentored service members will in turn mentor others themselves. In spite of 
these findings, the term “mentoring” tends to evoke a range of reactions among service 
members today. There are many factors at play here. These include miscommunica-
tions caused by conflicting definitions of mentoring, formal mentoring programs that 
are sometimes perceived as onerous administrative burdens (versus culturally accepted 
and integrated mechanisms for developing junior personnel), and lingering perceptions 
among some that mentoring connotes favoritism and unfair advantage.11 There is also 
some evidence that although military personnel want and value mentorships, they resist 
any program that attempts to legislate or formalize relationships.12 
It is easy to appreciate the Navy’s quandary with regard to formal mentoring programs. 
On one hand, there is considerable evidence that informal mentorships (those that emerge 
naturally through mutual initiation and ongoing interaction, free of external intervention 
or planning) result in stronger outcomes for mentees than are found for mentees formally 
assigned to mentors.13 In most organizational contexts, both mentors and mentees appear 
to seek out mentorship matches on the basis of similarities, shared interests, and frequent 
positive interactions. Two scholars in this field, Belle Ragins and John Cotton, have nicely 
described the sometimes-unconscious process at work in senior personnel as they gravitate 
toward junior members of the organization: “Informal mentoring relationships develop on 
the basis of mutual identification and the fulfillment of career needs. Mentors select proté-
gés who are viewed as younger versions of themselves, and the relationship provides men-
tors with a sense of generativity or contribution to future generations.”14 Nonetheless, there 
appear to be problems associated with compelling people to participate in mentorships. In 
light of the well-documented success of informal mentoring in the business world, many 
organizations—including the U.S. military—have moved to formalize the process. Planned 
and instigated by organizations, formal mentoring programs involve some process for 
matching or assigning dyads as well as some level of subsequent oversight and evaluation.15 
In contrast to informal mentorships, formalized relationships tend to be somewhat less 
emotionally intense, more visible within the organization, focused on specific developmen-
tal goals, and confined to predetermined periods of time.16 
From these findings, it is easy to conclude that organizations should let nature take 
its course when it comes to mentoring, hoping that enough informal mentorships will 
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evolve to meet the needs of junior personnel. But here is the rub: when an organization 
relies exclusively on chemistry and the informal connections that may develop between 
junior and senior personnel, fewer mentorships develop. That is, organizations that cre-
ate some structure for facilitating mentor-mentee matches have more junior members of 
the community getting mentored. Of course, the best structure for a specific organiza-
tion may not include a broad mandatory program; at times, voluntary programs and 
initiatives to stimulate and reward good mentoring are the best fit. 
In an earlier article, we highlighted several lingering questions about mentoring 
in the military. One of these is the question of the perceived value of both mentoring 
generally and formalized mentoring programs specifically among leaders in the fleet. 
Although the recent Leader Development Strategy indicates attention to mentorship at 
the highest levels of Navy leadership, we wondered how “deck plate” officers and senior 
enlisted perceive mentoring in the Navy.17
The Naval War College Mentoring Study
In light of the relatively sparse evidence illuminating mentoring in the U.S. Navy, and 
in an effort to assess the attitudes of officers and senior enlisted regarding formal men-
toring programs, we conducted a multimethod study of mentoring among 149 Navy 
personnel attending senior leadership courses at the Naval War College (fifty-five 
officers, ninety-four senior enlisted). All study participants consented to taking part. 
Participants were enrolled, variously, in four professional development courses: the 
Command Master Chief / Chief of the Boat Course (CMC/COB, n = 9); the Senior 
Enlisted Academy course (SEA, n = 85); Command Leadership School (CLS, n = 32); or 
the Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC, n = 23). Participants responded to a brief, 
four-page survey requesting demographic data, experience relative to mentoring in the 
fleet, and perspectives on mentoring programs in the Navy. A smaller sample of partici-
pants was randomly selected for participation in four course-specific focus groups on 
the topic of mentoring in the Navy.
Among the 149 participants, twelve were women. The mean age was forty years, and 
the average length of naval service was twenty years. Self-reported ethnicities were 110 
white (75.3 percent), nineteen black (13 percent), ten Hispanic (6.8 percent), and five 
Native American / Pacific Islander (3.4 percent). Eighty-five percent of enlisted partici-
pants were either E-8 or E-9 (that is, senior chief or master chief petty officer), while 89 
percent of officers were of the pay grades O-4 to O-6 (lieutenant commander to captain). 
Using a five-point scale (1 = Extremely Dissatisfied, 5 = Extremely Satisfied), we asked 
the participants to rate their overall level of satisfaction with their Navy careers. The 
mean satisfaction rating was 4.6 (enlisted = 4.7, officer = 4.5). 
A full 91 percent of our sample reported having had at least one significant mentor 
during their Navy careers (enlisted = 94.7 percent, officer = 85.5 percent). On average, 
participants reported 3.5 important mentors during their naval careers. By and large, 
mentors had been men (95 percent) and in nearly all cases had been older than par-
ticipants (91.2 percent), by an average of nine years. Ninety-three percent of mentors 
had been senior naval officers, and a full 81 percent had been in participants’ chains 
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of command. Strikingly, a full 55 percent of officer participants reported that their pri-
mary mentors had been their commanding officers; this was true for only 1.2 percent of 
enlisted participants. On average, participants reported that their primary mentorships 
in the Navy had lasted for 4.7 years. 
One section of the survey inquired about who had initiated the mentorship, fol-
lowed by a narrative question asking those participants who had had primary mentors 
to “describe how the mentor relationship began.” On the issue of relationship initiation, 
most indicated that the relationship had been initiated by the mentors (49.3 percent). 
Representative narrative responses include the following: “My mentor identified me as 
someone with potential and engaged in providing me advice and counseling. Once ini-
tiated, I felt comfortable seeking advice as I faced challenges”; “He asked me about my 
goals, gave me direction on a daily basis, let me know my strengths and weaknesses”; 
“My mentor took an interest in me. He saw potential and helped me to see it”; and “I 
was required to return to a different career field and this person took an interest in me. 
He formally trained me, took ownership, and followed up with calls and emails on a 
regular basis.” 
In other cases, the relationship was mutually initiated (32.8 percent): “Ours was a 
senior/subordinate relationship involving mutual interests, career and personal goals”; 
and “I was the Captain’s aide and after a few weeks in that capacity, a mentorship devel-
oped. I still seek his advice 6 years after that job ended.” 
In a smaller proportion of cases, mentorships were initiated primarily by the mentee 
(14.2 percent): “I recognized this person as an example of what I wanted to become. He 
displayed my goals. All I had to do at that point was ask him to be my mentor”; “I asked 
for guidance on how to broaden my horizons. I kept going to him when I no longer felt 
challenged and needed something new”; and “I sought him out through informal talking 
and asking selection board questions.” 
Only 3.7 percent of our participants indicated that the mentor-mentee match had 
been formed in the context of a formal mentoring program. These findings suggest that 
in 82 percent of all mentorships reported by participants, the relationships had been ini-
tiated primarily as a result of the mentors’ interest in and attention to the mentees.
We asked our participants to rate their level of agreement (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree) with the proposition that several specific mentoring functions had been 
evident in their primary mentorships. We list the functions in the table by strength of 
participant endorsement. 
These results indicate that excellent mentors in the fleet are active and deliberate in 
the roles of advocate, teacher/trainer, and career adviser. Moreover, mentors are consis- 
tently viewed as providing the personal acceptance, support, and encouragement that 
bolster the professional self-esteem of mentees. The fact that helping mentees bypass 
bureaucracy or obtain choice assignments are the mentor functions least frequently 
endorsed suggests that the perception of mentoring as mere favoritism, creating unfair 
privilege for a few, is not prevalent in the Navy.
To amplify further the behaviors of effective mentors, we asked mentored partici-
pants to respond to the following question: “Please describe an event or experience from 
the mentoring relationship which best illustrates how you benefitted from being men-
tored.” Responses fell into several consistent categories, including imparting wisdom/
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perspective, career advocacy / exposure / challenge, personal counsel, support during 
adversity, and provision of a model/exemplar. 
Responses illustrating the value of a mentor imparting wisdom in the form of a long-
term view of one’s naval career included these: “My mentor helped me learn to think 
strategically regarding the development of my career. She guided me into a course of 
instruction to help ensure future success in the Navy”; “My mentor gave me a glimpse 
of the road or path that I needed to take to achieve my personal and professional goals”; 
“He discussed a future job that I was not interested in but my community had offered 
me. His long term view helped direct my course”; “My mentor took an active role in 
ensuring that I chose a follow-on assignment that was conducive to career development”; 
and “He assisted me by guiding me to college and definitely changed my decision- 
making process.” 
One of the most prevalent response categories highlighted the value of mentor advo-
cacy, exposure, and challenge: “I didn’t fully understand what I was capable of. My men-
tor assigned me to a job that was out of my area of expertise and challenged me to get 
out of my comfort zone. Through this experience I learned another critical component 
of my duties and it made me an expert outside my field—I still have that confidence to 
tackle the jobs that I haven’t already mastered”; “My mentor gave me a chance to dem-
onstrate what I could do, then put his money where his mouth was by writing a strong 
recommendation letter to the screening board that got me selected”; “He pushed me to 
take challenging job assignments. Some of the assignments were given to me without 
Mentor Function Mean
Advocated on my behalf 4.57
Developed my military skills 4.55
Enhanced my military career development 4.46
Offered me acceptance, support, and encouragement 4.45
Provided direct training or instruction 4.17
Increased my self-esteem 4.15
Increased my visibility/exposure within the Navy 4.14
Enhanced my creativity and problem-solving skills 3.96
Developed my personal ethics and professional values 3.83
Provided emotional support/counseling 3.82
Assisted in establishing professional networks 3.77
Served to protect me 3.64
Provided me opportunities (choice assignments) 3.50
Helped me bypass bureaucracy 3.03
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me having to ask for them”; “He recognized my abilities, pushed for recognition of my 
achievements and was instrumental in getting me the jobs I needed for career progres-
sion”; “Multiple times, when a high visibility problem came up, he would pick me to go 
with him to fix it. The amount of experience and recognition he provided is unmeasur-
able”; and “My mentor exposed me to a network of senior leaders and encouraged me to 
pursue more senior positions and get out of my normal comfort zone.” 
Personal counseling and support constituted a third category of participants’ reflec-
tion regarding their mentors’ most salient mentoring behaviors: “I had a hard time 
adjusting to the Navy because I had been discriminated against on a constant basis. He 
showed me how to adapt”; “My mentor spent numerous hours guiding me on handling 
personal issues, keeping perspective, and problem-solving work relationship issues”; “She 
offered me acceptance, support, and encouragement”; “When I was going through a per-
sonal crisis about my career, he took the time to listen and give me honest and thorough 
advice”; “He was there for me personally when I went through a tough divorce”; “He 
has a way of helping me work through an issue and eventually lead me to the answers 
I already had for myself ”; and “My mentor taught me to control my emotions and self-
reflect to be more aware of my surroundings and how to be a professional.”  
Related to personal counsel was a category of responses specifically reflecting on the 
value of the mentor’s support and encouragement during moments of great professional 
difficulty: “I was passed over for promotion. Interaction with my mentor provided the 
support and recommendations needed to improve my chances for the next look, result-
ing in promotion”; and “When I wasn’t selected for O-5, my mentor provided the coach-
ing and visibility needed to successfully select in the next cycle.”
A final category of participants’ responses to our query about salient examples of 
their mentors’ behavior in the mentoring role had to do with the value of a powerful 
role model and professional exemplar: “My mentor (the CO [commanding officer]) 
led by example. His work ethic and leadership were worthy of emulation”; “He used his 
prior mistakes and experiences to give me food for thought”; “I had the opportunity to 
accompany this officer as part of a small team conducting an investigation, during which 
I had an opportunity to observe and learn about his approach to leadership, ethics, and 
professionalism in a very concentrated manner”; “He taught me how to be a better sailor, 
I wanted to emulate him”; and “I was always yelling at subordinates. He sat me down and 
told me how to treat people, but more than that, he showed me by his example.” 
When we asked our officers and senior enlisted personnel to provide overall assess-
ments of how important their primary mentor relationships had been to them both 
professionally and personally, the results were striking. Using the same five-point scale 
(1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree), mean ratings for professionally important 
(4.7) and personally important (4.4) were quite high and similar for officers and enlisted. 
Moreover, our participants strongly endorsed the value of mentoring for the Navy. When 
asked, “Overall, how important is effective mentoring to the development of future Navy 
leaders?” (1 = Not Important, 5 = Extremely Important), the mean rating for enlisted 
was 4.8 and for officers, 4.5. 
We also asked our participants whether they had served as mentors to junior mem-
bers of the naval service. A full 95 percent indicated they had mentored, on average, 
twenty individual mentees during their naval careers. 
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A final item included on our survey was this: “Many Navy commands now have 
formal mentor-protégé matching programs. In your experience, how successful are 
these programs?” On a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Not Successful) to 5 (Extremely 
Successful), the mean rating was 2.5 (enlisted = 2.33, officer = 2.8), indicating that 
formal matching efforts tended to be viewed as somewhat unsuccessful. The survey 
then solicited narrative responses regarding why formal mentoring programs should 
or should not be incorporated into the Navy’s plan for the development and training of 
future leaders. Among officers, twenty-eight of fifty-two narrative responses were nega-
tive regarding the value of formal programs, while thirteen responses were positive; the 
rest were neutral in valence. Among enlisted participants, fifty-four of eighty-six narra-
tive responses were negative, fifteen were positive, and the remainder were neutral. In 
light of the similarity of the comments, we combined the groups in the following catego-
rization of narrative themes. Among the comparatively small number of positive com-
ments, the following themes were salient.
Mentoring Prevents Junior Personnel from Getting Overlooked 
“There are a lot of lost sailors, too many of them fall through the cracks because they did 
not get the proper mentoring”; “With today’s new recruits, they need to have the guidance 
to ensure they are directed in their careers; Sailors need a ‘sea daddy’ to keep them on 
track and let them know when they have gone off it!”; and “Formal programs are especially 
useful for junior enlisted personnel who might otherwise be overlooked or forgotten.”
Mentoring Is Critical for Career Development
“A formal program could ensure that others receive the same benefit that I received, 
I can honestly say that I would not be where I am today without the mentorship I 
received”; “These programs help sailors understand the long-term consequences of 
actions and inactions”; and “Formal programs will mostly help convince those who 
would not ordinarily seek out mentoring that they can benefit from it. A mentor can 
teach a sailor from his/her experiences therefore eliminating the trial and error aspect, 
allowing fewer mistakes and more efficient learning.”
Formal Programs Hold Leaders Accountable 
“I think formal programs should be incorporated because it will hold senior leaders 
accountable for actions or lack thereof ”; “Formal programs are necessary to jump start 
mentoring throughout the various Navy communities”; “It is probably good to have for-
mal programs, but if leaders were doing their jobs well, mentoring would be inherent in 
the current process”; and “This should be force fed because some people won’t take care 
of their sailors.” 
Mentoring Is Crucial for Retention 
“One word, ‘retention’!”; “These programs offer a sound basis for developing better sail-
ors for the future of the Navy”; “In order for us to maintain, sustain, and continue to be 
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the best, we must invest wisely in our future”; and “Mentorship is important for develop-
ment of future leaders.”
The majority of narrative comments expressed strong concern about the rationale, util-
ity, and long-term value of formally assigned mentorships. As in the case of the positive 
themes, we identified four salient negative themes in participants’ responses. We list the 
four themes below with a representative sample of participant comments. 
Not All Senior Personnel Make Effective Mentors 
“Quite frankly, some people should not be mentors and to force them into a mentorship is 
absolutely ludicrous”; “Formal programs would force officers unsuited for mentorship into 
that job”; “Mentoring programs are promising but not everyone is qualified to be a mentor”; 
and “Not everyone is or could be a mentor and they should be identified through a vetting 
process. Formal programs will make people mentors who do not even care. Assigning the 
wrong person deters sailors from seeking good mentoring matches in the future.”
Forcing Matches Undermines the Value of Mentoring
“A formal program is not required, if people aren’t inclined to mentor on their own, the 
value of the mentorship won’t be that high”; “The chain of command—when functioning 
properly—already provides formal mentoring”; “Like a forced marriage (formal) ver-
sus a traditional marriage (couple decides)”; “To force something on someone is rarely 
effective”; “You cannot fabricate a relationship between two people”; “If you make it an 
instruction, it loses the spirit and value of old fashioned mentoring”; “Forcing mentor-
ship in any organization will result in poor quality”; and “Mentorship should be encour-
aged by leadership, initiated by seniors, but never forced on juniors. Some individuals do 
not want and will not benefit from a formal program.”
Quality Mentoring Hinges on the Perception of Choice
“A mentor chooses you or you choose a mentor, if you assign them you end up with 
pairs that have nothing in common or don’t even like each other”; “I should choose who 
I want to emulate, don’t choose for me!”; “Formal programs fail because it is difficult to 
match mentors and protégés of similar mind and temperament—often the relationship 
is more meaningful and lasts longer if they find each other naturally”; “Nothing beats 
finding a mentor you connect with personally”; “If there is a specific formula that suc-
cessfully promotes mentoring, I don’t think it has been discovered—mentoring involves 
chemistry, not a formal assignment”; and “A mentor needs to be someone a particular 
sailor looks up to, respects, and admires.”
Formalizing Mentorship Creates an Onerous Administrative Burden
“Formal programs translate into more busy work without achieving the goal”; “I believe 
formal programs are disingenuous and often only a paper chase”; “A formal program 
would add an administrative burden and create a ‘not my job’ scenario because some 
senior people would then have the excuse, ‘I’m not his assigned mentor’ and blow off 
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their jobs as leaders, educators, and mentors”; “This program will be a paper tiger”; “Just 
because it’s on paper doesn’t mean that real mentoring is occurring”; “I am skeptical of 
a big Navy program to enforce something as personal as mentoring”; “Formal program 
= check-in-the-box mentality”; “Now, the program will be inspected during inspection 
visits and lead to gundecking [falsifying results]”; and “Two words—paper drill.” 
To understand more fully the experiences of participants with formal mentoring pro-
grams in the Navy, we conducted four focus groups with volunteers from the four lead-
ership training courses mentioned earlier. Focus groups ranged in size from eight to 
twenty-three, and the duration of sessions ranged from forty minutes to one hour. The 
primary question posed to each group was: “Are formal mentoring programs (programs 
that involve matching mentors with mentees) a good idea for the Navy? Why or why 
not?” In most cases, our participants reflected on this question through the prisms of 
their own experiences with formal mentoring programs in the fleet. One member of the 
interview team took verbatim notes of the interviews. Participant responses were later 
grouped according to theme. Once again, negative comments tended to outnumber by 
far comments affirming a formal program. 
On the positive side, focus-group participants emphasized that they highly value 
the concept of mentorship (“The concept of mentoring is as popular and patriotic as 
motherhood and apple pie. Everyone likes it and understands in a fundamental way 
what it is”) and many believed that the Navy already has a culture that values mentorship 
(“We already do have some culture of mentoring . . . why not just improve that culture 
without coming up with an instruction?”). Some recommended that merely reinforcing 
excellent mentoring might be preferable to legislating it (“Drive it into the culture by 
rewarding and reinforcing it. Mention it on the fitrep [fitness report], ‘is a good men-
tor.’ Reemphasize it at various training and education waypoints along the way in one’s 
career”). Several were adamant that mentorship should be nested under the umbrella 
of leadership and the general leadership expectations of all officers and senior enlisted 
personnel. (“Chiefs have been mentoring for years—it’s leadership, not mentoring. When 
you make mentoring management and not leadership, you have problems”; “Mentoring 
is good, but mandatory mentoring is a crutch for commands with weak cultures of 
development”; “In my last command, we scrapped the formal mentorship program and 
made it the responsibility of the chiefs and division officers to get the deck plate leader-
ship done”). 
Finally, there was a perception by a few participants that formal mentoring programs 
were intended specifically for minority-group sailors: “The proposed instruction makes 
it sound like we should focus on minority groups, which suggests that this is another 
equal opportunity program”; and “This is never clearly addressed by any instruction but 
there is a strong implication that you should be mentoring minority sailors or women to 
enhance diversity.” 
The majority of our focus-group participants acknowledged that any formalized men-
toring program is likely to meet with resistance (“As soon as you say ‘mentoring’ you get 
a big sigh and resistance”; “If the Navy program is purely programmatic, not authentic, 
and if you force pairings, that is a recipe for disaster”; “Don’t create something that 95% 
of leadership disagrees with!”; “Nobody thinks mentoring should be formalized”). They 
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further emphasized that any formal program is quickly perceived as onerous in the fleet 
(“When folks in the fleet hear they are going to be held accountable for mentoring then 
it gets oppressive and people don’t do it for the right reasons”; “Oh gee whiz, another 
program, another three-ring binder, another report to generate that someone may or 
may not read”; “I was mentorship coordinator on a carrier, we had an actual form that 
both [mentor and mentee] had to sign that included the date and time we met each 
week. Nobody liked the mechanistic, mandatory aspect”). 
As in the narrative survey responses, our focus-group participants were cognizant of 
the problem inherent in the assumption that anyone can mentor effectively (“Some make 
good mentors and some don’t have what it takes to be effective in this role. It’s the same 
with selecting sponsors in a command. You want your best reps to do that. We need to 
do the same with mentors, pick your very best people and put them in the mentor role”; 
“I’m sorry, but there are some folks I don’t want talking to our junior guys”). Several 
indicated that mentor training should be a paramount concern (“Lack of training for 
mentors is a real problem. People need to be prepared for mentoring, this is a barrier to 
effectiveness”; “We don’t understand the complexity of mentorship. We don’t take time 
to train people”). One area in which training deficits created problems was failure to bal-
ance one’s mentoring and gatekeeping or enforcement roles with mentees appropriately 
(“These programs can undermine trust when a ‘mentor’ reports significant concerns 
about a mentee up the chain of command. In my command, this resulted in separation 
from the Navy for one sailor”). Balancing multiple roles with mentees may require a spe-
cific skill set and training for competence in the mentor role.
Focus-group participants also identified the need for “big Navy” flexibility and toler-
ance for the unique incarnations of mentoring programs in specific communities: “The 
cookie-cutter approach won’t work with the different communities and ranks. Tailor 
the program so that each command can use its structure and strengths”; “The question 
is how can various commands go about mentoring informally so that everyone has the 
opportunity for mentoring.” 
A final theme had to do with concerns about assessing mentoring in the fleet. Some 
participants were concerned that the “need” for mentoring programs had not been 
established (“Why are we doing this? Is it really needed? Did anyone check to find out 
how much mentoring is going on without a formal program?”). Others noted the dif-
ficulty inherent in evaluating unique outcomes associated with mentoring programs 
(“Mentoring outcomes are hard to measure. Many things contribute to success, mentor-
ing is just one element”). 
Intentional and Proactive Mentors
This is the first empirical snapshot of mentoring in the U.S. Navy since the proliferation 
of compulsory matching programs nearly a decade ago. Within our sample of senior 
enlisted and midgrade officers, 91 percent reported having had at least one significant 
mentor during their careers in the Navy. On average, participants reported three signifi-
cant mentorships. These numbers are consistent with data from retired flag officers.18 
As in previous studies of mentoring in the Navy, participants in our study reported that 
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their primary mentors had been crucial for them both personally and professionally; 
they overwhelmingly endorsed quality mentoring as of critical importance for the future 
of the Navy. A full 95 percent of our participants were already active mentors them-
selves, counting on average twenty mentees during their careers thus far. 
In the vast majority of mentor relationships, the mentor himself or herself had been 
instrumental in initiating the relationship. In approximately half of cases, the mentor had 
been the primary initiator, while an additional one-third of relationships had resulted 
from mutual interest and initiation. The fact that senior enlisted and commissioned 
mentors had been instrumental in launching 82 percent of the mentoring relationships 
reported by our participants is striking. With only 3.7 percent of mentorships born of 
formal mentoring programs, these data suggest that Navy leaders are intentional and 
proactive when it comes to reaching out to junior personnel and instigating meaningful 
mentoring relationships. It is particularly noteworthy that more than half of the officers 
in our sample reported that their own commanding officers had become their most sig-
nificant career mentors. 
What do effective mentors “do”? Participants in this study reported that strong advo-
cacy, direct instruction and development of military skills, career guidance, acceptance, 
support, and encouragement all loomed large among the most important mentor func-
tions. Reports of salient mentoring experiences confirmed these ratings. Participants 
recalled examples illustrating the value of imparting real-world wisdom, career advocacy, 
exposure and visibility within the community, personal counsel, challenge, and deliber-
ate role modeling. In contrast, our mentees were least likely to report that protection, 
help in bypassing the normal channels, or preference for choice assignments had been 
important elements of the mentorship. This evidence seems to refute concerns that men-
toring is equated with special privilege and unfair advantage in the military.19 
The most important contribution of this study was a multimethod exploration of 
participants’ perceptions of the value of formalized mentoring programs in the fleet. 
Overall, both officers and senior enlisted participants were between neutral and some-
what negative in their assessments of formal mentor-mentee programs—particularly 
those that are mandatory. Both survey and focus-group responses consistently raised 
concerns about the practice of requiring all senior personnel to mentor. Experience sug-
gests that not everyone has the interpersonal and technical competence to serve effec-
tively in the mentor role. Moreover, our participants expressed concern that marginal 
or incompetent mentorship may do more harm than good. Forcing sailors to participate 
in assigned mentorships—particularly in the absence of a thoughtful and participatory 
matching process—was seen as quite misguided. Because perceptions of choice loom 
large in determining whether any relationship is likely to succeed, participants were con-
cerned about haphazard or superficial approaches to the pairing of mentors and men-
tees. Finally, study participants were loud and clear in their objections to any directive 
that burdened commands with yet another paper chase to be scrutinized during inspec-
tions. As others have warned, mandatory formal programs run the risk of undermining 
the joy and motivation associated with giving to the next generation, through the art of 
mentorship.20 
On the basis of the foregoing results, we offer the following recommendations for 
consideration by Navy leaders. First, it is imperative that the Navy fully implement its 
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Leader Development Strategy, specifically core element number four, personal develop-
ment. This element focuses attention on individual strengths and weaknesses, personal 
reflection, evaluation, and growth in the context of competent coaching and mentoring 
relationships with senior personnel. Judging from the results of this study, mentoring is 
already taking place in the fleet for many officers and enlisted personnel, and our sample 
rated mentoring as exceptionally important for the future of the Navy. The challenge in 
the future will be to increase attention to mentoring as a salient leader competence.
Second, we recommend that local commanding officers approach formal mentoring 
programs thoughtfully, always with attention to the desired outcomes and structures that 
best align with the current command culture. In our previous explorations of mentor-
ship in the military, we have cautioned against programs for programs’ sakes and instead 
have encouraged leaders to enhance the culture of mentoring and the preparedness and 
commitment of personnel to mentor.21 So, rather than formal programs with mandatory 
matching of mentors and protégés, leaders might explore voluntary traditional one-to-
one matching programs, “team mentoring” structures in which a “master mentor” meets 
routinely with a small cohort of protégés, and “mentoring constellations” in which per-
sonnel are coached and mentored to create effective networks of career helpers—both 
inside and external to the command. The key is that some vision for what mentoring can 
and should achieve drive the development of a mentoring structure.
Third, members of our sample were quite clear in their assessment that not all senior 
Navy personnel are likely to be effective in the mentor role. This finding highlights the 
critical importance of preparation and training in the art and science of mentoring as 
Navy personnel progress through the leader pipeline. Because not all service members 
have positive mentor role models, and because relationship skills do not come easily for 
some, leaders must provide consistent and high-quality training for mentorship and, 
when formal mentoring programs exist, thoughtfully recruit master mentors with track 
records of excellence in the mentor role. 
Finally, it is imperative that the Navy find ways to highlight and reinforce mentoring 
so that it is perceived as a crucial and valued leader activity. Such reinforcement should 
include ongoing attention to mentorship in communications from top leaders, local 
commanders, and warfare communities. Reinforcement strategies might also incorporate 
fleet-wide mentoring awards and the development of special designations (“master men-
tor”) to recognize specialized training and exceptional performance in this role.
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CULTIVATING SAILOR ETHICAL 
FITNESS 
Michael Hallett 
The Navy’s rollout of its Leader Development Strategy provides an opportunity to think 
about new approaches to sailor training and education on ethical behavior.1 The cur-
rent approaches are not entirely satisfactory, as they focus predominantly on sanctions 
for ethical failures, such as misallocation of funds and extramarital affairs. As former 
President of the Naval War College and then–rear admiral Walter E. Carter Jr. explained 
in his Ethics in the U.S. Navy in March 2014, “the current culture for Navy ethics is one 
based on obeying the rules in order to avoid punishment.”2 Admiral Carter called for a 
new approach to Navy ethics training and education, making six recommendations; the 
third was to “[b]uild a culture for Navy ethics beyond compliance.”3 This article weaves 
multiple philosophical threads together into an ethical fitness concept as a contribution 
to practical implementation of this recommendation. It is designed for sailors engaged in 
combat, both at sea and on land.
This sketch of an ethical fitness concept aims to contribute to a strategic-level Navy 
ethics program that both avoids a legalistic focus on rule breaking and moves beyond 
exhortations to “act with integrity” to develop practical, actionable, ethical decision-
making skills. The goal is a concept of ethical competence that is both operationally 
effective in time-constrained, dynamic environments, including combat, and useful 
for sailors performing their daily tasks. Part 1 argues that adding specific ethics train-
ing for warriors is required; relying solely on standard, academic, off-the-shelf ethics 
training will not meet program requirements. Part 2 introduces the concept of “ethical 
fitness” as a guiding metaphor, using the Marine Corps’s creation of the Combat Fitness 
Test as a model for development of a sailor ethical fitness concept. Part 3 describes the 
advantages of the concept of ethical fitness as a way to move beyond compliance. Part 
4 explores implementing the ethical fitness concept in part by employing senior leaders 
as coaches.
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Part 1: Warriors Require a Warrior-Focused Ethics Training and 
Education Regimen
Before attempting to offer a concept for sailor-as-warrior ethical competency develop-
ment, we must draw a preliminary distinction between sailors as bureaucrats and as pro-
fessionals. As Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe, President of the Naval War College, points 
out, “Our Navy has a dual character. On one hand, it is a military department organized 
as a bureaucracy. The bureaucratic dimension of our organization is unavoidable for any 
organization of our size and complexity. But on the other, it is an organization dedicated 
to supporting a military profession. It is this dual nature as both a bureaucracy and a 
profession that shapes our key challenge as Navy leaders.”4
Current Navy ethics training emerged from a legal compliance paradigm and often 
has focused on sailors as they operate within the bureaucratic dimension of the Navy. 
While necessary, such training lacks the content necessary to inspire sailors operating 
in complex, violent, uncertain environments. The Navy Code of Ethics provides a list of 
dos and don’ts and includes the following: 
• Place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.
• Act impartially to all groups, persons, and organizations.
• Give an honest effort in the performance of your duties.
• Protect and conserve Federal property.
• Disclose fraud, waste, and abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.
• Fulfill in good faith your obligations as citizens, and pay your Federal, State, and local 
taxes.
• Comply with all laws providing equal opportunity to all persons, regardless of their race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.5 
Regular civilian ethical decision making, such as that captured in the Navy Code 
of Ethics, is governed by the rules of what Nassim Taleb in his book The Black Swan 
describes as “Mediocristan.” The supreme law of Mediocristan is “When your sample 
is large, no single instance will significantly change the aggregate or the total.”6 In this 
world, traditional ethical guidance, such as Kant’s categorical imperative or utilitarian 
precepts, is often valid. The exceptional situation generating suboptimal outcomes (e.g., 
an ax-wielding madman kills an innocent person) is so rare as not to require special 
attention.
Yet the ethical behavior rules in normal society poorly prepare warriors for combat. 
As Karl Marlantes in his book What It Is like to Go to War argues, “Our young war-
riors are raised in possibly the only culture on the planet that thinks death is [merely] 
an option. Given this, it is no surprise that not only they but many of their ostensible 
religious guides . . . enter the temple of Mars unprepared. Not only is such comfort too 
often delusional; it tends to numb one to spiritual reality and growth. Far worse, it has 
serious psychological and behavioral consequences.”7
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Today a full range of tools is available to prevent or reduce the moral injuries to 
which sailors become subject while performing the ethical tasks associated with combat 
risks. If we do not use these tools to supplement the existing ethics training and educa-
tion (which emphasize compliance), we fail to prepare our sailors effectively for what 
they will face.8 This is important, because warriors reside in what Taleb refers to as 
“Extremistan,” where the consequences of action are amplified beyond the normal range. 
Individual actions, taken or not taken, can generate consequences at levels ranging from 
the individual through the tactical to the grand strategic, and do so regularly as part of 
normal professional activity.9
The normal ethics training is not entirely adequate for comprehensively meeting the 
ethical training and education needs of the military professional dimension of the Navy, 
which includes the sailor as warrior. Sailors require an approach to ethics training and 
education tailored for naval professionals, who are, as Admiral Howe points out, profes-
sional warriors who also, but not exclusively, act in bureaucratic ways as part of perform-
ing their professional functions.
The foundation of warrior ethics is the awareness with which warriors take sides and 
accept the risks associated with that decision. They are cognizant of the risk-transference 
impacts of their actions, internalize the tensions in their decision making, and do not 
push the negative externalities onto others. As Marlantes puts it,
Choosing sides is the fundamental first choice that a warrior must make. . . . The 
second fundamental choice of the warrior is to be willing to use violence to protect 
someone against even intended or implied violence. This second fundamental choice 
engenders an additional choice, which is accepting the risk of death and maiming 
that usually results from the decision to use violence against violence. To become 
a warrior requires making these two fundamental choices and accepting the risks 
entailed. Doing the above eliminates any need to use the adjective “ethical” in front of 
the noun “warrior.” A warrior, by my definition, acts ethically.10
This tripartite decision bundle places warriors in a position that requires meta-
ethical principles to guide their application of ethical principles. Ethical principles, while 
congruent parts of an overarching ethical system, are not always identical in formula-
tion and application when applied to combat conditions versus ordinary life. Informed 
examination of the principles and how they operate in the various domains is necessary. 
In other words, combat demands a supplemental ethical operating system. Think of it 
as a turbocharger, which adds to an engine an additional physical capability for extreme 
situations. The supplemental ethical operating system enables effective ethical decision 
making across the full range of life experiences. Building this “turbocharger” requires 
additional efforts to facilitate the development of sailors’ ethical competence.
Therefore, the bulk of traditional academic, off-the-shelf ethical training—based on 
the Golden Rule and fundamental prohibitions such as “do not kill”—is not entirely ade-
quate for the sailor-as-warrior. This training starts from the assumption that the subjects 
of the training are rational actors operating in accordance with what Nobel Prize– 
winning thinker Herbert Simon described in Reason in Human Affairs as the Single 
Expected Utility model of rationality, which is characterized by well-ordered conditions 
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and a set of tame, if perhaps complicated, problems.11 Gary Klein, an expert on  
recognition-primed decision making, in his Streetlights and Shadows, refers to such condi-
tions as “streetlight” situations.12
However, warriors must conduct ethical decision making not only under streetlights 
but in poorly illuminated ethical environments, characterized by chaotic situations in 
which individuals must deal with other impassioned individuals through the filters of 
their own passions. They must engage in activities considered unethical under normal 
circumstances. Therefore practical ethical decision making requires an understanding of 
what Benedict de Spinoza in his book Ethics designated “human bondage,” within which 
people are ruled by passions, not the clear exercise of reason.13 Warriors’ efforts to man-
age wicked, complex problems in dynamic, agonistic environments therefore demand 
decision-making techniques different from those provided by traditional, rational actor 
model–based ethics training.14
What qualifies as “common sense” under the streetlight does not apply comprehen-
sively to the shadow situations of combat. Carl von Clausewitz, in the beginning of his 
book On War, states that a different ethical framework must be used when thinking 
about war. He writes, “Kind hearted people might of course think that there was some 
ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might 
imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that 
must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that mistakes which come from kind-
ness are the worst.”15 Within the traditional ethical perspectives, such as the Kantian, 
virtue ethics, or utilitarian, the idea that such things as “mistakes from kindness” exist is 
at first glance amoral and unethical.
However, as Socrates pointed out, the commonsense answer to a dilemma is often 
wrong. In book 1 of The Republic, Socrates, the combat veteran, points out that the sim-
ple ethical commands to give people what they are owed and never tell a lie are not auto-
matically just. He says, “Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons 
to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn’t 
return them, and wouldn’t be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to 
tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind.”16 In his search for a defini-
tion of justice, Socrates goes on to reject the idea that whatever is done to members of 
the out-group (enemies) is automatically just. The ethical category applying to another 
person can shift in an instant (for example, from enemy combatant to injured prisoner), 
changing the appropriate set of ethical behaviors that apply to that person. Socrates thus 
articulates the complexity of the warrior’s ethical understanding, which includes aware-
ness of the risks associated with both action and inaction, for self and others, and the 
central role that time and context play in the ethical treatment of people. This is not to 
say that ethics are relative, only that ethical behavior in Extremistan must attend to what 
Heraclitus referred to as the concealed logos, which in this context of ethical decision 
making can be understood as constituting the meta-level ethical principles governing 
when to apply specific ethical principles.17 Discerning, while in the shadows, the ethi-
cally appropriate action requires robust competency development.
This is not to say that the traditional approaches are invalid, only that they are not 
entirely sufficient for military professionals. As Klein explains in discussing the need for 
appropriate action in both the streetlights and the shadows, “The way we see in bright 
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light differs from the way we see in shadows. Neither is the ‘right’ way. We need both. 
This dual viewpoint of light and shadow affects how we make decisions and how we 
make sense of situations. It affects how we plan and how we manage risks and uncer-
tainty. It guides how we develop expertise and how we use our intuition.”18 Bureaucrats 
operate under the streetlights; warriors often, but not always, in the shadows.
The warrior’s ethical decision making is different from the normal ethic of society. 
This is so not only because killing, for example, is permissible but because the warrior 
internalizes the full risk-management constellation. The warrior understands the risk 
of action and inaction, and takes more risk on him- or herself so as to reduce it for oth-
ers. In other words, the warrior confronts the ax-wielding madman if necessary, instead 
of simply allowing that risk to pass him or her by; an example of the latter would be to 
follow the categorical imperative to tell the truth (“Which way did that kid go?!” “That 
way.”) as a means to avoid making an appropriate decision (“Put down the ax.”).
Thus, warriors require a specific ethics training and education program, in addition 
to but distinct from the conventional programs available. The “ethical fitness” concept 
constitutes a framework for this ethical competency development program.
Part 2: The Marine Corps Combat Fitness Approach as a Model for 
Cultivating Sailor Ethical Fitness
The Marine Corps approach to physical fitness offers a model for an approach to culti-
vating warrior ethical fitness. It demonstrates the necessity to add training, education, 
and assessment metrics in order to develop and assess specific combat-required capabili-
ties. In 2008 the Marines added a Combat Fitness Test (CFT) to their existing Physical 
Fitness Test. As MCO 6100.13 explained, “As professional warrior-athletes, every Marine 
must be physically fit, regardless of age, grade, or duty assignment. . . . The Physical 
Fitness Test (PFT), Combat Fitness Test and Remedial Conditioning Program (RCP) are 
components of an effective organizational Combat Conditioning Program.”19 Why did 
the Marines add another fitness, not wellness, test to the existing PFT? Greg Glassman’s 
definition of fitness in his article “What Is Fitness?” provides an answer. Fitness is the 
positive pole of the health continuum demarcated by sickness, wellness, and fitness.20 
Thus, fitness represents a higher degree of health than wellness, and professional warrior-
athletes must operate at the higher end of the fitness zone of the health continuum if they 
are to execute their missions effectively. Therefore, the Marines deemed a combat- 
specific test necessary because combat requires a bundle of physical competencies not 
cultivated by traditional athletic activity. It is possible to be an effective athlete—say, 
a runner or football player—and yet not possess the physical capabilities required for 
combat. As a result, normal physical fitness tests fail to evaluate these competencies ade-
quately, not because the tests are flawed, but because they focus on noncombat-related 
measures of performance and effectiveness. Therefore, the Marines deemed necessary an 
additional set of competencies, training to cultivate those competencies, and an assess-
ment mechanism to check both the effectiveness of the training and the individual pos-
session of the competency.
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Just as the Marines have two approaches to developing and testing physical fitness, 
the traditional PFT and the CFT, specific ethical competency development would benefit 
from a structured approach consisting of both the traditional and warrior-specific appli-
cations of traditional ethical systems. While conventional ethical training can and does 
meet many of the warrior ethical competency requirements, providing both principles 
and guidance for the application of those principles, it is insufficient. The addition of 
training and education on combat-focused application of principles, in accordance with 
the concept of ethical fitness for warriors, constitutes a necessary expansion to meet the 
ethical needs of twenty-first-century warriors.
Definition of Ethical Fitness
Borrowing the concept of “fitness” from the physical domain provides a model for think-
ing about enhancing sailor-warriors’ ethical competencies to inform their daily decision 
making in both combat and noncombat conditions. Ethical fitness consists of effective  
orientation, observation, decision, and action; with full cognizance of the risks; in 
accordance with Navy core values; applied in a violent, uncertain, extreme world.
Mapping ethics onto an ethical health bell curve, with depravity constituting the 
deficient condition, wellness the normal condition, and fitness the highest level of ethi-
cal competence, clarifies the distinction between the ethically well and the ethically fit. 
As shown in the figure, most people abide in the “ethically well” section, following rules 
and getting along under the normal conditions of everyday life. A few are depraved: 
intentionally harming others; constantly attempting to shift risk from themselves; and 
lying, cheating, and stealing as a normal part of their life practices. At the other pole are 
the ethically fit. The few people at this pole take risks on themselves to reduce the risk to 
others, while operating in extreme conditions such as combat.
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Figure 1. Ethical Health Bell Curve
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Applying Ethical Fitness
John Boyd’s presentation “The Essence of Winning and Losing” lays out the observation 
and orientation steps of his observe—orient—decide—act (OODA) loop. An individual 
warrior is ethically fit when he or she can apply these cognitive skills while operating in 
the dynamic conditions of Extremistan. Ethical fitness metaprinciples enable warriors 
to orient themselves appropriately in the context of engagement space, understand their 
own observations, and use them to inform their decisions and actions. Boyd explains 
that “[o]rientation is the Schwerpunkt [focus point]. It shapes the way we interact with 
the environment—hence orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the 
way we act. . . . Orientation shapes the character of present observation—orientation—
decision—action loops—while these present loops shape the character of future orien-
tation.”21 Ethical principles structure this orientation, and the meta-ethical principles 
informing warrior orientation provide an additional layer of insight into their applica-
tion that helps to make sense of observations and inform decisions and actions across all 
possible environments.
Part 3: Advantages of the Ethical Fitness Concept
The ethical fitness concept has three major advantages over current ethics training and 
education. 
First, the ethical fitness concept provides an overarching training, education, and 
practice paradigm, thereby helping to implement Rear Admiral Carter’s recommenda-
tion to move “beyond compliance” in ethics training and education.22 Framing ethics 
training and education as the cultivation of ethical fitness constitutes a positive approach 
to the sort of life-and-death decision making that is the specific task of warriors. It does 
so in a way that enables the flow of passion and enthusiasm to “do the right thing” that is 
the default setting for sailors. In contrast, the current Navy ethics guidance is a list of dos 
and don’ts for bureaucrats, not warriors. By avoiding a focus on the negative “don’ts” and 
“ought nots” from philosophers who have never faced combat, the ethical fitness concept 
provides a way for warriors to take the ethical initiative when they find themselves in 
a conflict. This enables sailors to perceive the ethical components of military decision 
making not as restraints (can’t do) but as fertile constraints (must do) that enable long-
term mission success.
Second, the ethical fitness concept provides a framework for the development of 
ethical decision-making habits. Ethical fitness, like physical fitness, arises from habitual 
exercise of the capability, appropriately guided through training and deliberative prac-
tice. As Aristotle said, “Thus the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature, 
but we are by nature able to acquire them, and reach our complete perfections through 
habit.”23 Habitual (regular, repeated) application of the desired behavior is necessary 
for humans actually to possess a competency. Aristotle compared the process of acquir-
ing ethical competency to the sort of hands-on training that builders receive. Aristotle 
explained, “Virtues, by contrast, we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having previ-
ously activated them. For we learn a craft by producing the same product that we must 
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produce when we have learned it, become builders, e.g., by building and harpists by 
playing the harp: so also, then, we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing 
temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions.”24 Athletic habituation ingrains appro-
priate movement patterns, just as experience, including imaginative experience gener-
ated through training and education, ingrains ethically fit behavior.
Third, the ethical fitness concept provides a framework for ethical behavior in mul-
tiple contexts. Warriors engage in activities not obviously justifiable using the conven-
tional ethical metrics of Mediocristan. As General James Mattis said in his 2004 William 
C. Stutt Ethics Lecture at the U.S. Naval Academy, entitled “Ethical Challenges in 
Contemporary Conflict: The Afghanistan and Iraq Cases,” “Your job, my fine young men 
and women, is to find the enemy that wants to end this experiment and kill every one of 
them until they’re so sick of the killing that they leave us and our freedoms intact.”25
However, a warrior is not engaged in killing all the time or in all places, or even 
indiscriminately in any one place or at any given time. Therefore, to act appropriately 
in multiple contexts, warriors must build, on the foundational ethical habits, what the 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche referred to as “brief habits.” Nietzsche wrote, 
“I love brief habits and consider them an invaluable means for getting to know many 
things and states down to the bottom of their sweetnesses and bitternesses; my nature is 
designed entirely for brief habits, even in the needs of its physical health and generally as 
far as I can see at all, from the lowest to the highest.”26 By extending the range of human 
experience, and of expertise within that experience, brief ethical habits inform individual 
warrior decisions and actions and thus foster the advanced level of ethical development 
necessary for warriors and leaders. A life in which the same ethical habits are applied in 
all contingencies will fail to correspond appropriately to the demands of an Extremistan 
ethical situation, just as performing the same set of exercises (even with good technique) 
without variation can lead to decreases in physical capability. Training and practice con-
sisting of varied stimuli and responses are necessary for ethical growth, and challenges 
stimulate development.27 The warrior requires multiple brief habits for ethical decision 
making to facilitate decision making across the full range of life activities.
The employ-
ment of the various 
ethical habit sets 
can be thought of 
as corresponding to 
weapons readiness 
levels.28 Weapons 
status readiness 
levels describe the 
appropriate posture 
for weapons employ-
ment; similarly, the 
ethical habit set 
articulates the bal-
ance of risk (between 
self and other) and 
Weapon 
Conditions Weapon Status
Likelihood Weapon  
Use Required
Condition 1 Magazine inserted, round in 
chamber, slide forward, and 
decocking/safety lever on
High
Condition 2 Not applicable Medium
Condition 3 Magazine inserted, chamber 
empty, slide forward, and  
decocking/safety lever on
Medium
Condition 4 Magazine removed, chamber 
empty, slide forward, and  
decocking/safety lever on
Low
Figure 2
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the appropriate level of violence available to respond to adversary action. The ethical 
habit set for combat is different from that for an exercise, just as weapons readiness lev-
els change with the situation. Hence, “mere” ethical wellness is insufficient for warriors; 
they require education, training, and practice to become ethically fit to enable them to 
shift rapidly among appropriate ethical habits. 
The concept of brief habits has the advantage of opening space for forgiveness, 
respect for the enemy, treatment of the dead, etc. He who is an enemy in one moment 
can become a prisoner or a fellow human being whose life has ended in the next. In 
dynamic combat conditions, such a shift can occur faster than it can be articulated 
explicitly. The training task is therefore to infuse warriors’ intuition (their tacit under-
standing), and thus their decisions and actions, with the appropriate ethical operating 
system. Brief habits, as part of ethical fitness, provide a way to think through how to deal 
with these varying circumstances. The ethically fit individual will have ingrained the 
correct “movement patterns” and thus possess the “muscle memory” necessary to decide 
and act appropriately in every situation.
Part 4: Concept Implementation— 
Coaching the Ethical Fitness Workout
Implementation of the ethical fitness concept requires appropriate training and edu-
cation—in other words, the development of an effective ethical habituation process. 
Indeed, the Navy as an institution has a responsibility to provide robust and effective 
ethics training. As General Mattis has said, “A tragedy is when one of your beloved 
young sailors or Marines, who will literally die to carry out your orders, does something, 
and now you have to court-martial him. That is the last thing you ever want to do, 
because you failed to talk your people through it, to illustrate for them what it’s going to 
be like.”29 Ethics training for bureaucrats based on ethical habits developed for everyday 
life in Mediocristan will not avert the tragedies to which General Mattis refers.
Yet simply saying that we need more and better ethics training is an inappropriate 
response. Effective ethics training must overcome two challenges: the scarcity of atten-
tion resources and the rules-based compliance model. Ethical fitness provides a frame-
work for developing an ethical training regime that meets both these challenges.
Scarcity of Attention
As Herbert Simon has pointed out, in a time of nearly unlimited information, the critical 
limiting factor is attention.30 Even as the increasing complexity of Navy tasks demands 
additional training, attention resources available to focus on training decrease. As a 
result, the reliance on more training to solve organizational problems creates its own 
ethical challenges. As Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras point out in their Lying to 
Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession, the well-intentioned effort to provide more 
training to deal with problems can have “detrimental effects on training management 
due to the suffocating amount of mandatory requirements imposed upon units and 
commanders.”31
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Similar tensions exist in the Navy. Therefore the training dedicated to ethics must 
be sensitive to this attention-constrained environment instead of simply adding more 
training as the answer to every challenge. Effective training will provide the minimum 
effective dose of ethics training in a way warriors find useful. A list of dos and don’ts is 
unlikely to meet this need. While compliance with rules is essential, it is not sufficient. 
Thus, warrior ethics training must go beyond a compliance-based set of rules on what to 
do and not do. It must provide principles that not only explicitly guide action but intui-
tively inform the moral operating system that animates the orientation of decision mak-
ing. This enables warriors to make value-based judgments that are always in accordance 
with the highest ethical standards.
The How-To
So how do we capture the warrior’s attention and provide the minimum effective ethics 
training and education dose in time-constrained, complex environments?
Effectively capturing the warrior’s attention requires that training and education be 
delivered not by an outsider but by a leader who is on the field of Mars with the warrior. 
Just as a team coach provides expert advice on techniques and training for the sport, so 
the military has coaches: senior leaders with expertise in navigating ethical situations. 
These coaches, serving as role models, provide positive tools to enhance the warrior’s 
competency to move through the OODA loop ethically.
Coaches facilitate warrior ethical competencies by developing their ethical decision-
making mental models through the pathways of life experience and education, similar 
to the development of physical competency through drills in the weight room and on 
the sports field. As Klein writes, “Mental models are developed through experience—
individual experience, organizational experience, and cultural experience.”32 By guiding 
reflection on experience and discussing imaginative experience gained through train-
ing and educational activities, coaches facilitate development of the ethical competen-
cies that together constitute ethical fitness, just as a physical coach guides a workout. 
Coaches do not simply point out mistakes; they are sensitive to tacit knowledge derived 
from understanding the context of an action, and help to sensitize those they coach to 
the weak signals emerging from the shadows.
Coaching takes many forms, including “workouts” that cultivate ethical competency. 
Admiral Carter articulates possible coach-provided ethical training and education 
content:
[S]potlight examples of good ethical choices and behavior; as well as examples that 
favorably represent the naval profession. . . . [I]nstitutionally reward good decisions and 
actions that reinforce Navy Core Values and the Navy Ethos. Tend to the moral devel-
opment of our Sailors—i.e., helping them develop habits for making the right ethical 
choices and utilizing proper discretionary judgment. . . . [P]rovide opportunities for 
facilitated dialogues, peer discussions, and open roundtables around topics of motiva-
tion, reasoning, and processing of moral choices. Capitalize on existing training and 
education that present opportunities to instill ethics discussions and learning.33 [ital-
ics in original]
LES2 - Demy.indb   68 11/29/18   9:10 AM
hallett 69
Ethical fitness workouts can vary significantly in length and intensity. Examples 
include plan of the day (POD) notes requiring a minute to read;34 complex, multiactor 
scenarios as capstone events in schools; asides in lectures; boxed texts in doctrinal man-
uals; and commentaries on recommended texts. Such material exists: Steven Pressfield’s 
The Warrior Ethos, Karl Marlantes’s already-mentioned What It Is like to Go to War, 
Nicholas Monsarrat’s The Cruel Sea, E. D. Swinton’s Defense of Duffer’s Drift, and many 
others; it need only be placed in the appropriate package for sailor use. The lessons lit-
erature need not focus on mistakes; especially for those beginning their ethical fitness 
workouts, providing positive role models for making ethically fit decisions in complex, 
chaotic situations provides outstanding value. For example, Steven Pressfield’s book 
The Lion’s Gate offers multiple positive examples, such as the way Ran Ronen dealt with 
his mistake in combat during the Six-Day War: by taking more risk on himself and his 
squad by flying his plane under the other Mirage formations (so low, in fact, that he cre-
ated a wake on the Mediterranean Sea below) so as to avoid transferring that risk onto 
others through failure to hit his targets at the assigned time.35
Ethical fitness can be achieved only by engagement—by wrestling with ethical issues 
in a wide variety of environments. Its relationship to rules (rules are necessary but not 
sufficient and not always available) makes ethical fitness difficult, both for practitioners 
and for those working to train and educate warriors aspiring to ethical fitness. The ethi-
cally fit must decide and act both in compliance with explicit rules and dynamically in 
accordance with core values.
This article offers the ethical fitness concept as a contribution to implementing previ-
ous calls to enhance the Navy’s approach to ethics training and education. The addition 
of an active growth and exercise component to ethics training and education, based on 
an analogy to the physical demands of combat (sprinting, climbing through warped 
hatches, lifting ammunition, etc.), provides a readily comprehensible, accessible, and 
actionable methodology for engaging in ethical decision making both in the extremes 
of combat and in everyday life. Ethical fitness therefore provides a way to think about 
ethics training and practice that goes beyond exhortations to “be good.” The goal is to 
provide sailors with practical, actionable ethical decision-making skills. Importantly, the 
ethical fitness concept adds to the rich set of images, such as “moral compass,” “golden 
rule,” and “straight and narrow,” that already shape ethics education and practice.36
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CAPTAINS OF THE SOUL 
Stoic Philosophy and the Western Profession of Arms in the 
Twenty-First Century 
Michael Evans 
To meet life as a powerful conqueror,  
No fumes, no ennui, no more complaints or scornful criticisms,  
To these proud laws of the air, the water, and the ground,  
Proving my interior soul impregnable,  
And nothing exterior shall ever take command of me. 
Walt Whitman, “A Song of Joys” (1860)
In the new millennium Western militaries are spending a great deal of their resources on 
training and arming uniformed professionals for the instrumental rigors of operational 
service. Most modern armed forces equip their personnel with the latest body armor, 
the best protected vehicles, and the most sophisticated counterexplosive electronics, 
acquiring as well the most advanced medical services for those physically wounded or 
maimed. Much less time is devoted to providing military personnel with existential or 
inner armaments—with the mental armor and philosophical protection—that is neces-
sary to confront an asymmetric enemy who abides by a different set of cultural rules. 
Much is also made in today’s Western political and military circles about the need to 
relearn counterinsurgency, with its central tenet of winning “hearts and minds” among 
contested populations. Yet comparatively little is done to provide Western military pro-
fessionals with sufficient moral philosophy to protect their own hearts and minds against 
the rigors of contemporary warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is true that all English-speaking Western militaries possess codes of behavior that 
govern the ethical conduct of their members. These codes tend to cover the law of 
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armed conflict, just-war theory, and the importance of upholding humanitarian values. 
However, such guides, while essential, tend to be rooted in social science, law, and psy-
chology rather than in moral philosophy, with its grounding in the great humanities.1 
Moreover, while modern ethical codes emphasize institutional rules of behavior, moral 
philosophy puts in the foreground the development of personal character and the recon-
ciliation of the individual to the social environment in which he or she operates. Ethics 
need, therefore, to be complemented by a stronger focus on philosophy that permits 
the professional military to become fully a self-conscious moral community committed 
to maintaining traditions essential to the integrity of its people and the discharge of its 
responsibilities.2
This article analyzes the importance of teaching Stoic moral philosophy within 
today’s armed forces, covering three areas. First, the article examines the challenge to the 
warrior ethos emanating from the increasing postmodern instrumentalism of warfare. 
Second, it examines the case for upholding in the professional military a moral philoso-
phy that is based on adapting what the British philosopher Bertrand Russell once called 
the virtues of “Stoic self-command.”3  Third, the article discusses the extent to which 
philosophical values based on Stoicism might serve as moral guides to today’s military 
professionals, by drawing on lessons and choices from Western literature, politics, and 
history. 
The Challenge to the Western Military Ethos:  
Postmodernity, Technological Instrumentalism, and Honor 
Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, the editors of an influential 
2000 work, argued that advanced Western armed forces were undergoing an uneven, 
but clearly discernible, transition from modern to postmodern status.4 This transition, 
they suggested, was challenging to the professional military ethos, for two overarching 
reasons. First, a loosening of ties to both society and state was occurring, symbolized by 
the rise of a moral relativism in which “there is a shrinking consensus about what values 
constitute the public good, and little confidence that we know how, by the use of reason, 
to determine what the public good might be.”5 Second, the rise of “revolution in mili-
tary affairs” technologies based on the instrumental technology of precision and stealth 
pitted, they suggested, the ethos of professionalism against a growing occupational 
outlook.6 John Allen Williams, in his contribution to their volume, went so far as to con-
clude that “military culture is challenged by a relativistic civilian ethos from without and 
by the increasing civilianization of military functions and personnel orientation from 
within.”7
Over the last decade, Christopher Coker, perhaps the world’s leading philosopher 
of contemporary war, has in a series of important studies further analyzed the implica-
tions for the military profession of the onset of postmodernity.8 For Coker, much of the 
contemporary West today is dominated by what he calls an “ethics without morality,” in 
which the existential and metaphysical ideals that have traditionally underpinned a life 
dedicated to military professionalism seem increasingly obsolescent.9 Despite the long 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Coker believes, postmodern trends in operational practice 
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and advanced technology are now so deeply entrenched in contemporary modes of 
warfare “that in the future there will be no place for the warrior ideal.”10 In a pessimistic 
tone he writes: 
Even the professional soldier who volunteers to fight sees war increasingly as a trade 
rather than as a vocation, a job like any other, even if it differs from every other in the 
fear and anxiety it generates. Even if that is not true of every soldier (and we produce 
a few warriors still), war in the early twenty-first century does indeed seem to the 
rest of us rather barren, bereft of that [existential] dimension that made the warrior a 
human type as Hegel understood the term, a man who through war perceives his own 
humanity.11 
Other observers have written on how postmodern trends have led throughout con-
temporary society to an alleged decline of public honor that impacts upon the Western 
military’s professional ethos and its institutional notions of duty and sacrifice.12 This 
development, it is contended, has had the effect of making Western militaries’ internal 
codes of honor less reflections of wider social beliefs than species of subculture. Writers 
such as Akbar S. Ahmed and James Bowman have charged that one of the major weak-
nesses in the contemporary West’s waging of wars is that its nations do so as “post-honor 
societies.”13 In their view, a gulf has grown between the honor codes of volunteer mili-
tary professionals and parent societies, the latter of which are increasingly governed 
by the more relativist mores of postmodernity. This gulf, it is suggested, puts Western 
democracies at a disadvantage when fighting opponents who are impelled by absolut-
ist cultural imperatives based on older codes of honor.14 As Coker reflects, “the West is 
engaged with an [Islamist] adversary that is the product of one of the world’s great unre-
constructed and unreformed honour cultures at a time when the fortunes of the West’s 
own honour culture are at a low ebb.”15 
Moral Philosophy for Military Professionals:  
The Case for Reviving Stoicism 
How does one, then, counter the rise of an instrumental vision of war and with it the 
growth of occupational ideals that reflect Coker’s “ethics without morality”? If there is 
a growing incompatibility between the norms of an evolving, postmodern era based on 
instrumental rationality and the values of a professional military ethos based on exis-
tential meaning, we clearly need to reinforce the philosophical inner selves of men and 
women in the West’s armed forces. 
This article argues that one of the most effective philosophical traditions for those 
in military uniform is that of Stoicism. The moral philosophy of the ancient Greek and 
Roman Stoics as taught by such great thinkers as Epictetus, Seneca, Cicero, and Marcus 
Aurelius offers an effective path for those who seek to understand the existential char-
acter of the profession of arms. Yet Stoic philosophy runs against all postmodern philo-
sophical trends and is thus unfashionable today. As Tad Brennan comments in a 2007 
book, those who seek to adhere to Stoic philosophy are likely to be seen as out of touch 
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with their age, seeking only to cling to a jumbled-up “mixture of tough-guy bravado, 
hypocrisy and heartlessness [that is] neither personally compelling nor philosophically 
interesting.”16 Why should an ancient 
Hellenistic philosophy noted for its 
harsh prescriptions and designed for 
life in preindustrial agrarian city-states 
be of any use to military profession-
als who have been reared in the social 
and material sophistication of a postindustrial electronic age? The answer lies in the 
unchanging human dimension of the military profession, and it is this dimension—with 
its focus on strength of character—that links the Greek hoplites on the fields of Attica to 
today’s Western soldiers in the mountains of Afghanistan. 
What is most attractive about the Stoic school of philosophy is its central notion 
that character is fate. The ideas of Stoicism infuse much of the edifice of Western civi-
lization, and this debt is evident in the writings of such towering intellectual figures as 
Montaigne, Pascal, Spinoza, Descartes, Kant, and Hume. Moreover, Stoicism in some 
form infuses much of Christian theology, from St. Augustine through Thomas à Kempis 
to the Flemish philosopher Justus Lipsius, as symbolized by the famous Serenity Prayer: 
“God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change 
the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference.” Indeed, the philosopher 
Charles Taylor has written of how a Christianized Stoicism, or neo-Stoicism, developed 
by Lipsius in the sixteenth century influenced the evolution of modern Calvinism, 
Lutheranism, and Catholicism—with Calvin beginning his life of religious activism by 
publishing a study of Seneca.17 Prominent later adherents of Stoicism have included the 
great Prussian general Frederick the Great, the Holocaust philosopher Viktor E. Frankl, 
the Russian writer and dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and the South African states-
man Nelson Mandela.18 
It is often argued that members of the armed services are natural Stoics, capable 
of repelling the psychic shock of combat through ingrained mental toughness. Such a 
belief is highly misleading, as the frequent incidence of post–traumatic stress disorder in 
modern military establishments in recent years attests. As the American scholar Nancy 
Sherman emphasizes in a 2005 study, “catastrophic, external circumstance can derail the 
best-lived life.”19 In 2008 the RAND Corporation found that nearly 20 percent of U.S. 
military service members returning from Iraq and Afghanistan reported symptoms of 
post–traumatic stress disorder and depression—what it called the “invisible wounds of 
war.”20 To what extent a philosophy of Stoicism can assist those in uniform to prevent 
or mitigate modern neuropsychiatric disorders remains a matter of debate. As RAND 
researchers have pointed out, there remain “fundamental gaps” in our knowledge of 
the causal links between individual educational backgrounds, collective military train-
ing, and operational deployment, and the incidence of mental health problems.21 
Nonetheless, as one leading American soldier, Brigadier General H. R. McMaster, U.S. 
Army, has observed, cultivation of Stoic-like resilience and fortitude for self-control is 
likely to be of value in reducing combat stress. In McMaster’s words, “Soldiers must  
view war as a challenge and as their duty, not as trauma.”22 This view is shared by Coker, 
who writes that aspiring warriors must seek “to be true to what [Ralph Waldo] Emerson 
As the ancient Stoic thinkers teach us, what truly 
counts is the nature of life itself as an unending form 
of warfare that must be confronted and mastered if 
one is to overcome fortune and fate.
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calls ‘the great stoical doctrine—obey thyself.’ Nothing is more true of the warrior ethos 
than this doctrine.”23 
For the most part, contemporary military notions of Stoicism tend to be based on 
secondhand platitudes and common stereotypes about manliness, “stiff upper lips,” and 
“can do” willingness. Popular Stoic stereotypes include the emotionless Mr. Spock in 
the television series Star Trek and Russell Crowe’s “strength and honor” Roman soldier, 
Maximus, in the 1999 movie Gladiator. Of course, there is much more to Stoic philoso-
phy than popular culture allows. Stoicism is a school of ancient philosophy founded by 
the fourth century bce by the Greek thinker Zeno of Citium and systematized by his 
successors Cleanthes and Chrysippus in the third century bce. Since Zeno’s original  
followers met in a public portico in Athens known as the “Painted Porch” (Stoa Poikilē), 
they came to be known as Stoics, or “men of the Porch.” The Stoic doctrines that have 
been bequeathed to the modern world represent a powerful method of reasoning involv-
ing the rigorous cultivation of self-command, self-reliance, and moral autonomy, a sys-
tem in which an individual seeks to develop character on the basis of the four cardinal 
virtues of courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom.24 
Rigorously studied and properly applied, Stoic philosophy delivers profound insights 
into the challenges of military life. Peter Ryan, an Australian hero of the Second World 
War and author of the celebrated 1959 memoir Fear Drive My Feet, has written of the 
impact of the writings of Marcus Aurelius on his own military conduct. In it Ryan 
describes himself as, when coming under Japanese fire for the first time, “a shuddering 
mess of demoralised terror” until he recalls the teachings of Stoicism: 
Then I thought of Marcus Aurelius. Hadn’t he taught me that, when Fate approached, 
there was no escape, but that a man would keep his grim appointment with dignity 
and calm? The effect was instant; certainly I still felt great fear, but I was no longer ab-
ject. It was this recovery of self-control and self-respect . . . that preserved me through 
all the testing months in the [New Guinea] bush that lay ahead in 1942 and 1943.25 
In recent years, the most prominent and systematic advocate of military Stoicism was 
the distinguished U.S. naval officer, Medal of Honor recipient, and 1992 vice presidential 
contender Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, who died in 2005. Stockdale’s 1995 book 
Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot is one of the finest introductions to Stoicism 
and its meaning for the profession of arms.26 Stockdale’s personal embrace of Stoicism 
helped him to survive seven and a half years of systematic torture and solitary con-
finement, from 1965 until 1972, as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese in the dreaded 
“Hanoi Hilton.” In the late 1970s, as President of the U.S. Naval War College, Stockdale 
introduced at Newport an innovative course, “Foundations of Moral Obligation” (widely 
known as “the Stockdale Course”), which was heavily influenced by Stoic thought. More 
than any other warrior-scholar in the English-speaking West, Stockdale disseminated the 
value of Stoic philosophy within the American and allied military establishments,  
even influencing the work of such literary figures as Tom Wolfe.27 In particular,  
Stockdale did much to elevate the writings of the Stoic slave-philosopher Epictetus over 
those of Marcus Aurelius, by revealing the former’s Stoic teachings in his Enchiridion 
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(Handbook) as what Stockdale called “a manual for combat officers.” As Stockdale puts 
it, in the pages of the Enchiridion “I had found the proper philosophy for the military 
arts as I practiced them. The Roman Stoics coined the formula Vivere militare—‘Life is 
being a soldier.’”28 Stockdale’s writings remain highly relevant today; among the purposes 
of this article are to salute his legacy and extend it into the new millennium. 
What are the central tenets of Stoicism, and how do they fit into the cosmology of 
the twenty-first-century military professional? As a philosophy, Stoicism teaches that 
life is unfair and that there is no moral economy in the human universe. Martyrs and 
honest men may die poor; swindlers and dishonest men may die rich. In this respect, 
the fate of both the Old Testament’s Job, God’s good servant, and of Shakespeare’s King 
Lear, the exemplary father, are reminders of what we must endure from a life that fits the 
Stoic creed. The spirit of Stoicism as an unrelenting struggle for virtuous character in 
a world devoid of fairness is hauntingly captured by the Greek playwright Aeschylus in 
his Agamemnon: “He who learns must suffer. And even in our sleep, pain which cannot 
forget falls drop by drop on the heart until, in our own despair, against our will, comes 
wisdom through the awful grace of God.”29 
The absence of a moral economy outside of the workings of our inner selves means 
that in the Stoic catechism there is no such category as “victimhood.” Stoicism is thus 
about empowerment by perception—a cultivation of an invincibility of the will by 
minimizing personal vulnerability through a mixture of Socratic self-examination and 
control of the emotions. Stoicism teaches concentration on what individuals can con-
trol—what French scholar Pierre Hadot, in his study of Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, 
calls the cultivation of the “inner citadel” of the soul.30 Stoicism’s four great teachings 
may be summarized as the quest for virtue, as representing the sole human good; the 
understanding that external goods do not equate to human happiness; the belief that a 
good life strives to control emotions to enhance reason; and the conviction that virtue 
consists in knowing what is in one’s control and what is not.31 
The Quest for Virtue as the Sole Human Good 
For the Stoic, character is formed by freedom of personal choice. Stoicism is thus a 
formula for maintaining self-respect and dignity through the conscious pursuit of vir-
tue and the avoidance of vice, in times of either adversity or prosperity. The realities 
of poverty and wealth matter only insofar as they are used to shape the essential good-
ness of our character. As Epictetus puts it in the Enchiridion, true wealth stems from 
righteousness, honor, and decency, viewed collectively as absolute virtue. Such virtue is 
wholly indifferent to all matters of mere fortune, including health and illness, wealth and 
poverty, even life and death. It is a message of wisdom that has echoed across the cen-
turies. In the twentieth century, the French philosopher Simone Weil echoed Epictetus 
when she wrote that authentic human greatness is always found in virtue and honor 
manifested in a “desire for the truth, ceaseless effort to achieve it, and obedience to one’s 
calling.”32 Stoics firmly reject the notion of collective or social guilt as a force in shaping 
virtue. For the Stoic, collective guilt is an impossible proposition, simply because guilt is 
always about individual choice and personal wrongdoing, “even in dreams, in drunken-
ness and in melancholy madness.”33 No one can ever be guilty for the act of another, 
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and no society can be held accountable for the actions of individuals of a previous 
generation. 
Externals Do Not Amount to Happiness 
In his Enchiridion, Epictetus teaches us that every individual has a fundamental choice—
whether to live by inner or outer values. This choice is summed up by his famous doc-
trine, “Of things some are in our power and others are not. In our power, are opinion, 
movement towards a thing [aim], desire, aversion (turning from a thing); and in a word, 
whatever are our own acts; not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices 
(magisterial power) and, in a word, whatever are not our own acts.”34
Epictetus goes on to warn that as long as a person occupies himself with externals, he 
will neglect the inner self. Since one cannot control external issues, they must become 
“indifferents”—that is, they are outside our will. As Epictetus puts it, “The things in our 
power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in 
our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint and in the power of others.” The Stoic 
pursues only that which is his own, within his power, and seeks a rational, self-sufficient 
existence motivated by the discipline of personal virtue.35 
Such an unrelenting concentration on the inner self at the expense of a life in society 
may strike some readers as a harsh doctrine. However, it is important to note that the 
Stoic philosophers never suggest that an individual should not partake of “the game of 
life,” the search for public success or worldly goods. They only warn that one should not 
become caught up in the game to the extent that it reduces individual freedom of choice 
and constrains the pursuit of virtue. Stoics are not unworldly. It must be remembered 
that two of the most important Roman Stoics, Cicero and Seneca, were wealthy politi-
cians, while Marcus Aurelius was at once emperor, soldier, and philosopher.36 A true 
Stoic is a participant in human affairs who understands the harsh realities of the world 
only too well. It is not for nothing that Epictetus compares the Stoic’s life to that of the 
discharge of military service to the highest standards: “Do you not know that life is a sol-
dier’s service? . . . So too it is in the world; each man’s life is a campaign, and a long and 
varied one. It is for you to play the soldier’s part—do everything at the General’s bidding, 
divining his wishes, if it be possible.”37 
It is because of Stoics’ understanding of life that they will never be dismayed by hap-
penings outside their spans of control; Nil admirari is their motto—“Be astonished at 
nothing.” In Stoic cosmology, true freedom lies in the form of how much autonomy can 
be gained by an individual in order to live a virtuous existence, despite the pressures of 
professional duties and social obligations.38 One of the most fundamental of Stoic atti-
tudes, then, is what Pierre Hadot, in his analysis of Marcus Aurelius’s thought, describes 
as “the delimitation of our own sphere of liberty as an impregnable islet of autonomy, in 
the midst of the vast river of events and of Destiny.”39 
Striving to Control Emotions Is the Essence of Rational Activity 
The ancient Stoics believed that all moral purpose must be grounded in reason, not 
emotion. Consequently, emotions such as desire, pleasure, fear, and dejection must be 
transformed into acts of free will. For example, one suffers fear only if one decides to 
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fear—for as Epictetus observes, everything in life is connected to “what lies within our 
will,” or in Admiral Stockdale’s interpretation, “decisions of the will.”40 For the Stoic, the 
unhappiest people are those preoccupied individuals who, as Seneca puts it, have the 
desires of immortals combined with the fears of mortals. Such unfortunates allow emo-
tionally based fears concerning their bodies, worldly possessions, and relationships to 
assail and overcome them.41 Those who are unhappy are always “oblivious of the past, 
negligent of the present, [and] fearful of the future.” They exemplify the truth that “the 
least concern of the pre-occupied man is life; it is the hardest science of all.”42 
For Seneca, prosperity can come to the vulgar and to ordinary talents, but triumph-
ing over the disasters and terrors of life takes a special prowess that is “the privilege of 
the great man.”43 The Stoic must master the emotions of Fate, for “you do not shine out-
wardly because all your goods are turned inward. So does our [Stoic] world scorn what 
lies without and rejoice in the contemplation of itself. Your whole good I have bestowed 
within yourselves: your good fortune is not to need good fortune.”44 The central ideal of 
the Stoic will is thus to master all conflicting emotions in favor of the power of reason 
and so create an inner self that is, in Cicero’s words, “safe, impregnable, fenced and 
fortified”—a harmony of mind and soul that is capable of functioning both in isolation 
and yet is also in comradeship with other virtuous minds.45 
Virtue Comes from Knowing What Is in One’s Control and What Is Not 
As we have seen, in the inner citadel of the Stoic soul it is important to distinguish 
between the things that depend on human activity and the things that do not, for as 
Seneca notes, “it is in the power of any person to despise all things but in the power of 
no person to possess all things.”46 The true meaning of personal freedom is summed
up by Epictetus in the Enchiridion: “Whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither 
wish for anything nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not observe 
this rule, he must be a slave.”47 Moreover, in order to maximize the realm of personal 
freedom, a Stoic competes with others only as a matter of moral choice, when virtue 
and self-knowledge are at stake. Epictetus warns against external appearances, since the 
nature of good is always within. As he puts it, “You can be invincible if you enter no  
contest in which it is not in your power to conquer.”48 
Ultimately, Stoicism, while challenging to modern military sensibilities, is not an 
impossible creed. As Nancy Sherman has argued, it should not be interpreted as a narrow 
philosophy aimed at creating a race of iron men, divorced from cosmopolitan concerns 
of fellowship and social community.49 Rather, Stoicism is about fostering a spirit of invin-
cibility only in the sense of a willingness to endure and overcome life’s inevitable chal-
lenges, difficulties, and tragedies. Moreover, the Stoic who seeks such invincible resolution 
should not be viewed as in search of moral perfection but rather as seeking constant moral 
progress within a social context. It is this interpretation of Stoicism—one defined by the 
Roman philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes as representing a “progression towards virtue”—
that is most useful as a creed for twenty-first-century military professionals.50 
According to Cicero, this is a Stoicism that upholds public service undertaken in “a 
spirit of humanity and mutual consideration” as the supreme good. For Cicero, in his vari-
ous writings, including On Duties, the exemplar of such service was the great soldier and 
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man of letters Scipio Africanus the Elder.51 In Cicero’s “The Dream of Scipio,” Africanus 
appears in a dream to his adoptive grandson Scipio Africanus the Younger and reveals to 
him the essence of public duty.52 The elder Africanus, conqueror of Hannibal and epitome 
of Roman grandeur, teaches the younger, “Every man who has preserved or helped his 
country, or has made its greatness even greater, is reserved a special place in heaven, where 
he may enjoy eternal happiness.” The key to an honorable life is found not in private affairs 
but in public service: “The very best deeds are those which serve your country.”53 
Viewed in terms of moral progression, then, the Stoic life is a profoundly human 
quest for knowledge and as such is a philosophical journey, never a destination—an 
archetype to be approximated, never an ideal to be achieved. The Stoic overcomes the 
playground of the Furies that life represents by developing an endurance marked by the 
cultivation of reason and the practice of willpower—both born out of a lifelong pursuit 
of good character.54 
Stoic Lessons and Choices for Twenty-First-Century  
Military Professionals 
How can so demanding a personal philosophy work within the parameters of the 
twenty-first-century Western military profession? Eight moral lessons and seven moral 
choices that reflect the influence of Stoicism emerge from the annals of Western philoso-
phy, literature, and history. They may assist uniformed military personnel in the arming 
of the inner selves as they pursue their journeys of professional development. 
Eight Moral Lessons from Stoicism 
A first lesson concerns the need to develop an understanding of the meaning of a human 
life, assailed from three directions—the body, the external world, and personal relation-
ships. The writings of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius argue that life often resembles a 
storm-tossed sea, not a tranquil ocean, and that one should seek to navigate its shoals 
and currents according to a moral philosophy. As Seneca says in his letter “The Happy 
Life,” the road to meaningful life lies not in the senses but in the pursuit of virtue and 
honor based on “self-sufficiency and abiding tranquillity.” Together, these qualities pro-
duce a constancy that in turn confers “the gift of greatness of soul”—a gift that consum-
mates everlasting good and transcends the brevity of human existence.55 
It is also useful to recall Marcus Aurelius’s injunction in his Meditations on the need 
for a philosophy of life. The Meditations, composed as it was in campaign tents in innu-
merable frontier wars against Teutonic barbarians, has an obvious resonance for mem-
bers of the profession of arms today: 
Of man’s life, his time is a point, his existence a flux, his sensation clouded, his body’s 
entire composition corruptible, his vital spirit an eddy of breath, his fortune hard to 
predict, his fame uncertain. Briefly, all the things of the body, a river; all the things 
of the spirit, dream and delirium; his life is a warfare and a sojourn in a strange land, 
his after-fame oblivion. What then can be his escort through life? One thing and one 
thing only, Philosophy.56 
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For many Stoics, meaningful living is further symbolized by Xenophon’s story about 
Hercules’s choice. On the eve of manhood, Hercules retires to the desert to reflect on his 
future. He is soon visited by two goddesses, Aretē (Virtue) and Hēdonē (Pleasure), who 
offer him different paths in life. Aretē offers Hercules an arduous path with much pain, 
labor, and tumult but also true meaning, moral purpose, and enduring honor. In con-
trast, Hēdonē offers him a pleasurable path of sensual ease, repose, and sumptuous living 
but without lasting significance. Hercules, with philosophical wisdom, chooses aretē and 
a life of struggle but one defined by righteous action, fidelity, honor, and decency.57 
A second lesson from the Stoic canon concerns the question of how a military profes-
sional should face his day, and again one can draw upon Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations. 
Marcus believed that “a man should stand upright, not be held upright.”58 A virtuous 
soul must always seek moral autonomy, because it is engaged in a personal journey to 
eternity. An individual’s true power comes from the inner strength arising from a self-
mastery that is honed to overcome the ebb and flow of frustration and failure. For the 
Roman soldier-emperor, then, daily moral life was about honorable action irrespective of 
the circumstances that an individual must face and to this end he offered the following 
sage advice: 
Say to yourself in the early morning: I shall meet today inquisitive, ungrateful, vio-
lent, treacherous, envious, uncharitable men. All these things have come upon them 
through ignorance of real good and ill. But I, because I have seen that the nature of 
good is the right and of ill the wrong, and that the nature of the man himself who 
does wrong is akin to my own (not of the same blood and seed, but partaking with me 
in mind, that is in a portion of divinity), I can neither be harmed by any of them, for 
no man will involve me in wrong, nor can I be angry with my kinsman or hate him; 
for we have come into the world to live together.59 
For Marcus, those who behave badly do so because they lack Stoic character and value 
the external “indifferents” in life; theirs is a rationality that remains untutored by the 
quest for virtue. In contrast, the Stoic, aside from necessary cooperation with others for 
the common good, will always remain personally aloof from those who possess “igno-
rant and unlearned” souls.60 
A third lesson of great value imparts the central tenet of Stoicism, namely, know-
ing what one can control and what one cannot control. Here a military professional can 
take to heart Epictetus’s advice in the Enchiridion to the effect that we always have a 
choice about the character of our inner lives and that trying to control or change what 
we cannot only results in anguish and torment. As Epictetus puts it, “If you desire any-
thing which is not in our power, you 
must be unfortunate; but of the things 
in our power, and which it is good 
to desire, nothing is yet before you”; 
therefore, “Pursue nothing that is outside us, nothing that is not our own.”61 This tenet 
does not translate to mere passivity in the storm of events. On the contrary, the Stoic 
interior character can exert its own will in a duel with external events with the power 
with which a magnet draws iron. 
A gulf has grown between the honor codes of volun-
teer military professionals and parent societies.
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How an individual military professional exerts his will on an external situation is 
illuminated by Charles de Gaulle’s pre–World War II reflections on philosophy and 
military self-reliance in the opening chapters of his 1932 book The Edge of the Sword. 
Influenced by Cicero’s notion that character exhibits the supreme value of self-reliance 
and that “great men of action have always been of the meditative type,” the French sol-
dier and future statesman wrote that when faced with the challenge of events, the man 
of character has recourse to himself, for “it is character that supplies the essential ele-
ment, the creative touch, the divine spark, in other words, the basic fact of initiative.”62 
The instinctive response of the man of character “is to leave his mark on action, to 
take responsibility for it, to make it his own business.” Such an individual “finds an 
especial attractiveness in difficulty, since it is only by coming to grips with difficulty 
that he can realise his potentialities.”63 After France’s disastrous defeat of 1940, de 
Gaulle lived these tenets first as leader in exile of the Free French and later, after 1958, 
as president of his country, in the cauldron of counterrevolutionary warfare in Algeria. 
A powerful fourth lesson deals with how happiness can be found only within, and 
again a military professional can make use of Epictetus’s and Marcus Aurelius’s writ-
ings—this time in the form of their teaching that maximizing individual freedom is 
the only worthy goal in life. Happiness born out of such a sense of freedom depends 
on the interaction of three spheres of personal activity: the discipline of desire (control 
of emotions), the discipline of assent (the exercise of judgment based on reason), and 
the discipline of action (the pursuit of honorable service).64 Here one can learn from 
the great seventeenth-century French thinker René Descartes, whose moral philoso-
phy has been described as a form of neo-Stoicism.65 In his “Discourse on Method,” 
Descartes writes that the path to human happiness is to be found in the disciplines 
of Stoic thought. Descartes described the “third maxim” of his system of morals as 
follows: 
My third maxim was always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to alter my 
desires rather than change the order of the world, and generally to accustom myself to 
believe that there is nothing entirely within our power but our own thoughts: so that 
after we have done our best in regard to the things that are without us, our ill-success 
cannot possibly be failure on our part.66 
Although such an approach required great self-discipline and “long exercise and medita-
tion often repeated,” in it, concludes Descartes, “is to be found the secret of those phi-
losophers who, in ancient times, were able to free themselves from the empire of fortune, 
or despite suffering or poverty, to rival their gods in their happiness.”67 
The fifth lesson suggests that events do not necessarily hurt us, but our views of them 
can. In this respect, the Stoics urge the use of reason to ensure correct perception, 
since if we cannot always choose our external circumstances, we can always choose 
how we shall respond to them. The Stoic view of life as a valiant response to a fate that 
must be borne is immortalized in the poem “Invictus” (Invincible), written in 1875 by 
William Ernest Henley, an Englishman who endured a lifetime of debilitating illness 
and infirmity. Despite his great suffering, Henley chose to remain undiminished, and 
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the unconquerable spirit he represented is enshrined in the lines of what is regarded 
by many today as the personification of the Stoic creed: 
Out of the night that covers me, 
Black as the Pit from pole to pole, 
I thank whatever gods may be 
For my unconquerable soul. 
In the fell clutches of circumstance 
I have not winced nor cried aloud. 
Under the bludgeonings of chance 
My head is bloody, but unbowed. 
Beyond this place of wrath and tears 
Looms but the horror of the shade, 
And yet the menace of the years 
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid. 
It matters not how strait the gate, 
How charged with punishment the scroll. 
I am the master of my fate: 
I am the captain of my soul.68 
Henley’s Captain of the Soul is unflinching and unyielding, not least in the face of 
the ultimate adversity—death. Here, we should note the Stoic teaching that death is ev-
eryone’s fate and should not be unduly feared. As Marcus Aurelius dryly observes, “An 
unscientific but none the less a helpful support to disdain of death is to review those 
who have clung tenaciously to life.” Similarly, Seneca writes that because life is brief and 
perishable, “everything must therefore be borne with fortitude, because events do not, as 
we suppose, happen but arrive by appointment.”69 
From a military perspective, perhaps the ultimate Stoic view of how to master the 
spectre of death can be found in the works of the former World War II combat infantry-
man and writer James Jones, the author of From Here to Eternity and The Thin Red Line. 
Jones has been described as “the Tolstoy of the foot soldiers,” a “mid–twentieth century 
American stoic, akin to Marcus Aurelius in his long apprenticeship to war, suffering, and 
the effort to bear it all.”70 Detesting those who, from afar, glorified war, Jones loved the 
American fighting man; his essay “Evolution of a Soldier,” from his 1975 book WW II, 
is a bracing Stoic text for military professionals facing the test of combat. With searing 
honesty, Jones writes that the most successful combat soldier makes a “final full accep-
tance of the fact that his name is already written down in the rolls of the already dead”:71 
Every combat soldier, if he follows far enough along the path that began with his in-
duction, must, I think, be led inexorably to that awareness. He must make a compact 
with himself or with Fate that he is lost. Only then can he function as he ought to 
function, under fire. He knows and accepts beforehand that he’s dead. . . . That soldier 
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you have walking around there with this awareness in him is the final end product of 
the EVOLUTION OF A SOLDIER.72 
Jones admits that this is a grim and hard philosophy, but he argues that those who 
accept the status of the “living dead” paradoxically find their fatalism vibrant and life 
affirming, since “the acceptance and the giving up of hope create and reinstill hope in 
a kind of reverse-process photo-negative function.” In accepting a Stoic doctrine that 
“sufficient unto the day is the existence thereof,” many soldiers ironically increase their 
chances of battlefield effectiveness and personal survival. They learn to hate war and yet 
also to love the drama, excitement, and comradeship as aids in overcoming the dread 
of death in combat. Still others learn through experience to rationalize and master war’s 
harsh purpose and rigorous demands and make it their lives’ great professional calling.73 
Jones’s perceptive Stoical meditations on how a soldier can respond to the external cir- 
cumstances of battle, which are beyond his personal control, are among the most real-
istic writings ever penned on modern war. They represent a timeless testament for all 
those in uniform who seek to be Henley’s Captains of the Soul. 
A sixth lesson upholds the great Stoic truth that character matters more than reputa-
tion. Echoing Charles de Gaulle, General George C. Marshall once observed those who 
are called to lead men in battle must be judged less on technical ability than on charac-
ter, on a reputation for fairness, patriotic purpose, and selfless determination.74 A good 
way of reinforcing this message is to read Howard Spring’s 1940 novel Fame Is the Spur, 
the tale of the rise of an idealistic British working-class political leader, Hamer Radshaw, 
who in pursuit of high office becomes corrupted, renouncing every principle he ever 
espoused and every person who ever placed faith in him.75 Making a cavalry sabre his 
honor symbol, he gradually allows its blade to lie unused. In a memorable scene in the 
1947 film of Spring’s book, Radshaw at the end of his life, resplendent with accumulated 
honors and a peerage, tries to draw the sword, only to find that the blade has rusted in 
its scabbard. The scene is a metaphor of a career in which Radshaw’s soul has rusted 
in his body and his moral principles have withered in the face of unrelenting personal 
ambition.76 
A seventh lesson is that in the Stoic world, effective leadership and good conduct are 
always dependent on a willingness to play the role that is assigned. For those who aspire 
to be military Stoics, mastery of the “three disciplines” of desire, assent, and action is all-
important.77 At every stage of his military career, no matter what the personal discom-
fort, the professional officer must seek to behave correctly. As Epictetus puts it, life is like 
a play, and “it is your duty to act well the part that is given to you; but to select the part 
belongs to another.”78 
Particularly relevant to the military professional is the Stoic’s “discipline of action,” 
the need for honorable and “appropriate actions” when serving the greater good. A use-
ful reminder of what can happen when such appropriate actions are ignored is James 
Kennaway’s Tunes of Glory, a concise and powerful 1956 study of military character.79 Set 
in an unnamed peacetime Scottish Highland regiment in the early post–Second World 
War era, the novel explores what happens when an acting battalion commander refuses 
to give his loyalty to an appointed successor. The passed-over officer, the extrovert Major 
Jock Sinclair, is an up-from-the-ranks hero of El Alamein whose charismatic wartime 
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leadership and natural aggression have in peacetime conditions been reduced to a resi-
due of professional soldiering bolstered by hard drinking and boorish behavior masquer-
ading as manliness. Sinclair is replaced by a polar opposite, the cultivated but sensitive 
Lieutenant Colonel Basil Barrow, a graduate of Eton, Sandhurst, and Oxford, a former 
prisoner of war of the Japanese and “Special Duties” officer. 
In a mixture of aggressive spirit, hurt pride, and class resentment, Sinclair refuses to 
accept his loss of command for the good of the regiment. The wily Sinclair constantly 
criticizes and undermines the new commanding officer, and his psychological and physi-
cal subversions confuse and divide the battalion’s officers and noncommissioned offi-
cers.80 A court-martial brings a crisis that eventually implodes into a double tragedy in 
the form of Barrow’s suicide and Sinclair’s mental collapse from a belated sense of guilt 
for the lethal consequences of his coarse egocentrism. As a study of military character, 
Tunes of Glory is a compelling reminder of the need for Stoic self-discipline and of the 
demands of duty and obligation irrespective of individual feelings. As a study of charac-
ter, the book can be usefully supplemented by the masterly British film made under the 
same title in 1960.81 
An eighth and final Stoic lesson concerns the question of suffering and where the line 
of goodness may be found in life. For the military professional, suffering is an inescapable 
part of duty, and here one can do no better than study Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s reflec-
tions, in his monumental The Gulag Archipelago, on how the collision between “the soul 
and barbed wire” may yet become a transformative force for good. Solzhenitsyn’s chapter 
“The Ascent”—one of the greatest pieces of twentieth-century writing—is about nour-
ishment of the soul in the midst of despair and hardship. The Russian dissident writes 
of how misfortune may become the raw material from which the soul “ripens from suf-
fering.”82 In “The Ascent” Solzhenitsyn, despite years of dehumanization in the Soviet 
prison system, reaches a Stoic consciousness about the essential individual nature of 
good and evil and the power of personal revelation.83 He accepts that while it is impos-
sible to expel evil from the world in its entirety, “it is possible to constrict it within each 
person” by an awakening of omniscience, from a self-knowledge of good that is born out 
of suffering:84 
It was only when I lay there on the rotting prison straw that I sensed within myself the 
first stirrings of good. Gradually it was disclosed to me that the line separating good 
and evil passes not between states nor between classes nor between political parties 
but right through every human heart, through all human hearts. . . . Since then I have 
come to understand the truth of all the religions of the world: They struggle with the 
evil inside a human being (inside every human being).85 
Prison had nourished Solzhenitsyn’s soul in the pursuit of virtue, allowing him to write, 
“I turn back to the years of my imprisonment and say, sometimes to the astonishment of 
those about me. . . . Bless you prison, for having been in my life!”86 
Solzhenitsyn’s world is that inhabited earlier by other Stoics denied human free-
dom, including the great Spanish writer Miguel de Cervantes, America’s James 
Stockdale, and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela. All of these extraordinary figures 
underwent a form of Solzhenitsyn’s ascent of the soul and reached Stoic transcendence 
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through suffering. Their experiences and their subsequent lives echo Seneca’s wise 
teaching that “disaster is virtue’s opportunity,” for true character can never be revealed 
without a struggle with adversity—just as “gold is tried by fire, brave men [are tested] 
by misfortune.”87 
Seven Moral Choices from Stoicism 
All members of the profession of arms face a career in which moral choices are ines-
capable. Stoicism may assist individuals in applying judgments born out of the cultiva-
tion of good character. The following seven moral choices, all drawn from Western 
literature and history, are offered as a framework for the moral decision making of 
military professionals. 
The first of these choices—deciding the kind of military professional you want to 
be—is drawn from Anton Myrer’s 1968 novel Once an Eagle, about the American pro-
fession of arms between the First World War and the beginnings of Vietnam. Although 
the setting of the book is firmly American in style and tone, Myrer’s tale is a universal 
one.88 In it two officer archetypes are contrasted. The first archetype is the dutiful and 
Stoic Sam Damon, a moral warrior and an exemplar of all that is best in the profes-
sion of arms. The second is the Epicurean and brilliantly cynical careerist Courtney 
Massengale, an officer of many social connections but whose moral compass is as cor-
rupt as that of Lord Henry Wotton in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray. 
Damon and Massengale both rise to become generals, but their careers are in 
stark contrast. The Stoic Damon, a straight-talking “mustang” (i.e., up from the 
ranks) with a brilliant World War I combat record, is no match for the silken malice 
of Massengale, especially in the flick-knife political world of the U.S. Army staff in 
Washington. As a result, over the years Damon, the complete military professional, is 
perpetually outranked and outmaneuvered by Massengale’s unscrupulous careerism—a 
careerism symbolized by insouciant charm and great verbal facility and propelled by 
an “astonishing intellectual prowess like some jeweled sword.”89 
As Damon’s superior officer during World War II in the Pacific and later in 
Southeast Asia, Massengale regards Damon’s relentless honesty and single-minded 
military integrity not as operational assets but as obstacles to his own advancement. 
Massengale dismisses Damon’s frequent professional protestations over his self-seeking 
command methods as naïve: “Like most strictly combat types he [Damon] lacks politi-
cal savoir faire.”90 Myrer’s sprawling saga becomes a powerful meditation on the moral 
choices involved in military officership and upon the eternal danger that the unscru-
pulous Massengales pose to the honest Damons. Indeed, both the title and tone of the 
book are taken from Aeschylus’s famous lines: 
So in the Libyan fable it is told  
That once an eagle stricken with a dart,  
Said, when he saw the fashion of the shaft,  
“With our own feathers, not by others’ hands,  
Are we now smitten.”91 
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The second moral choice that will confront many Western officers in particular is the 
substance of officership as a choice between a quest for status and a search for real achieve-
ment. Here a useful model is the tempestuous career of the brilliant U.S. Air Force colo-
nel John Boyd—a man whom some observers have regarded as “the American Sun Tzu,” 
because of his espousal of maneuver warfare and the novel “OODA” (observe, orient, 
decide, act) decision cycle. Boyd was an irascible and outspoken intellectual maverick 
whose views were always at odds with the U.S. Air Force establishment. Consequently, 
his strategic ideas were unwelcome and remained little appreciated during his profes-
sional career.92 
Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, those who opposed and 
impeded Boyd’s career are forgotten men, while Boyd’s influence permeates advanced 
military doctrine throughout the West. In retrospect, his dogged pursuit of strategic 
innovation can now be seen as a monument of moral courage, a tribute to imaginative 
professional perseverance, and a salutary reminder that professional militaries often 
neglect their finest minds. Boyd’s spirit of officership is conveyed in his Stoic-like “to be 
or to do, that is the question,” speech delivered to military colleagues and subordinates 
in the Pentagon in June 1974: 
You have to make a choice about what kind of person you are going to be. There 
are two [military] career paths in front of you, and you have to choose which path 
you will follow. One path leads to promotions, titles and positions of distinctions. 
To achieve success down that path, you have to conduct yourself a certain way. You 
must go along with the system. . . . The other path leads to doing things that are truly 
significant for the Air Force, but you may have to cross swords with the party line on 
occasion. You can’t go down both paths, you have to choose. Do you want to be a man 
of distinction or do you want to do things that really influence the shape of the Air 
Force? To be or to do, that is the question.93 
A third moral choice facing military professionals involves the need to resist the cor-
rosive influence on the warrior spirit of bureaucratization. As Charles de Gaulle once 
wrote, the true combat officer must always keep his intellect focused on the art of war 
and resist the intrusion of bureaucratic politics—for only through a dedicated pursuit 
of military philosophy “will an edge be given to the sword.”94 A good example of this 
moral choice is exemplified by Emmanuel Wald’s 1992 book The Decline of Israeli 
National Security since 1967, in which the author analyzes the conceptual confusion 
and analytical failings of the Israeli officer corps—confusion and failings that arguably 
came to a head during the reverses suffered in the second Lebanon war, in 2006.95 
Wald’s book warns that during the 1970s and 1980s the Israeli Defense Force’s 
much-vaunted operational philosophy, honed in the 1948, 1956, and 1967 wars against 
the Arabs, became corroded by “a procedure of nonstrategy” based on bureaucratic 
compromise and conformity.96 Wald quotes General Israel Tal’s speech at the Israeli 
National Defense College in April 1979 on how bureaucratic arrogance, intrigue, and 
mediocrity can combine to destroy the creative imagination that is fundamental to 
future generals: 
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[Israeli] officers at the rank of captain or major, naïve and full of youthful enthusiasm, 
believe they will be judged by their achievements. Lacking bureaucratic experience, 
they will try to exercise critical and original thought. . . . If these officers do not grasp 
that it is forbidden to damage bureaucratic harmony and coddling they will quickly 
be dropped from the IDF [Israeli Defense Force] system which does not tolerate devi-
ants. If they are able to last in an organisation which, by its very nature, enslaves and 
constrains the thinker, then they will eventually, after many years of learning, reach 
the rank of general. By then, of course, not much can be expected from them in terms 
of creative thinking.97 
A fourth moral choice for those in uniform arises from the proposition that no 
individual of character can remain neutral in a moral crisis. Here much can be learned 
from the 1930s “wilderness years” of Winston Churchill, during which, in Stoic-like 
grandeur, he waged a lonely crusade to warn the British people about the mortal threat 
that growing Nazi power posed to Western civilization. In particular, Churchill’s 1948 
The Gathering Storm is instructive, for in this volume of his monumental history of the 
Second World War the great statesman documents how the liberal democracies of the 
1930s lacked essential elements of character, persistence, and conviction in matters of 
international security. Western policy toward Hitler’s Germany took the form of moral 
compromise, based on the policy of appeasement. Knowing that this failure of states-
manship was to create a war in which the worst “material ruin and moral havoc” in 
recorded history would be inflicted upon humanity, Churchill reflects: 
It is my purpose as one who lived and acted in those days to show how easily the 
tragedy of the Second World War could have been prevented; how the malice of the 
wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous. . . . We shall see how the 
councils of prudence and restraint may become the prime agents of mortal danger; 
how the middle course adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found 
to lead direct to the bull’s-eye of disaster.98 
Churchill’s book embodies his famous moral lesson: “In War: Resolution / In Defeat: 
Defiance / In Victory: Magnanimity / In Peace: Good Will.”99 
A fifth choice that reflects Stoic teaching revolves around the necessity for a mili-
tary professional always to make the best of adversity. As Seneca argues, the individual 
of good character will always seek to turn adversity to advantage, for “the thing that 
matters is not what you bear but how you bear it.”100 There are interesting connections 
between Stoicism and Christianity here, as evidenced in such works as St. Augustine’s 
Confessions and Thomas à Kempis’s The Imitation of Christ.101 As mentioned earlier, 
a Christianized form of Stoicism was disseminated in the sixteenth century by Justus 
Lipsius, upholding Seneca’s teaching that “we are born into a kingdom; to obey God is to 
be free.” Indeed, the origins of the Western professional military ethic itself can be traced 
to Lipsius’s Christian neo-Stoicism and its influence over such early modern Western 
military reformers as Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, and Oliver Cromwell.102 
Given these connections, the anonymous “Soldier’s Prayer” from the American Civil 
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War, found in a military prison in 1865 (and given below as reproduced by Admiral 
Stockdale), repays reading as both a Stoic and Christian testament: 
We asked for strength that we might achieve,  
God made us weak that we might obey.  
We asked for health that we might do great things  
He gave us infirmity that we might do better things  
We asked for riches that we might be happy;  
We were given poverty that we might be wise.  
We asked for power that we might have the praise of men;  
We were given weakness that we might feel the need of God  
We asked for all things that we might enjoy life;  
We were given life that we might enjoy all things  
We received nothing that we asked for  
But all that we hoped for  
And our prayers were answered. We were most blessed.103 
The sixth moral choice that military professionals need to ponder is whether they 
are willing to pay the terrible price that may be required when choosing to act out of con-
science and principle. Nowhere in recent military history is this better illustrated than 
by the German army officers who joined the abortive 20 July 1944 Valkyrie plot to kill 
Adolf Hitler, as recounted by such eminent historians as Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Peter 
Hoffmann, and Joachim Fest.104 Much inspiration can be drawn from the actions of 
Brigadier General Henning von Tresckow and Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, 
who were the noblest spirits behind the 1944 conspiracy to rid Germany of a criminal  
regime. Both men came to view Hitler as the Antichrist, the archenemy of both 
Germany and Western civilization, whose death was a redemptive necessity “before the 
eyes of the world and of history.”105 
Immediately following the failure of the assassination attempt, von Tresckow pre-
pared to commit suicide with a grenade in order to deny the SS the opportunity to 
torture him into revealing the names of other conspirators. As this young general and 
cultured German patriot left his Eastern Front headquarters on 21 July 1944 to take his 
own life in no-man’s-land, he turned to his adjutant, Captain Fabian von Schlabrendorff, 
and said with Stoic poignancy: 
When, in a few hours, I go before God to account for what I have done and left 
undone, I know I will be able to justify in good conscience what I did in the struggle 
against Hitler. God promised Abraham that He would not destroy Sodom if just ten 
righteous men could be found and I hope God will not destroy Germany. None of us 
can bewail his own death; those who consented to join our circle put on the robe of 
Nessus. A human being’s moral integrity begins when he is prepared to sacrifice his 
life for his convictions.106 
Tresckow’s courageous participation in the doomed 1944 assassination plot embodies 
Seneca’s famous challenge: “What is the duty of the good man? To offer himself to Fate,” 
for “good men toil, spend and are spent, and willingly.”107 
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A seventh and final moral choice for military professionals concerns the need to sub-
mit oneself to the spirit of endurance. Such a choice reflects the Stoic teaching that true 
courage represents steadfastness of soul, expressed in a decision to bear and forbear the 
storms of life over time and circumstance. In Seneca’s words, “The demonstration of 
courage can never be gentle. Fortune scourges and rends us; we must endure it. It is not 
cruelty but a contest, and the oftener we submit to it the braver shall we be.”108 
Here much wisdom can be gleaned from the writings of the philosophers Aristotle 
and Arthur Schopenhauer, from the Austrian psychiatrist and Holocaust survivor Viktor 
E. Frankl, from former British prime minister Gordon Brown, and from the American 
war correspondent and novelist Glendon Swarthout.109 In his insightful reflections on 
the meaning of courage, Aristotle warns us that true courage differs from audacity.110 
The latter is counterfeit courage; it is based on an “excess of intrepidity,” on a physical 
impulsiveness that represents “a boastful species of bravery and the mere ape of man-
hood” and may conceal a fundamental moral cowardice. For Aristotle, real courage—
particularly in its military manifestation—is based on a combination of confidence and 
caution, on the capacity for discriminating thought and clear judgment, and it prefers 
“the grace and beauty of a habitual fortitude.”111 
Both Arthur Schopenhauer and Viktor Frankl arrive at a similar conclusion on cour-
age as a form of fortitude. In his writing on ethics, Schopenhauer defines courage as 
“a kind of endurance.”112 Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning echoes the work of 
Epictetus, in stating that the way one behaves in a situation depends more on personal 
decisions rather than on impersonal conditions.113 He holds that all faced by physical 
danger and moral adversity have at 
their disposal a master key to pick the 
lock of courage, in the form of “the 
last of human freedoms—[the right] 
to choose one’s attitude in any given 
set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”114 More recently, in his Courage: Eight 
Portraits, Gordon Brown concentrates on courage in the Stoic spirit, not simply as phys-
ical audacity but as prolonged exposure to danger and risk in the form of “sustained 
altruism,” exhibited by committed individuals as diverse as the British wartime nurse 
Edith Cavell, the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and the Burmese political 
dissident Aung San Suu Kyi. Brown quotes approvingly Churchill’s famous remark that 
“courage is the first of all human qualities because it is the quality which guarantees all 
the others.”115 
Perhaps nowhere in twentieth-century American military literature are Aristotle’s 
distinction between mere audacity and real courage, Frankl’s “last of human freedoms,” 
and Brown’s notion of “sustained altruism” better illustrated than in Glendon Swarthout’s 
Pulitzer Prize–nominated 1958 novel They Came to Cordura, one of the most insight-
ful literary meditations ever composed on what constitutes courage under arms.116 
Swarthout’s novel is set during the U.S. Army’s abortive 1916 punitive expedition into 
Mexico to chastise Pancho Villa and his revolutionaries. The central figure is Major 
Thomas Thorn, awards officer of the campaign, who is ordered to escort five cavalry-
men cited for the Congressional Medal of Honor across the barren desert of Chihuahua 
to the town of Cordura and safety. As the patrol moves across the stark terrain, Thorn, a 
Ethics need to be complemented by a stronger focus 
on philosophy that permits the professional military 
to become fully a self-conscious moral community.
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middle-aged soldier tortured by the memory of his own sudden failure of nerve in a pre-
vious military engagement, ponders the qualities of the five heroes in his charge, whom 
he regards as members of Socrates’s “golden race.”117 
The journey to Cordura—the town’s name means “courage” in Spanish—becomes a 
dark metaphor by which Swarthout examines the character of courage in wartime. The 
patrol is ambushed by Villistas and tormented by heat, thirst, and adversity, and the 
golden mettle of Thorn’s five “heroes” begins to betray base qualities. With the excep-
tion of Thorn, each man falters under the strain of prolonged exposure to danger and 
risk. Faced by the need to exhibit continuous courage, each of the five heroes chooses 
instead to become a moral coward. It becomes clear that the physical gallantry under 
fire that had been demonstrated by the five Medal of Honor candidates had been lit-
tle more than Aristotle’s “deformed courage” of audacity, momentary accidents in their 
otherwise undistinguished lives. In the end, Thorn, with classic Stoic fortitude, comes 
to Cordura—and thus to the meaning of courage—by delivering the flawed nominees to 
safety against all odds and, within sight of the town, at the sacrifice of his own life. His 
journey has seen him discover the reservoirs of an enduring bravery that he feared he 
did not possess—a realization that allows him to fulfil a sworn duty to five apparently 
courageous, but in reality morally unworthy, comrades.118 
Life Is Being A Soldier 
In contemporary Western culture, the teachings of ancient Stoicism may seem redun-
dant, but it is not so. In twenty-first-century warfare the instrumental dimension of the 
scientific battle space may be important to success, but warfare remains a profoundly 
human experience that reflects existential meaning and reveals both moral agency and 
character. We must remember that human nature is unchanging and that it is hubristic 
of any generation to suggest that it can somehow escape the long shadow cast by history. 
We may not live in the past, but the past lives in the present, and we ignore its wisdom 
at our peril. There is a famous saying (attributed to Albert Einstein) that is especially 
pertinent to advanced Western militaries in the new millennium—“Not everything that 
counts can be counted; and not everything that can be counted, counts.” 
As the ancient Stoic thinkers teach us, what truly does count is the nature of life itself 
as an unending form of warfare that must be confronted and mastered if one is to over-
come fortune and fate. While we can never insulate ourselves from misfortune, tragedy, 
or suffering, Stoicism, a philosophy of resolution that spans the ages, seeks to make its 
adherents Captains of the Soul, building inner citadels of character, rational thought, and 
moral values. The Stoic journey is one of rigor and self-discipline; it demands a regime 
of constant self-improvement. It does not promise a life of comfort or ease and one can 
expect to become only a reasonable archetype of the successful Stoic, since perfect wis-
dom and complete equanimity are unreachable ideals. In words that are not for the faint-
hearted, Epictetus warns of the endurance required from the master Stoic: “Show me 
a man who though sick is happy, who though in danger is happy, who though dying is 
happy, who though condemned to exile is happy, and who though in disrepute is happy! 
Show him to me! By the gods, I would then see a Stoic!”119 
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Yet for all its ascetic challenges and arduous demands, a Stoic philosophy has much 
to offer today’s Western uniformed professionals in their pursuit of vivere militare. 
Nowhere is this truer than in the Stoic teaching that real courage is in itself endurance of 
the human spirit. Such courage is based on a resilience in which individuality is embed-
ded within a larger community of comradeship, a unity of self and society that upholds 
a balance between the principles of private excellence and public duty. For these reasons, 
the Stoic philosophy bequeathed to us by the Hellenistic Age will continue to find new 
adherents in the twenty-first century, not least among those who choose the lives of duty, 
honor, and sacrifice demanded by the military calling. As Epictetus also writes, “Great 
is the struggle [of the Stoic life] and divine the task. The prize is a kingdom, freedom, 
serenity and peace.”120 In many respects, the Stoic ideal recalls the famous injunction to 
the Ithacan wanderers in Tennyson’s poem “Ulysses”—“To strive, to seek, to find, and 
not to yield.”121 In the Stoic creed, it is always our moral mastery of the testing journey 
of life that abides. In this sense, Stoicism’s virtues are like the stars in the night sky: they 
shine high above us, and while we may not always reach them, we are ennobled both by 
their presence and by their promise. 
Notes
   © 2010 by Michael Evans. Reprinted by permission.
  1. See the works of Christopher Paul, including The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal 
and Moral Issues (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1941); also George R. Lucas, Jr., and Paul E. 
Roush, eds., Ethics for Military Leaders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998); Martin L. Cook, The 
Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the US Military (Albany: State Univ. of New York, 2005); and 
Timothy L. Challans, Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare (Albany: State Univ. of 
New York, 2007). 
  2. Two useful studies that emphasize issues of moral character in war and that draw from classical lit-
erature are Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), and Shannon E. French, The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior 
Values Past and Present (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
  3. Quoted in John Sellars, Stoicism (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2007), p. 153. 
  4. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces after the Cold War,” in 
The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, ed. Moskos, Williams, and Segal (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 1–13. 
  5. Ibid., p. 4. 
  6. Ibid., p. 5. 
  7. John Allen Williams, “The Postmodern Military Reconsidered,” in Postmodern Military, ed. 
Moskos, Williams, and Segal, p. 274. 
  8. Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2002), Waging War without Warriors? 
The Changing Culture of Military Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), The Future of 
War: The Re-enchantment of War in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2004), The 
Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2007), Ethics and War 
in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2008), and War in an Age of Risk (London: Polity, 2009). 
  9. Coker, Waging War without Warriors? p. 2, and Ethics and War in the 21st Century, pp. 97, 137. 
 10. Coker, Waging War without Warriors? p. 160. 
 11. Ibid. 
 12. See Peter Berger, “On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor,” in Revisions: Changing 
Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Alastair MacIntyre (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 172–81. 
LES2 - Demy.indb   93 11/29/18   9:10 AM
94 ethics and the twenty-first-century military professional
 13. Professor Akbar S. Ahmed, lecture (Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C., 10 March 
2003, reported in Washington Post, 11 March 2003); James Bowman, Honor: A History (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2007), esp. part 3, and “Decline of the Honor Culture,” Policy Review, no. 156 
(August–September 2009), pp. 27–39. 
 14. Bowman, “Decline of the Honor Culture,” pp. 27–39. 
 15. Coker, Ethics and War in the 21st Century, p. 112. 
 16. Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties and Fate (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 
8–9. 
 17. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2007), pp. 116, 119. 
 18. For the legacy of Greek and Roman Stoicism see Brad Inwood, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
the Stoics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), esp. pp. 365–92; Sellars, Stoicism, chap. 
6; and Frank McLynn, Marcus Aurelius: A Life (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2009), chap. 19. 
 19. Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), p. 125. 
 20. Terri Tanieelian and Lisa H. Jaycox, eds., Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive 
Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Recovery (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2008). 
 21. Ibid., pp. ix–xx. 
 22. H. R. McMaster, “Ancient Lessons for Today’s Soldiers,” Survival 50, no. 4 (August–September 
2008), p. 187. 
 23. Coker, Warrior Ethos, p. 103. 
 24. See Sellars, Stoicism, pp. 1–31. 
 25. Peter Ryan, “Behind Enemy Lines with Marcus Aurelius,” Quadrant (April 2010), p. 128. 
 26. James Bond Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 
1995). 
 27. For Stockdale’s role at the U.S. Naval War College see Joseph Gerard Brennan, Foundations of Moral 
Obligation: The Stockdale Course (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1994). For Stockdale’s influence on Tom 
Wolfe see A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2002), pp. 269–70, 273–74. 
 28. Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, p. 189. Stockdale’s approach to Stoicism is largely 
drawn from Epictetus. See his essays, pp. 177–189, 222–37. 
 29. Aeschylus, The Oresteian Tragedy: Agamemnon/The Choephori/The Eumenides, trans. Philip Vellacot 
(London: Penguin, 1959), p. 58. For studies of Stoicism see Inwood, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
the Stoics; Sellars, Stoicism; and Brennan, Stoic Life. Other good general studies include Pierre Hadot, 
The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998); 
Long, Epictetus; Keith Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living 
(New York: Routledge, 2005); M. Andrew Holowchak, The Stoics: A Guide for the Perplexed (New 
York: Continuum International, 2008); and William B. Irvine, A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient 
Art of Stoic Joy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). For Stoicism and the challenge of modern phi-
losophy see Lawrence C. Becker, A New Stoicism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998). The 
case for a practical course in Stoicism, adapted to modern sensibilities, is presented by Keith Seddon, 
Stoic Serenity: A Practical Course on Finding Inner Peace (Hertfordshire, U.K.: by author through Lulu, 
2008). 
 30. Hadot, Inner Citadel, esp. chap. 6. 
 31. For discussion of these teachings see Holowchak, Stoics, chap. 1; Sellars, Stoicism, chaps. 2 and 5; and 
Irvine, Guide to the Good Life, part 3. 
 32. Brennan, Foundations of Moral Obligation, p. 2. 
 33. Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, pp. 180, 234–36. Stoic ethics and moral auton-
omy are well discussed in Long, Epictetus, chaps. 7–8. 
 34. Epictetus, Enchiridion, trans. George Long (New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 11. See also 
the popular interpretation of Enchiridion in Sharon Lebell, Epictetus: The Art of Living—the Classic 
Manual on Virtue, Happiness, and Effectiveness (San Francisco: Harper, 1995). 
 35. Epictetus, Enchiridion, p. 11, and Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes, pp. 14–27. 
 36. For a Stoic view of public affairs see Cicero, On the Good Life, trans. Michael Grant (London: Folio 
Society, 2003), especially his essays On Duties and On the State; L. P. Wilkinson, Letters of Cicero 
LES2 - Demy.indb   94 11/29/18   9:10 AM
evans 95
(London: Hutchinson, 1966); Moses Hadas, The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1958); and McLynn, Marcus Aurelius. 
 37. Epictetus, Discourses, cited in Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes, p. 27. 
 38. For good analysis on these points see Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, and 
Holowchak, Stoics, pp. 19–28. 
 39. Hadot, Inner Citadel, p. 83. 
 40. Epictetus, Discourses, cited in Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes, pp. 17–18; 
Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, p. 182. 
 41. Seneca, “On the Shortness of Life,” in Hadas, Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, p. 51. 
 42. Ibid., pp. 55, 59, 68. 
 43. Seneca, “On Providence,” in Hadas, Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, p. 36. 
 44. Ibid., p. 44. 
 45. Cited in Sherman, Stoic Warriors, p. 101 [emphasis added]. 
 46. Cited in Holowchak, Stoics, p. 162. 
 47. Epictetus, Enchiridion, p. 19. 
 48. Ibid., p. 21. 
 49. See Sherman, Stoic Warriors, chap. 7. 
 50. See Michael Grant, “Introduction” in Cicero, On the Good Life, pp. xxvii–xxxi, and Hadas, Stoic 
Philosophy of Seneca, pp. 1–26. 
 51. See Cicero, “On Duties (II): Service” and “On Duties (III): A Practical Code of Behaviour,” in On 
the Good Life, trans. Grant, pp. 69, 107–108. 
 52. Cicero, “The Dream of Scipio,” in On the Good Life, trans. Grant, pp. 357–67. 
 53. Ibid., p. 366. 
 54. On this theme see Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes, and Stoic Serenity. 
 55. Seneca, “The Happy Life,” in Hadas, Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, pp. 239–47. 
 56. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. and ed. A. S. L. Farquharson (London: Everyman’s Library, 
1992), p. 11. 
 57. Cited in Holowchak, Stoics, pp. 196–97. 
 58. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, p. 14. 
 59. Ibid., p. 7. 
 60. Ibid., p. 33. 
 61. Epictetus, Enchiridion, p. 13; Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes, pp. 17–18. 
 62. Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, trans. Gerard Hopkins (London: Faber and Faber, 1960, 
originally Le fil de l’épée), pp. 22, 40, 42. 
 63. Ibid., pp. 39–40, 42–43 [emphasis original]. 
 64. For the three disciplines see Seddon, Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes; Long, Epictetus, 
pp. 14–20; and Hadot, Inner Citadel, chaps. 6–8. 
 65. Taylor, Secular Age, pp. 130–32. 
 66. See E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, eds., The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1931), pp. 95–97, 290 [emphasis added]. 
 67. Ibid., p. 97. 
 68. William Ernest Henley, “Invictus,” cited in Brennan, Stoic Life, pp. 3–4. 
 69. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, p. 26; Seneca, “On Providence,” p. 41. 
 70. James R. Giles and J. Michael Lennon, introduction to The James Jones Reader: Outstanding 
Selections from His War Writings (New York: Birch Lane, 1991), p. 19. 
 71. Ibid., p. 262. 
 72. Ibid. [uppercase in original]. 
 73. Ibid., pp. 262–63. 
 74. Gen. George C. Marshall, “The Challenge of Command: An Address to the First Officer Candidate 
School, Fort Benning Georgia, 18 September 1942,” in Selected Speeches of General of the Army, 
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff United States Army, ed. H. A. DeWeerd (Washington, D.C.: 
Infantry Journal, 1945), pp. 220–21. 
 75. Howard Spring, Fame Is the Spur (New York: Viking, 1940). 
 76. Fame Is the Spur, directed by Roy Boulting (Two Cities Films, 1947). Michael Redgrave appeared as 
Hamer Radshaw. 
LES2 - Demy.indb   95 11/29/18   9:10 AM
96 ethics and the twenty-first-century military professional
 77. See Long, Epictetus, pp. 236–40, and Hadot, Inner Citadel, chaps. 6–8. 
 78. Epictetus, Enchiridion, pp. 21–22. 
 79. James Kennaway, Tunes of Glory (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1985). 
 80. Ibid. 
 81. See Tunes of Glory, directed by Ronald Neame (Janus Films, 1960, in the Criterion Collection, 
2004). Alec Guinness appears as Acting Lt. Col. Jock Sinclair and John Mills as Lt. Col. Basil 
Barrow. 
 82. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “The Ascent,” in The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956 Abridged: An 
Experiment in Literary Investigation (New York: Harper, 2007), pp. 299–313. See also Edward E. 
Ericson, Jr., and Daniel J. Mahoney, eds., The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings, 
1947–2005, 2nd ed. (Wilmington, Del.: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2009), pp. 253–67. 
 83. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956 Abridged, pp. 299–314. 
 84. Ibid., pp. 311–13. 
 85. Ibid., p. 312 [emphasis original]. 
 86. Ibid., p. 313 [emphasis original]. 
 87. Seneca, “On Providence,” pp. 37, 42. 
 88. Anton Myrer, Once an Eagle (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Foundation, 1997). 
 89. Ibid., p. 788. 
 90. Ibid., pp. 793–94. 
 91. Ibid., p. xiii. 
 92. For Boyd’s career and military significance see Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd 
and American Security (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2001); Robert Coram, Boyd: 
The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002); and Frans P. B. 
Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
 93. Quoted in James G. Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 37 [emphasis original]. 
 94. De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 14. 
 95. Emmanuel Wald, The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967 (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1992). For Israel’s poor performance in the 2006 Lebanon war and its root 
causes see Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor 
Performance?” Journal of Strategic Studies 1, no. 1 (February 2008), pp. 3–40. 
 96. Wald, Wald Report, p. 131. 
 97. Ibid., pp. 132–33. 
 98. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1, The Gathering Storm (New York: Penguin, 
2005), p. 16. 
 99. Ibid. 
100. Seneca, “On Providence,” p. 30 [emphasis added]. 
101. St. Augustine, Confessions (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1961); Thomas à Kempis, The Imitation 
of Christ (New York: Pocket Library, 1961). For discussion of Stoic-Christian connections see H. 
Stanley Davis, Greek and Roman Stoicism and Some of Its Disciples (Boston: Herbert B. Turner, 
1903), chap. 8; and McLynn, Marcus Aurelius, chap. 19. 
102. Taylor, Secular Age, pp. 114–15, 118–19. 
103. Cited in Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, p. 124. 
104. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945 
(London: Macmillan, 1953), chap. 7; Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–
1945, trans. Richard Barry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), part 9; Joachim Fest, Plotting 
Hitler’s Death: The German Resistance to Hitler, 1933–1945, trans. Bruce Little (London: Phoenix, 
1997), chap. 9. 
105. Quoted in Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death, p. 173. 
106. Ibid., pp. 289–90. 
107. Seneca, “On Providence,” pp. 41–42. 
108. Ibid., p. 39. 
109. Aristotle, “On Courage,” in Waller R. Newell, What Is a Man? 3,000 Years of Wisdom on the Art of 
Manly Virtue (New York: Harper, 2001), pp. 551–52. See also Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, 
LES2 - Demy.indb   96 11/29/18   9:10 AM
evans 97
trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press for Loeb Classical Library, 1934), 
chaps. 6–7. 
110. Aristotle, “On Courage,” p. 551. 
111. Ibid. 
112. Arthur Schopenhauer, “On Ethics,” in Essays and Aphorisms, trans. R. G. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin, 1988), p. 135. 
113. Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon, 2006). 
114. Ibid., p. 66. 
115. Gordon Brown, Courage: Eight Portraits (New York: Weinstein Books, 2008), pp. 138, 140. 
116. Glendon Swarthout, They Came to Cordura (London: Secker and Warburg, 1974). 
117. Ibid., p. 75. 
118. Ibid., pp. 214–48. 
119. Epictetus, Discourses, cited in Holowchak, Stoics, p. 193. 
120. Epictetus, Discourses, cited in Seddon, Stoic Serenity, p. 5. 
121. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, “Ulysses,” in The Oxford Library of English Poetry, vol. 3, From Dryden to 
Heaney, ed. John Wain (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 85–86. 
LES2 - Demy.indb   97 11/29/18   9:10 AM
LES2 - Demy.indb   98 11/29/18   9:10 AM
EPICTETUS VS. ARISTOTLE
What Is the Best Way to Frame the Military Virtues?
Mark N. Jensen 
The virtue theoretic approach to ethics locates moral value primarily in the character of 
the agent rather than in the rules governing an act or the consequences that follow from 
it. Concerns about the character of the agent long have been a central preoccupation of 
military organizations. To be sure, modern military organizations in the United States 
and other Western, liberal, democratic states pay close attention to the rules governing 
acts and the consequences of these acts. Nevertheless, virtue ethics are of first impor-
tance, insofar as military organizations aim to cultivate soldiers, sailors, and airmen with 
specific sets of character traits, habits, and practices. This interest in moral development 
and moral virtue is especially evident in the missions and operations of service acade-
mies, officer training schools, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs. It also can 
be found in the programs for training enlisted personnel as well as the regular, annual 
training provided to operational forces.
When we consider virtue ethics as a moral theory, it is important to understand that 
there is no single account. Virtue ethics includes a family of theories with a rich and 
complex history, including ancient perspectives from the likes of Aristotle and the Stoics, 
as well as medieval perspectives such as that of Thomas Aquinas.1 More recently, there 
has been a significant uptick of interest in virtue ethics, with notable yet very different 
approaches offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote, Robert 
Adams, Julia Annas, Nancy Sherman, Christine Swanton, Nancy Snow, and Daniel 
Russell, among many others.2
While military theory and practice have not been insulated from these contemporary 
developments, military thinkers have tended to be attracted to the Stoics. The leading 
voices here are James Stockdale, Nancy Sherman, and Michael Evans.3 The Stoics them-
selves do not speak with one voice, and the extant writings that we have from ancient 
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Stoic authors do not offer the same kind of substance and depth that we find in con-
tributors such as Aristotle and Aquinas. Epictetus’s Handbook, for example, is a series 
of loosely connected aphorisms and short reflections. The same can be said of Marcus 
Aurelius’s Meditations. Nevertheless, a close reading of Stoic texts reveals a set of themes 
that together outline a distinct and different approach to virtue ethics. In brief, while 
the ultimate good for humans is happiness, the Stoics regard the social world in which 
we try to attain this good as opaque, unfair, and out of our control. As a result, happi-
ness must be achieved entirely in the inner life, as it is the only realm we can control. 
Emotions, insofar as they are responses to external events, must be regulated tightly 
or eliminated. The virtues themselves are inner, rational dispositions that contribute 
to self-control. Public service is valuable not for the attainment of honors or external 
goods, but as an opportunity to practice the virtues. Social attachments are grounded in 
a cosmopolitan respect for shared humanity. In the military context, the Stoic approach 
is thought to resonate with the international nature of conflict; the chaos of warfare; and 
the need for order, discipline, and bravery on the battlefield.
It seems to me, however, that military organizations’ attraction to the Stoic approach 
to virtue ethics is misplaced. In this article, I will argue that an approach to virtue ethics 
inspired by Aristotle provides a better theoretical and practical foundation for military 
organizations than the approach offered by the Stoics. It is not just that Aristotle offers a 
more sophisticated account of human flourishing and the attendant virtues; his approach 
has the added value of speaking to military organizations on and off the battlefield in 
ways that are especially relevant to the nature of modern Western militaries and their 
activities. I will not be arguing that the approach of the Stoics is false or dangerous; I 
will argue instead that Aristotle’s is simply better. In particular, the Aristotelian approach 
(1) is a better match for the institutional nature of modern Western military service, 
(2) incorporates a higher degree of flexibility, which allows the account to be adjusted 
appropriately to the variety of circumstances in which modern militaries operate, and (3) 
is better able to contend with the kinds of tragedies that are at the heart of the military 
experience in war.
The article is organized as follows. I begin with a comparative sketch of Aristot le’s 
approach and the Stoic approach. I then point out salient features of modern Western 
military practice, noting how they comport with the systems of Aristotle and the Stoics. 
At this stage I develop in detail the three areas in which I take Aristotle’s account to 
be superior. I conclude with a comparative practical example: a brief sketch of how 
Aristotle’s ethics might provide better resources for tackling the current challenge that 
modern Western militaries, especially the U.S. military, face in terms of eliminating 
sexual assault and sexual harassment.
Comparative Ethics: Aristotle
All virtue theoretic approaches begin with an account of the excellent person, especially 
the habits, traits, and practices that together constitute human excellence.4 This focus on 
excellence of character contrasts with other prominent theoretical approaches to ethics, 
such as consequentialism, which focuses on the good that we bring about through our 
LES2 - Demy.indb   100 11/29/18   9:10 AM
jensen 101
actions, and deontology, which focuses on the moral laws that we should obey. Among 
the virtue theoretic approaches, Aristotle’s account is a complex affair with many mov-
ing parts. To frame a useful comparison with the Stoic account, I will focus on each 
account’s answer to two questions. First, what is moral excellence? Second, what are 
the intrinsic limitations that we face in trying to achieve moral excellence? While there 
is much more that could be said, and indeed has been said, in defense of these two 
accounts in general, my argument here will focus narrowly on their comparative fitness 
for military professionals and their organizations. It is my view that our accounts’ com-
parative answers to these two questions will be sufficient to determine which is better for 
the military context.
Moral Excellence according to Aristotle
Aristotle believed that moral excellence is found in a happy human community. By hap-
piness we mean a life of “doing well” or “being well.”5 Many commentators propose that 
the happy life is understood best as the flourishing life, to distinguish it from the vari-
ous trivializations of “happiness” that seem to have taken over contemporary Western 
culture. The flourishing human life, in turn, is defined in terms of human function.6 In 
other words, just as we can determine what it means to be an excellent or flourishing 
dolphin if we have an account of the purposes, lives, and nature of dolphins, so we can 
determine what it means to be an excellent or flourishing human if we have an account 
of the purposes, lives, and nature of humans.7 On that score, we observe that a full 
account of human function will make reference to psychological and sociological con-
texts, as these are main contexts within which humans live.
Psychologically speaking, every human being is composed of rational and nonra-
tional faculties, where the nonrational faculties include those that are capable of listening 
to reason (appetites and passions) and those that are not (involuntary bodily functions).8 
According to Aristotle, moral excellence is found at the intersection of the rational facul-
ties and the nonrational faculties that are capable of listening to reason.9 The morally 
excellent person uses her reason—or, more specifically, her deliberative and decision-
making powers—to regulate her appetites and passions so she can fulfill those functions 
specific to the appetites and passions themselves. Aristotle is not suggesting that we 
suppress or eliminate our appetites and passions; instead he argues that, in a flourishing 
person, appetites and passions will be expressed in ways that accord with right reason. 
Simply put, the morally excellent person is the well-regulated person.
Moving from psychology to sociology, we note that the functions of our faculties 
of appetite and emotion often are connected to our social roles. At the same time, part 
of the human function is defined in terms of the various social and political roles that 
we fulfill in human community. For each of these discrete faculties and roles, Aristotle 
maintains that we can isolate a specific moral excellence in the mean between extremes. 
Consider three examples. Fear is an aspect of human emotion that serves as an indicator 
of and a response to a threat. As Aristotle puts it, when we are fearful at the right time, 
toward the right people, to the right degree, and so on, we achieve an excellence with 
respect to fear: bravery.10 If one is fearful in the wrong circumstances, one has an excess 
of fear: the vice of cowardliness. If one fails to be fearful when the circumstances require 
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it, one has a deficiency of fear: the vice of foolhardiness. Consider another example. In 
our everyday interactions with others, we find some people who are ingratiating: they 
never disagree and always offer praise. Others are quarrelsome: they object to everything 
and everyone. The mean between these extremes, according to Aristotle, is friendli-
ness.11 Finally, consider the hierarchical ordering of our various social and political roles. 
Given the contributions that we make in our families, communities, and businesses, we 
should expect an appropriate response, whether that be remuneration, recognition, or 
gratitude. In terms of extremes, those who seek out honors that do not befit their respec-
tive places in the community we call “honor loving,” while those who are deficient fail to 
enjoy the honor that is their due. Aristotle does not give us a clear name for the virtue, 
other than to call it the virtue concerned with small honors.12
Multiplied across our passions, appetites, and social roles, overall moral excellence 
can be captured in a catalog of the virtues. Aristotle’s own catalog names ten virtues of 
character; subsequent virtue theorists have provided different, often longer, lists. While 
Aristotle himself does not provide us with an explicit story of how we might determine 
which traits belong in our catalog and which do not, the theory behind his catalog 
suggests an account. Excellent character is a composite of excellences attached to our 
humanity, to our socioeconomic status, and to our social and political roles. In other 
words, the catalog of virtues is tied to one’s specific psychological, sociological, and 
political functions.
As a result, the list of virtues for each person will be slightly different. Where we 
share a function with everyone else, we will have common virtues. Where we do not 
share a function with others or share a function with only a subgroup, we will have 
special virtues. Common virtues, in other words, include those attached to our uni-
versally shared features. These include virtues tied to our emotional life (e.g., bravery), 
our appetites (e.g., temperance), and the inescapably social nature of our species (e.g., 
friendliness).
Special virtues are those determined by the specific circumstances of our social, 
economic, and political conditions. Magnificence, Aristotle’s virtue for generosity as it 
pertains to large gifts, will be relevant to me only if I have significant wealth. The virtue 
concerning small honors will be relevant to me only if I have no social and political 
potential for magnanimity, which is the virtue concerned with big honors. Outside of 
Aristotle’s catalog, we can conceive of a host of additional special virtues. The vir-
tues associated with being the firstborn (perhaps including special responsibilities for 
younger siblings and for older parents) will apply only if one is in fact the firstborn. 
The virtues associated with democratic citizenship (e.g., being well-informed, capable 
of deliberating over public policy, and committed to democratic decision-making pro-
cesses) will apply only if one happens to live in a democracy. And the virtues associated 
with officership in the military of a democracy (e.g., loyalty, honor, integrity, and cour-
age) will be determined by one’s specific responsibilities and rank and the overall mis-
sion of the military institution.
Understood in this way, the catalog of virtues is derived from psychological and 
sociological facts about us. On the one hand, these grounds provide for a kind of uni-
versality and permanency in the catalog, insofar as our nature as human beings and the 
basic features of human life are unchanging. On the other hand, insofar as our roles 
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and functions are defined at least in part by the particulars of our social and political 
circumstances, the catalog will have variations across individuals in their various social, 
cultural, and political circumstances. There will be lots of ways in which the specific 
conditions of our lives imply different roles and functions, which in turn will specify 
modified, and possibly novel, virtues.
It will be helpful, then, to notice the way that Aristotle organizes our various roles 
and functions within the broader social and political context. Moral excellence is not an 
individual achievement but instead the achievement of a community. Every flourishing 
person, in virtue of her humanity, is part of a larger social and political project. We are, 
as he phrases it, “political animals.”13 Put another way, humans are members of a spe-
cies that flourishes in a particular type of community. Just like the ant, bee, wolf, or lion, 
the character of the individual human being cannot be understood fully apart from an 
understanding of her particular role or function in the community to which she belongs.
For his part, Aristotle describes a nested set of three communities: family, village, and 
community.14 Our roles and functions in each of these communities imply an account 
of performing specific roles and functions excellently and, in turn, define part of the 
catalog of virtues that apply to us. In the family we might be a son or daughter, brother 
or sister, father or mother, husband or wife. In the village we have roles in terms of our 
vocation, in terms of our property and neighbors, and in terms of our local institutions. 
In the community we are defined in terms of our citizenship in general as well as in 
terms of any specific role we might occupy in the institutions of the community (e.g., 
legislator, soldier, judge). With respect to each role that I occupy in my family, village, 
and community, we can specify what it means to flourish, and then in turn identify 
those virtues that contribute to, as well as constitute, my flourishing in that context. 
Some of these will be specialized versions of virtues of which I make use in other con-
texts; others will be unique to my particular roles. Insofar as our roles change over the 
course of our lives, our catalog will change as well. This does not mean that morality is 
relative; it means instead that moral excellence is context sensitive. Human life is not a 
static or uniform experience; any description of the excellences required for flourishing 
must be adjusted to fit our circumstances.
Despite the variety of catalogs of virtues that apply to individuals, Aristotle argues 
that we can identify an unchanging common good: the good of the community. The 
good of the community is the flourishing of the community qua community. This is 
the chief good, such that the goods of all the other components of the community are 
subordinate to it. We must be careful here, however: to say that the goods of the com-
ponents of the community are subordinate is not to say that they simply are means to 
achieving the chief good. Nor are we saying that the chief good is simply the aggregate 
of all the goods of the components. Aristotle’s account here is more nuanced. The goods 
of the subordinate communities are ends in themselves as well as means to achieving the 
chief good. It is also correct to say that they are constituents of the chief good, although 
the chief good cannot be defined purely in terms of the achievement of its subordinate 
elements. Overall excellence or flourishing is achieved not merely by my excellence as a 
family member and a village member; it also requires my excellence as a citizen—a role 
that cannot be reduced to the others.
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Moral Limitations according to Aristotle
The excellent or flourishing community, together with the morally excellent people who 
constitute it, is vulnerable on Aristotle’s account. Some forms of attack or corruption will 
be sufficient to impair excellence and flourishing both for individuals and for the com-
munity as a whole. We can distinguish two kinds of challenges to the flourishing of the 
community: internal challenges and external.
Consider one form of internal challenge. The moral virtues are habits that must be 
cultivated through a program of education that includes apprenticeship under those 
who have a high degree of mastery of the virtues already. For example, one learns to be 
brave under the tutelage of brave people. But if a sociopolitical system lacks a program 
of education in the virtues or lacks exemplars, moral excellence becomes very difficult 
to achieve. A second form of internal challenge is associated with the intelligibility of 
the social world. Identifying the special virtues associated with one’s various social roles 
presupposes a clearly defined set of social roles as well as a clear understanding of what 
one’s social roles are. Otherwise, one’s account of excellence in one’s various functions 
will be incomplete, vague, or perhaps missing altogether. But in contemporary societies, 
especially the large, complex, and disorganized societies that characterize the West, we 
find just these kinds of challenges to the clarity of social roles and our understandings of 
our respective places.
External threats to the flourishing of an otherwise morally excellent community are 
often more straightforward. External threats such as war, natural disaster, or the scarcity 
of natural resources can undermine the ability of a community to achieve and maintain 
flourishing. Sometimes, despite our best efforts, circumstances that are completely out of 
our control can get the better of us.
Taken together, the vulnerabilities associated with these two types of challenges imply 
that a people can fail to achieve moral excellence and that, in many cases, this failure can 
happen through no fault of their own. In other words, moral tragedy is a real possibility 
in Aristotle’s world; human excellence or flourishing is dependent on circumstances that 
are, at least in part, out of our control.
Comparative Ethics: Stoicism
Let us turn now to the Stoic account and consider the Stoic answers to these same ques-
tions. Of course, in one sense there is no single Stoic answer, insofar as Stoicism is a 
philosophical school with many adherents but no dominant voice. We also do not have a 
complete record of Stoic teachings. Nevertheless, we can detect themes that run through-
out Stoic writings—themes that provide a sense of the Stoic account, and themes that 
have been picked up by military ethicists such as Sherman, Stockdale, and Evans. In fact, 
since these contemporary writers serve as the primary lens through which many military 
members and organizations have been introduced to Stoicism, it is their interpretation 
that provides the best target for our discussion here. Just as with Aristotle, we cannot 
hope to provide a comprehensive account, but we can present a contrasting picture that 
will be sufficient for discussing the relative merits of the Stoic perspective for contempo-
rary military service.
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Moral Excellence according to the Stoics
It is important to keep in mind that the Stoic approach to virtue ethics is deeply indebted 
to Aristotle. While virtue theory, broadly considered, is the central approach to ethics 
for most of the thinkers throughout the Greek and Roman world, Aristotle’s account is 
among the most prominent, and philosophers who come after him presuppose aspects of 
his view even when they attempt to depart from it. Stoic philosophers, for their part, see 
themselves as developing or improving on earlier accounts. One way to exercise charity 
in reading the Stoics is to regard their comparative lack of theoretical sophistication as 
a reflection of a common philosophical background and a common set of assumptions. 
In other words, perhaps they are understood best as taking much of Greek philosophy, 
including Aristotle, for granted, and then focusing their own efforts on the few places 
where they believe the account should be updated.
Taking this approach, we can see a variety of ways in which the Stoics modify 
Aristotle’s account of moral excellence. With Aristotle, we saw that my happiness is only 
partly under my control. Since I am a dependent and social creature, my own good is 
bound up with the good of others: if my community is not flourishing, then I am not 
flourishing. In other words, living a flourishing life depends, at least in part, on good 
moral luck. The Stoics find this approach entirely wrongheaded. As they see it, the excel-
lent or flourishing life ought to be in my power, not arbitrarily subject to the choices of 
others. Aurelius writes, “[T]rue good fortune is what you make for yourself. Good for-
tune: good character, good intentions, and good actions.”15 In other words, my happiness 
should be entirely up to me: if I can develop the right kind of character, I can control my 
own destiny. Evans provides a summary as follows:
In the Stoic catechism there is no such category as “victimhood” because there is no 
moral economy outside of the workings of our inner selves. Stoicism is thus about 
empowerment by perception—a cultivation of an invincibility of the will through 
minimizing personal vulnerability by a mixture of Socratic self-examination and an 
emphasis on control of the emotions. Stoicism teaches concentration on what indi-
viduals can control, what Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations called the “inner cita-
del” of the soul.16
The Stoic focus on controlling our fate changes the nature of our moral life in many 
ways, but for the purpose of developing an argument with application to contemporary 
military service I will focus on just two: individualism and interiorization. By individual-
ism, I mean the way in which Stoics focus on the ethics of the individual rather than the 
ethics of the community; by interiorization, I mean the way in which Stoics focus on the 
mental lives of individuals rather than their actions. Both of these modifications reflect 
Stoic objections to Aristotle’s program.
Let us begin with individualism. Stoics agree that the flourishing person has excellent 
character, and excellent character is a matter of having a specific set of moral virtues.17 
Stoic catalogs of the virtues are different from Aristotle’s: sometimes they include vir-
tues that appear to be broader in scope, such as righteousness, honor, and dignity; at 
other times, Stoics hint at virtues that reflect a disengaged or aesthetic life. Aurelius, for 
LES2 - Demy.indb   105 11/29/18   9:10 AM
106 ethics and the twenty-first-century military professional
example, lists honesty, gravity, endurance, austerity, resignation, abstinence, patience, 
sincerity, moderation, seriousness, and high-mindedness.18
The more important contrast, for our purposes, can be found in the different aims of 
the Stoic virtues. On the Stoic account, the cultivation and exercise of these virtues have 
value primarily for the development of the character of the individual, not for the sake 
of the community. Aurelius writes, “[P]eople are our proper occupation. Our job is to do 
them good and put up with them. But when they obstruct our proper tasks, they become 
irrelevant to us—like wind, sun, and animals. Our actions may be impeded by them, but 
there can be no impeding our intentions or dispositions.”19
Every action stands on its own as a measure of the character of the agent who per-
forms it, independent of the value of the action for the community. I am not responsible 
for the actions of others, and they cannot be responsible for my own actions. After all, 
I cannot control them and they cannot control me. My own good is therefore my ulti-
mate point of reference, as it is the only thing I truly can control. In this way, the Stoic 
approach to happiness is far more individualistic than the approach offered by Aristotle. 
Where Aristotle views the ethical life as a joint enterprise aimed at building our social 
and political world, the Stoics view the ethical life as an individual enterprise aimed at 
achieving excellence despite our social and political world.
This contrast should not be especially surprising. Aristotle’s starting point in his 
writing, as in his life, is the self-contained social and political unity of the Greek city-
state. Stoic writers, in contrast, are lost in the vast, diverse, cosmopolitan expanse of the 
Roman Empire. Correspondingly, the Stoics view the social world as opaque, cruel, and 
arbitrary—utterly outside the control of the individual. To be sure, Stoics were not the 
kind of pessimists who aim at disengagement; they were not the Roman equivalent of 
modern doomsday preppers. Stoics call for service, kindness, and other forms of social 
engagement. Moreover, Stoics themselves were active for the good of their friends and 
their communities, whatever their stations and circumstances. Cicero and Seneca were 
Roman politicians; Marcus Aurelius was a soldier and emperor. But all these exercises 
of the social virtues reflect a much more detached approach to our social and political 
world, an approach centered on the character of the individual agent. At the same time, 
Stoic social and political engagement did not have as its primary objective the achieve-
ment of a common good or the construction of a flourishing community.
In the midst of this chaotic world, it seems fair to ask the Stoic whether moral excel-
lence or flourishing is even possible. This brings us to the second point of contrast 
between the Stoic approach and the Aristotelian approach: the interiorization of the moral 
life. When Aristotle allows that tragedy can make an otherwise virtuous person unhappy, 
the Stoics recoil. They propose instead a system in which happiness is not at all depend-
ent on one’s social, political, and physical circumstances. Aurelius writes as follows:
If you do the job in a principled way, with diligence, energy and patience, if you keep 
yourself free of distractions, and keep the spirit inside you undamaged, as if you might 
have to give it back at any moment—If you can embrace this without fear or expec-
tation—can find fulfillment in what you’re doing now, as Nature intended, and in 
superhuman truthfulness (every word, every utterance)—then your life will be happy. 
No one can prevent that.20
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In other words, the happy life is a matter of internal rather than external fulfillment. 
Whatever the state of the world around me, it is still possible for me to have excellent 
character. I can accomplish this, the Stoics explain, provided that I achieve the following.
First, I must come to terms with the fact that happiness has nothing to do with exter-
nal successes. Epictetus writes, “Do not seek to have events happen to you as you want 
them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your life will go well.”21 
If happiness lies entirely within my control, and the only things over which I have com-
plete control are my internal responses and my internal life, then I must learn to master 
my internal life and avoid seeking happiness in external goods. External goods of wealth, 
fame, and power are outside my control; it would be a mistake to put my happiness in 
them. To be sure, this does not mean that Stoics eschew these goods. Stoicism need not 
imply a monkish way of life; such a way of life itself could become an object of worship. 
Instead, the Stoic avoids emotional attachment to external goods. Epictetus explains 
somewhat graphically: “It shows lack of natural talent to spend time on what concerns the 
body, as in exercising a great deal, eating a great deal, drinking a great deal, moving one’s 
bowels or copulating a great deal. Instead you must do these things in passing, but turn 
your whole attention toward your faculty of judgment.”22 In other words, it is our attitude 
toward external goods that matters, not the goods themselves.
Second, I need to learn to be guided by reason alone. While our social and political 
world may be chaotic, the universe as a whole is guided by reason. There is a natural 
order or a law of nature that I discover and toward which I can orient my will. Again, 
Epictetus: “On every occasion you must have these thoughts ready: lead me, Zeus, and 
you too, Destiny, wherever I am assigned by you; I’ll follow and not hesitate, but even if 
I do not wish to, because I’m bad, I’ll follow anyway. Whoever has complied well with 
necessity is counted wise by us, and understands divine affairs.”23
To do this, I must learn to control my emotions. In particular, I must recondition 
my emotional life so that I am not emotionally sensitive to the things that I see and the 
events that befall me, no matter how pleasurable or cruel they may be. Sherman explains 
the Stoic perspective here: “They hold that emotions, as most of us experience them, 
typically involve assent to false opinions. That is, the impressions we assent to have a 
propositional structure . . . and emotions typically involve false opinions of good and 
evil.”24 It is not that Stoics eschew emotions altogether; what they claim instead is that 
our emotional responses must be keyed solely to our mental life. We can take pleasure 
in our virtuous intentions, but not in the results that come from actions that accord 
with those virtuous intentions. After all, the results of our actions, no matter how well 
intended they may be, are not in our control.
Third, and in keeping with the previous achievements, I must cultivate inner 
strength, especially fortitude, if I am to flourish in the midst of the cruel and harsh world 
in which we live. Not only is my social and political context outside my control; it actu-
ally tends to pose a threat to my physical, social, and political well-being. In this way, 
inner happiness is something that I must achieve despite my suffering. Suffering and 
death are inevitable. Aurelius’s Meditations, in particular, are preoccupied heavily with 
reminders of the shortness of life and the inevitability of death: “[K]now this: Human 
lives are brief and trivial. Yesterday a blob of semen; tomorrow embalming fluid, ash. To 
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pass through this brief life as nature demands. To give it up without complaint. Like an 
olive that ripens and falls. Praising its mother, thanking the tree it grew on.”25
Moral Limitations according to the Stoics
From the preceding discussion, it should be evident that if the Stoic life can be achieved, 
there will be no limits on my happiness. Insofar as I resist the temptations of worldly 
goods and worldly pleasures, I can create for myself an impenetrable mental fortress—
a place where I am immune to the effects of tragedy, a place in which I can be happy, 
though the world may fall apart. As Sherman explains, for the Stoics, “[H]appiness must 
be a matter of virtue alone.”26
This is not to say that Stoicism is easy. Reconditioning my emotional life according to 
the Stoic program is especially difficult, as my emotions seem to be naturally responsive 
to my experience in the world and not to the particulars of my character. Stoics recog-
nize the challenges here. They remind followers that Stoic ideals are achieved to one 
degree or another; one need not achieve perfection to have made progress. Flourishing 
does not require the complete realization of the ideal; further achievement with respect 
to happiness is always possible. Whatever the world may throw at me, my happiness 
remains in my control, and I can take steps to achieve it all the more. Evans quotes 
Henley’s 1875 poem “Invictus” to make the point: 
Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.
In the fell clutches of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed.
Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid.
It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll.
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul.27
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The Superiority of Aristotle in the Modern Military World
At first blush, one can see the attraction of the Stoic approach to the military context. 
Soldiers on the contemporary battlefield are expected to perform excellently when their 
lives are under constant threat, often in the midst of great suffering, and under strategic 
and tactical conditions that are nearly always out of their control. The fear of death can 
be psychologically paralyzing; the Stoic power to eliminate that fear and concentrate  
single-mindedly on the tasks at hand sounds like liberation for the soldier in combat. 
James Stockdale famously remembered thinking to himself, as he parachuted into a 
North Vietnamese village, that he was “entering the world of Epictetus.”28 Stockdale 
believed the Stoic approach described above was vital to his survival as a prisoner of war 
(POW) in North Vietnam, and vital to his effective leadership there.
On the one hand, we should not dismiss Stockdale’s experiences, or those of other 
soldiers who have found resilience and liberation in Stoic philosophy, with a mere wave 
of the hand or a short piece of philosophical argument. Certainly under POW condi-
tions, there is very little among our externalities that we can control, and any happiness 
that we find likely will be a matter of the inner character and strength that the Stoics 
describe. It may be that the Stoic approach to pain and suffering could be a helpful addi-
tion to certain parts of military training, especially those concerned with survival and 
capture.
On the other hand, the conditions in which Stoicism seems especially pertinent are 
not the experiences of the vast majority of soldiers in the modern military. Instead, 
soldiers in modern militaries are contributors to an enormous and complex social and 
political project, a project that requires creativity and flexibility, and a project that can 
and sometimes does go wrong. In my view, this is the world of Aristotle, not the world of 
Epictetus. In providing a detailed argument for the superiority of Aristotle’s approach, I 
will focus on three features: the institutional setting of modern Western military service, 
the need for higher degrees of flexibility, and the reality of tragedy.
In the first place, Aristotle’s account is better suited to the institutional conditions 
of contemporary military service. Unlike the Stoics, Aristotle does not view the social 
world as opaque and arbitrary. Aristotle’s theory is not concerned with explaining how 
we might flourish in spite of our institutions, but more optimistically provides a road 
map for the creation and development of excellent institutions in which we can flourish 
together. The fact is, modern Western military conditions and practices are well suited 
for this approach, especially in those aspects that extend beyond individual psychology. 
Each soldier has a specific role to play associated with her unit, and the description of 
this role implies an account of excellence. Each unit, in turn, is part of a larger unit in 
the military organization, where that military organization in turn plays a very specific 
role in the good of the state. Thus we have a set of elements analogous to the family, 
the village, and the community. The chief good for the soldier is found in the good of 
the state, while the military itself plays a specific role in sustaining that good. As with 
Aristotle’s other intermediate institutions, the good for the military is neither a mere 
means to nor a mere constituent of the good of the state. Soldiering is both an end in 
itself and a means to the achievement of other ends. At the same time, the achievement 
of the good for the military and its units is a necessary condition for the achievement of 
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the good for the state, but in the sense that the specific good for the military organiza-
tion is an end itself, a means through which other aspects of the state can achieve their 
good, as well as a constituent element in the complex common good by which we assess 
the state as a whole.
This organizational structure is not merely thrust on soldiers in modern militaries; 
instead they construct and sustain it. Both officers and enlisted personnel are expected 
to take on leadership roles gradually, using their experience, together with the guidance 
of their superiors, to build and rebuild the organization in keeping with an account of its 
good that they are responsible for formulating and reformulating. In this way, the insti-
tution presupposes that its members will exercise control over it, despite the challenges 
of size and complexity. Notice that this account contrasts sharply with the Stoic approach 
to social and political institutions. While Stoics allow for public service and contribu-
tions to the good of the community, the Stoic must not take on the good of these institu-
tions as her own. To do so would be to accept the existence of external goods and subject 
one’s own happiness to the judgments and actions of others. Insofar as social trust is 
built on identity of interests, shared commitments, and common purpose, Sto ically ori-
ented soldiers will not be as trustworthy as Aristotelians in the project of building and 
sustaining modern military organizations.
In the second place, Aristotle’s account allows for significantly more creativity and 
flexibility than the account we get from the Stoics. Aristotle’s virtue of prudence is pro-
active: one evaluates the circumstances in which one finds oneself, identifies the goods 
relevant to one’s circumstances and the circumstances of one’s group, and then identifies 
practices and activities that will contribute to the accomplishment of those goods. Since 
the common good is always in view, Aristotle’s soldiers never are preoccupied with their 
own individual happiness—after all, their own individual good is a constituent of and a 
means to accomplishing the common good, given the natures of their particular roles. 
By definition, the Aristotelian does not interiorize her ethical life—the common good is 
exterior, at least with respect to the others that compose her group.
War is, at least in one sense, a violent competition among groups with (at least) two 
different visions of the good. Stoics who distance themselves from the common good, 
and who view the external world as a place of temptation and cruelty, seem to be unat-
tractive partners in the social and political project that is modern warfare. To be sure, 
it appears that Stoic detachment could be useful in a narrow range of circumstances 
in modern warfare, such as when captured by the enemy—Stockdale’s experience. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that proponents of Stoicism under these conditions miss 
the fact that Aristotle’s virtue of prudence, with its context-sensitive adjustment to new 
circumstances, could prescribe an account of flourishing similar to that prescribed by 
the Stoics under conditions of capture. In other words, where the Stoics propose a rigid 
morality of detachment, Aristotle proposes a kind of adaptability that could recommend 
a degree of emotional detachment when circumstances call for it. When an Aristotelian 
finds himself in a social structure that is inimical to flourishing in the conventional way 
(e.g., family, village, community), he will look for ways to make the best of his circum-
stances. In fact, Stockdale’s own experience as a POW had far more Aristotelian elements 
than he seems to have recognized. By accepting a leadership role among the other cap-
tured Americans, by promulgating principles for prisoner behavior, and by finding ways 
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to encourage others in the midst of their suffering, Stockdale remained committed to the 
good of the American prisoners, not just as individuals but as Americans committed to 
the good of the United States.29
Finally, Aristotle’s account has a better approach to error and tragedy. Where the Stoic 
is expected to be “astonished at nothing,” Aristotle recognizes the possibility of genuine 
errors, mistakes, and tragedies in the context of military service and war. Not every 
social structure conforms to the ideal; warfare, quite obviously, is a nonideal social cir-
cumstance. Things have gone wrong, possibly quite badly, and this is a genuine tragedy 
for Aristotelians—the social structures that support a life lived according to the virtues 
and in pursuit of joint goods have broken down, thereby reducing the amount of hap-
piness that is possible in the moment. The Stoic response would appear to be to chide 
the Aristotelian for looking for happiness outside herself; the Stoics insist that it can be 
found reliably only within. In this way, the Stoic detaches herself from the possibility 
of tragedy, from the very idea that our circumstances can be described as bad or good. 
However, it seems to me that if we do not recognize tragedy, we will have little motiva-
tion to work to prevent it in the future. Whatever the merits of the Stoic approach as it 
concerns the resilience of the individual, the fact is that modern soldiers in modern mili-
taries strive for more. Military action often aims at stopping and responding to tragedy, 
and even learning from it so as to put in place measures to prevent it from recurring. 
Tragedy cannot be eliminated from warfare, insofar as good men and women always will 
suffer and die; however, our response should not be to structure our mental life so we 
are not affected by tragedy, but instead to rejoin more forcefully the challenge of build-
ing institutions, practices, and soldiers who are adept at minimizing internal and exter-
nal harms. Modern institutions like the military aim to improve performance, achieve 
efficiencies, and accomplish very specific common ends. More generally, our political 
systems and political leaders should be striving to find peace and support flourishing 
nations and citizens. The Stoic ethic, with its much more limited focus on the good of 
the individual, does not seem to be as good a fit as the Aristotelian ethic, with its focus 
on building a flourishing set of nested institutions.
The Special Case of Sexual Harassment
In recent years, the U.S. military has become especially concerned with incidents of sexual 
assault and harassment inside the organization. Leaders are looking for better ways to catch 
and remove those who perpetrate these crimes, as well as ways to build a culture of zero 
tolerance. Both are goals of long standing, but they have proved elusive. Insofar as virtue 
theorists are concerned with cultivating individual and social moral excellence, and a culture 
of sexual harassment and sexual assault falls well short, they would seem to have something 
to contribute to the conversation.
Stoicism, with its virtues of righteousness and decency, offers an account of a moral 
soldier and a military culture consistent with the elimination of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment. The Stoic focus on cultivating resilience in the face of personal suffering also 
might prove useful to victims. However, there seem to be very few resources in Stoicism that 
might provide better guidance for solving the problem. As it stands, it is not as if the message 
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of treating one’s fellow soldiers with decency is absent, nor is resilience missing from con-
temporary military training. Quite the opposite: in the annual sexual assault prevention and 
response training that members (including myself) of the U.S. Defense Department of all 
ranks receive, respect and resilience as ethical virtues are central themes. Yet sexual harass-
ment and assault persist.
Aristotle provides a richer theoretical framework from which to start our reflections on 
how to make progress on this issue. We begin with the observation that the vast majority 
of the sexual assault and harassment incidents involve men assaulting or harassing women. 
Instead of focusing on individuals qua individuals and promoting general virtues such as 
respect and decency, Aristotle would begin by identifying the psychological, sociological, 
and political conditions that give rise to the trends we observe. In other words, if there is a 
problem that seems to be connected to a particular demographic, it makes sense to start at 
the level of sociological investigation to determine root causes across the population. Why 
do men tend to be the perpetrators; why do women tend to be the victims?
At the same time, Aristotle would begin to think about solutions from inside the socio-
logical circumstances. What are the social norms and virtues that we expect men and 
women to cultivate in the context of their relationships, both to the military and to each 
other? Notice that, in answering this question, Aristotle would be concerned not only with 
preventing bad behavior but with cultivating good behavior. Remember, in Aristotle’s virtue 
theoretic account, bad moral behavior occurs when a person tends toward the extreme of 
some feeling, appetite, or social role, rather than toward the mean. The cowardly person has 
too much fear, the brave person has the right amount; the overly social person is ingratiating, 
the friendly person is social to the right degree.
If sexual assault and harassment are actions attached to vices that are akin to coward-
ice, then what is the feeling, appetite, or social role that is in question? Suppose, insofar as 
sexuality is a psychological and sociological aspect of human beings, that there are virtues 
and vices associated with human sexuality. If sexual assault and sexual harassment are vices 
with respect to human sexuality, then it follows that there also must be virtues associated 
with sexual excellence and sexual flourishing. Moreover, since vices fall on the extremes and 
virtues fall in the mean between the extremes, any program to reduce vice is, for Aristotle, at 
the same time a program to improve virtue; we cannot help but cultivate bravery in the pro-
cess of reducing cowardice.
In other words, an Aristotelian program for reducing or eliminating sexual assault and 
harassment must be, at the same time, a program aimed at cultivating sexual excellence 
and sexual flourishing. The important practical implication of this story, Aristotle would 
argue, is that we cannot institute programs to change the culture and practices that encour-
age sexual assault and harassment until we have a clear account of the culture and practices 
that cultivate sexual excellence and flourishing. This, of course, means that we need a robust 
account of sexual excellence and sexual flourishing in the first place. For Aristotelians, 
such an account cannot simply be a set of rules, e.g., all sex must be consensual. Although 
Aristotelians are happy to include laws, rules, and principles in their social and political 
schemes, they would not want their approach to be confused with or reduced to a deonto-
logical approach. Instead, Aristotelians will search for an account of how human sexuality 
contributes to the excellent functioning of human beings as individuals and in their relation-
ships with others.
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It is these two pieces of information—an account of sexual flourishing, together with an 
account of the social conditions that will cultivate and sustain it best—that we need if we 
are to make genuine progress in eliminating sexual assault and harassment from military 
organizations. On the one hand, the unfortunate fact is that at present we do not possess 
either of them. While the second piece of information is something we could investigate as 
a matter of psychology and sociology, the first is not. An account of sexual excellence and 
sexual flourishing is a matter of ethics, and therefore not a matter of conventional empirical 
research. Certainly, ethical research, together with common and historical experience, has 
resulted in agreement on important issues. We reject slavery, murder, and adultery, and we 
affirm the importance of equal treatment and opportunity across distinctions of race and 
gender. Nevertheless, the content of sexual ethics does not appear to be one of these areas of 
agreement. At present we do not have a social or political consensus sufficient to serve as the 
basis for a program of improvement.
Unfortunately, Aristotle’s own views will not be of much help here. Among the things on 
which we do agree is that Aristotle’s patriarchal approach to family relationships, grounded 
on his belief that women are inferior to men, is wrong. While he does not offer an explicit 
theory of sexual excellence or sexual flourishing, we safely can assume that any theory he 
would offer would be grounded on assumptions that we reject.
On the other hand, if we are in agreement that these two pieces of information are what 
we need if we are to make progress, we can devote our attention to acquiring them. This 
means, in the first place, that we need to have a serious discussion about human sexuality, 
with an eye toward developing an account of an excellent and flourishing sexual life. Perhaps 
we never will agree on all the particulars, and perhaps there are groups that always will insist 
on their own eccentric views. But we may find that there are areas of agreement that will be 
sufficient to establish a counterweight to the vices of sexual assault and sexual harassment, 
even if we cannot agree on a comprehensive account of the ideal. With these areas of agree-
ment in hand, we then can turn to social science to make progress in determining what 
types of institutional and cultural changes will achieve these ends best. Together, these two 
pieces of information constitute the heart of an Aristotelian approach to solving the problem 
of sexual harassment and sexual assault in military organizations.
Stockdale kept a copy of Epictetus’s Handbook on his bedside table aboard ship during the 
Vietnam War. Admittedly, the Handbook may be better suited for bedtime reading in war-
time; its short paragraphs and aphorisms are pithy, memorable, and challenging, and have 
the appearance of offering important and profound wisdom on how an individual might 
find happiness amid daily mortal threat and uncertainty.
In contrast, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics do not make for good bedtime 
reading. They offer complicated and open-ended arguments that require serious interpretive 
work to be relevant to our modern conditions. In this way, Aristotle is a bit like the road less 
traveled. And yet the implication of the argument I have made here is that our military forces 
and our character-education programs would be much better off following the Aristotelian 
than the Stoic path. While it might be more difficult, the payoff will be much better.
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ETHICS IN THE U.S. NAVY
Walter E. Carter Jr.
Preface
From the outset, both officer and enlisted personnel share a common bond in the 
U.S. Navy—we took an oath and solemnly affirmed to “support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; [and that 
we would] bear true faith and allegiance to the same.” This oath binds us from the 
start; we’re in this Navy—this profession of arms—together.
While historically our professional skills are most associated with activities on, 
under, and above the maritime domain, they have evolved, extending to the realms 
of space and cyber, and are now global reaching. Our enduring ethical responsibili-
ties, though, have never been bounded; they have remained with us permanently, 
described not by domains or temporal limits, but as a constant, a part of who we are.
Our profession is unique. As members of an armed service within our nation’s 
Department of Defense, we are trusted to be experts in the profession of arms. We 
operate with lethal force and are expected to prevail under conditions of extreme 
adversity—in peacetime, through crisis, and in war. We build winning teams to 
deliver on this expectation and believe “war fighting first” accurately captures our 
priorities. The missions we regularly are asked to perform, and must be ready to per-
form, together with the value of the lives of those we are charged to lead, demand a 
trust in our leadership to employ every means available to make the right decisions. 
These means include a strong ethical foundation.
War fighting, by definition, requires ultimate commitment: a willingness to lay our 
lives on the line, if required. That commitment is reinforced through discipline in our 
actions and trust. This is a realm where absolutes do apply, and it drives an impera-
tive for adhering scrupulously to high standards and consistency in ethical behav-
ior—at both the individual and institutional levels. Why? This behavior reinforces 
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trust; conversely, breaches and omissions in ethical behavior undermine it. In the 
end, trust is the single most important factor from which we derive our authority to 
lead. When an order is given in combat and we rely on the training, skill, and courage 
of our sailors (officer and enlisted) to execute it, their actions and commitment ulti-
mately are founded on trust in their leaders, trust in their shipmates, and trust in our 
institution—the Navy. Everything we do in the execution of our duties either adds to 
or subtracts from this trust. This condition of commitment is enduring—there is no 
“on” or “off ”—and it describes who we are and how we live 24×7×365.
This notion of commitment, combined with the logic connecting it to our duties 
in the naval profession and the central role of trust, is a truth we cannot take for 
granted. It must be discussed actively and promoted in our wardrooms and chiefs’ 
messes and on the deckplates. Ethos, character, virtue, morality, and integrity are not 
relics from the dusty shelves of the classroom; they are terms and concepts that dwell 
in the environment of trust—natural accompaniments to this most central element of 
our profession.
As we endeavor to build winning teams, we commit to making ourselves, and 
those we lead, better people. It is a matter of “all in”—all the time—all the way.
Remember: we took an oath.
Introduction: The U.S. Navy and the American People
[Enlisted] sailors surmise that Navy leadership expects them to adopt pre-
scribed morals, standards, and rules of behavior without investing in the 
process required to instill, teach, develop, and mentor these standards on the 
deckplates.
Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)  
Sailor Roundtables Report, December 17, 2013
The U.S. military is among the most trusted of American institutions.1 The trust that the 
American people accord to the U.S. Navy derives from our status as members of the mil-
itary profession. Only to the degree that the Navy is, and is perceived to be, trustworthy 
can we maintain our status as the naval profession in American society.
The American public we serve and some members of Congress recently have ques-
tioned the Department of Defense concerning a number of ethical lapses. This is the 
nexus where the central importance of ethics emerges for the Navy. It is the trust of the 
American people that grounds the ethical and behavioral expectations for all sailors at 
every level.2 While only a small percentage of our people are caught engaging in illegal 
actions, what can we conclude about ethical behavior in our ranks? Does our culture dis-
courage ethical actions in the name of mission accomplishment or career advancement? 
Does acceptance of low-level ethical failure lead to the sort of high-profile lawbreaking 
that undermines the trust of the American people in their Navy?3
Our war-fighting capability is diminished by the reality—and the perception—of ille-
gal, unethical, and immoral behavior. Navy Core Values and moral and ethical conduct 
serve as the enablers to build trust, morale, unit cohesion, and, ultimately, our combat 
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readiness. Yet it is possible for sailors to matriculate from an accession source and serve 
an entire career to retirement without having had more than basic ethics training.
Our predominant approach to ethics is legalistic in content and often negative 
in tone. Ethics training is equated with the Code of Conduct, law, policy, and Judge 
Advocate General Corps guidance. We exhort our sailors to follow the rules or suffer the 
consequences, without making the corresponding effort to train and educate, to develop 
and mentor, and to create the systemic conditions for dealing positively with the ethical 
challenges and problems inherent in the profession of arms. At best, we employ a check-
list of what not to do; at worst, ethical development of our people is a chore or burden 
that takes away from getting the job done. Too often in our current approach the intrin-
sic good assigned to ethical conduct—whether to service, to unit, or to self—is lost. We 
have a moral obligation to do better. We can and we must.
The Naval Profession and the Public Trust
In modern English, professional often means anything a person is paid to do. However, 
there is another, sociological sense of the term profession, one based on the notion of 
“social trust,” that is, the bond of trust between the profession and society. True social-
trust professions (e.g., the body of those who practice medicine and the law, and the 
clergy) have a special bargain with the societies they serve. In exchange for the high 
regard and trust their societies place in them, they are (1) granted a high degree of col-
lective autonomy; (2) allowed to control their own education, certification, promotion, 
and dismissal; and (3) given considerable discretion and latitude in how they apply 
the unique professional knowledge they possess. This status as a profession is allowed 
and maintained only insofar as the trust relationship with the client—in our case, the 
American people—is firm and intact. Whenever that trust is compromised, the society 
reduces or even eliminates professional autonomy through its legislative and executive 
branches.4
The foundation of our naval profes-
sion is the oath of office or enlistment. 
Individuals come into the Navy from a 
diverse range of backgrounds on many 
dimensions—cultural, religious, ethi-
cal, socioeconomic, and so forth—but all sailors share central ethical obligations result-
ing from their oath to the Constitution, providing the foundation for common values. 
By taking the oath, Navy personnel explicitly adopt a shared commitment to service and 
sacrifice, and implicitly assume a shared identity as a member of the naval profession.
Furthermore, the unique professional knowledge that members of the naval profes-
sion develop and maintain leads to ethical expectations and requirements that establish 
the professional military ethic. The personal ethics that diverse individuals bring into the 
Navy are not necessarily identical to, or in perfect correlation with, the professional mili-
tary ethic on the one hand, nor are they mutually exclusive on the other.
Only to the degree that the Navy is, and is perceived 
to be, trustworthy can we maintain our status as [a] 
profession in American society.
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Implication 1
For our diverse Navy, the critically important takeaway is that the foundation for com-
mon values comes from shared membership in, and identity with, the naval profession. 
Shared identity as members of the naval profession helps to inculcate Navy Core Values 
and the Navy Ethos throughout the force, engendering a more meaningful application of 
ethics for individual sailors. The strength of our shared identity must be built over time 
and continually reinforced.
Ethical Foundations: More Than Compliance
A fuller understanding of ethics beyond compliance models rests on the foundations 
of moral philosophy. Indeed, by his own accounting, the character, courage, and disci-
pline that Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale displayed while in captivity in Vietnam were 
shaped by his study of philosophy and the humanities. Stockdale believed that an eth-
ics course for military officers need not be organized directly around military ideas or 
military writings. Rather, he advocated the study of classical philosophers as a matter of 
personal and professional development, with the attendant consequence of molding bet-
ter (and moral) human beings.5
Philosophical traditions on ethics provide a number of touchstones to guide Navy 
ethics education and training and foster a supportive culture for Navy ethics. Both 
classical and modern philosophical traditions direct our attention to multiple aspects 
of moral philosophy, including (1) self-discipline (Plato), (2) individual character 
(Aristotle), (3) sense of duty (Immanuel Kant), and (4) the collective good (John Stuart 
Mill). Together these philosophies point to the importance of both the individual and 
the institution in maintaining ethical standards.
When we compare Plato’s moral philosophy with that of Aristotle, for instance, we 
learn the importance of, and some limitations to, ethics education and training centered 
on character and integrity. Plato espouses the virtues of self-discipline and personal 
restraint for a well-ordered society, particularly as applied to the “soldier” and devel-
oped through rigorous and repetitive military training. He argues that people’s capacity 
for understanding both their own and the common good enables the inculcation of a 
persuasive ethos and cultural norms to guide good behavior. Aristotle espouses moral 
virtue (“excellence of character”), developed through formed habits. He contends that a 
stable character leads a person to do the right thing always—in the right way and at the 
right time.
An underlying assumption of Plato’s philosophy is that “no one knowingly does 
wrong.” In other words, if people know 
and understand what is morally right, 
they can be relied on to act accord-
ingly. This assumption, of course, 
is easily challenged, which points 
to the limitation of relying primarily on directives for ethical outcomes. At the same 
time, Aristotle’s ideas of character have been shown to be only partially correct. While 
[W]e need to look at both “good apples” and “good 
barrels” . . . if we are to do everything possible to 
facilitate ethical behavior and build ethical climates.
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integrity and good character are indeed important, research indicates that situational 
factors also have a great influence on actual behavior.6 
Implication 2
What this means for our Navy’s ethics efforts is that self-discipline, character, and 
integrity are indeed important for a well-ordered organization. However, we also must 
be mindful that we cannot presume a prescribed common meaning of moral integrity 
among all Navy personnel, and we must consider the potential effects of the situation 
and the environment (e.g., command climate and system-driven expectations) on ethical 
behavior. As many social scientists phrase it, we need to look at both “good apples” and 
“good barrels” (the latter understood as the environment, the tools, and the conditions 
that we create) if we are to do everything possible to facilitate ethical behavior and build 
ethical climates.
A comparison between Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill speaks to why individu-
als might act morally. Kant espouses the concept of moral obligation, distinguishing 
between actions that are merely in accordance with duty (i.e., the individual may have 
performed the right action, but for many possible reasons, including fear of punish-
ment or hope for reward) and action from duty (in which the individual did the right 
action because of a dutiful allegiance to doing the right thing). The former reasoning 
speaks to compliance with the rules. In the latter reasoning, moral actions are derived 
from an intrinsic sense of duty (for example, an internally driven moral imperative 
to uphold the standards of the naval profession), resulting in more-resolute ethical 
behavior.
John Stuart Mill adopts a utilitarian perspective on moral actions, stressing the 
importance of acting in such a way that the outcome provides “the greatest good for 
the greatest number.” This greatest-good motivation requires subordination of indi-
viduals’ interests to those that best benefit the collective organization. In this way, 
members of the naval profession, for example, desire to act in a way that forgoes self-
interested behavior in favor of moral actions that support Navy Core Values and the 
Navy Ethos.
Implication 3
What we learn from Kant and Mill is that Navy ethics education and training must 
address internal motivations for ethical behavior, beyond the application of rules and 
policy. Comprehending the underlying impetus for ethical behavior and moral choice 
informs our approaches to instilling, training, and mentoring on ethical standards, as 
well as the policies and procedures intended to facilitate ethical behavior.
Taken together, these various perspectives of moral philosophy indicate that more than 
a one-size-fits-all approach is required to sustain ethical behavior and a culture for Navy 
ethics. As we reexamine our approach to ethics, our efforts must be comprehensive, 
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considering not only the individual sailor—his or her commitment, ethical understand-
ing, and moral motivations—but, perhaps even more importantly, the systems and pro-
cesses within our Navy that can facilitate ethical behavior.
Moral Choice: Domains for Ethical Decision-Making
Fundamentally, ethics is about choice. The decisions to adhere to core values, adopt pre-
scribed morals, and act in accordance with ethical standards all revolve around personal 
choice. Our frame for understanding moral choice pivots on two widely separated but 
complementary perspectives: (1) a speech given by Lord Moulton, minister of munitions 
for Great Britain during World War I, published in 1924, and (2) a more recently pub-
lished popular book by Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty.
Lord Moulton describes the domains of ethical choice, which he divides into three 
spheres of human action.7 The first is the sphere of positive law: actions in which indi-
viduals adhere to rigidly prescribed and dutifully enforced rules. The third he calls the 
sphere of absolute freedom, in which individuals enjoy complete free will regarding their 
behavior. In between he identifies the domain of obedience to the unenforceable, which he 
calls “doing what you should do although you are not obliged to do it.” In other words, 
this is the sphere in which individuals must exercise discretion and judgment, making 
decisions when the only enforcers are themselves (see figure 1). Obedience to the unen-
forceable relies on an internalized sense of responsibility and an intrinsically developed 
ethical core.
Implication 4
Again, for our Navy, 
this suggests that com-
pliance is the moral 
minimum. Complying 
with rules and policies is 
but one—and, to some 
degree, a limiting—fac-
tor that contributes to 
ethical decision-making. 
Due attention, therefore, 
is needed to address the 
unenforceable domain of 
human action as well—
specifically, discretion 
and moral judgment. 
Tending to the moral 
development of sailors, 
such that ethical choices 
become routine, helps establish a culture for Navy ethics, and in essence transforms 
the unenforceable into the enforceable.
Positive law 
Absolute freedom 
Obedience to the 
unenforceable 
 Ethical choice 
Figure 1. Lord Moulton’s Domains for Humans
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The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty notes that all individuals possess the human 
capacity for both honesty and dishonesty, whether exhibited in enforceable or unen-
forceable domains.8 In other words, every person is susceptible to this most human 
foible and less-than-optimal behavior. There are a host of forces that can lead indi-
viduals down the slippery slope of dishonesty, such as (1) the ability to rational-
ize, (2) conflicts of interest, (3) creative reasoning, (4) one immoral act, (5) being 
depleted—tired and overtaxed, (6) others benefiting from dishonesty, and (7) watch-
ing others behave dishonestly.9 Ultimately, these forces have been shown to shape 
moral choice.
One key lesson from Ariely’s research is that a first act of dishonesty—even a 
seemingly innocuous one—might be particularly important in shaping an individual’s 
subsequent ethical decision-making. Therefore, it is important to address poor moral 
choices early on, so as to be preventive (proactive) in addressing ethics behavior over 
time. Another key lesson from this examination of dishonesty is that highlighting 
acts of honesty is incredibly important for establishing the sense of social moral-
ity. By publicly promoting salient examples of commendable behavior, we improve 
what is viewed as acceptable behavior, and ultimately improve ethical decisions and 
actions.10
Implication 5
When our Navy attributes unethical behavior to just a few “bad apples,” the extent of 
potential ethical challenges throughout the naval force can be obscured. When it is 
addressed with a compliance-based approach aimed at maintaining high standards, the 
result is policies and rules that serve only to punish those “bad apples” who cross the 
“redline.” In contrast, when our Navy promotes commendable ethical decisions and 
behavior it fosters a culture for Navy ethics.
A Culture for Navy Ethics: Proactive versus Reactive
As we seek to develop and maintain a solid ethical foundation in all Navy personnel, it is 
important to consider how change comes about in large organizations, particularly with 
respect to organizational culture. It is within an organization’s culture that expectations 
for ethical behavior are sourced and reinforced.
Organizational culture, defined by Edgar Schein as the “set of structures, routines, 
rules, and norms that guide and constrain behavior,” constitutes the overarching organi-
zational environment.11 Culture encompasses the identity of the organization and its 
members (i.e., how they define “who we are” as an entity) and is a primary driver of the 
organization’s outlook. Culture is enduring. While leaders, policies, and circumstances 
change, culture transcends organizational transformations (e.g., the Navy’s culture of 
command). Schein proposed that culture can be understood and analyzed at three lev-
els: (1) on the surface, (2) among espoused beliefs and values, and (3) within underlying 
assumptions.
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At the surface level the most obvious indicators of an organization’s culture are visible 
structures, processes, and rituals (e.g., platforms, operational regulations, change-of-
command ceremonies). The organization’s espoused beliefs and values form a deeper 
stratum of the culture and guide and justify behaviors and choices (e.g., “we believe in 
war fighting first”). At the deepest level are the underlying assumptions that are the true 
foundations of the organization’s sense of itself (e.g., “this is how we do things here”). A 
challenge for many organizations is ensuring that espoused values align with the some-
times more forceful underlying assumptions, to avoid a “say-do” mismatch. In the case of 
ethics, the organization’s culture defines what its members understand to be most impor-
tant to their leaders, and dictates their actions as a result.
Implication 6
Organizational culture informs our understanding of the utility of the Navy’s current 
ethics approach for shaping ethical behavior. Considering both the visible aspects of cul-
ture and the underlying assumptions, the Navy seems to have developed a “prohibitive” 
and “reactive” culture for ethics. The tendencies to spotlight individual ethical failures 
(“bad apples”) and generally respond by firing the offenders, issuing new policies, and 
mandating more training—each occurring after ethical misconduct has occurred—send 
a pervasive signal of “just don’t be that person!” The “don’t do this” mentality then 
becomes deeply entrenched in the culture. Even the language of ethics failure or lapse 
emphasizes a negative culture for Navy ethics versus a positive approach. Thus, the 
current culture for Navy ethics is one based on obeying the rules to avoid punishment, 
rather than a proactive culture that fosters and inspires individuals to embody Navy 
Core Values and the Navy Ethos, and to use their discretionary judgment profession-
ally, making the right ethical decisions and taking the right ethical actions, even in the 
domain of the unenforceable.
A Way Forward
As our Navy reexamines its approach to comprehensive ethics development, educa-
tion, and training at all levels while fostering a proactive culture for Navy ethics, 
Stockdale’s wisdom is worthy of serious consideration. When and where in the devel-
opment of Navy personnel does the kind of deep reading, thinking, and reflection 
that Stockdale advocated occur? When do we engage our people in serious conversa-
tion about their identity as members of the naval profession and the kinds of ethical 
responsibilities that flow from that identity? For most of a Navy career at present, eth-
ics means a focus on legal compliance and general exhortations to be persons of good 
character. If we take Stockdale at his word, however, we should be thinking in terms 
of more-substantive engagement that would make not just better naval personnel and 
better citizens but a better war-fighting organization.
Grounding the Navy’s ethics development, education, and training efforts in a 
shared understanding of the naval profession will instill in our sailors a cultural ethos 
to act for the good of the service, the unit, and themselves. In addition to focusing on 
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observable behavior, a common understanding of the naval profession helps to shape 
self-awareness, shared identity, and a more internalized application of ethics. From 
this vantage point, the broader scope of ethical development is inherently valuable. 
This is not, however, education for its own sake; rather, this is about improving our 
war-fighting readiness today, and maintaining the trust of our fellow citizens for the 
future.
Ethics Development: From the Bottom Up and the Top Down
The following recommendations derive from the implications listed in this article, 
as well as insights based on previous taskings and research related to Navy ethics. 
The orientation is both bottom up and top down, aiming to engage sailors from 
the deckplate level all the way through to the responsibilities of senior leadership. 
Establishing a culture for Navy ethics requires investment on the part of individuals 
and our Navy as an institution. Ultimately, recommitting to the naval profession—
and maintaining the trust of the American people—serves as the driver for Navy 
ethics.
The following recommendations are in no way all-inclusive. They offer a broad 
view of necessary efforts to strengthen the culture of ethics for the Navy.
Recommendation 1: Inculcate Understanding of the “Naval Profession”
• We must have a common understanding of what it means to be a member of the 
naval profession. Presently, we represent eighteen distinct communities, and our 
community most often shapes our views and actions (e.g., “I am a fighter pilot”; “I 
am an enlisted surface warfare specialist”).
• Recognizing that we are first and foremost members of the naval profession 
(“I am a United States sailor”), and only then members of our respective com-
munities, places greatest emphasis on our unifying Navy Core Values and the 
Navy Ethos.
• The concept of the naval profession establishes why maintaining the trust of the 
American people through a culture of Navy ethics matters.
Recommendation 2: Construct “Good Barrels” and Cultivate “Good Apples”
• Examine policies and procedures, as well as system-driven expectations (e.g., per-
ceived pressures to cheat), that may lead unintentionally to poor ethical choices.
• Example: examine existing or previous ethics challenges to study how policies, 
procedures, and expectations may have contributed to less-than-optimal deci-
sions and behaviors, and adjust accordingly.
• Example: consider where—along the continuum of leader development, or at 
which career milestones—to inject more-intensive ethics development, train-
ing, and education, recognizing that the scope of sailors’ ethical responsibilities 
grows as their experience levels increase and contexts shift.
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• Examine whether we are helping or hindering sailors in the execution of their 
mission through ethical leadership.
• Example: consider the impact on “good barrels” (i.e., the trust environment 
that leaders create) of endless “priority one” tasks.
• Enforce existing and institute new policies that support the ethical development of 
our sailors.
• Example: enforce policies requiring completion of Navy professional military 
education, which includes a significant ethics component.
• Invest in the ethical and leader development of our people. Consider again the 
statement from the PACFLT roundtables: “Sailors surmise that Navy leadership 
expects them to adopt prescribed morals, standards, and rules of behavior with-
out investing in the process required to instill, teach, develop, and mentor these 
standards on the deckplates.” Our sailors desire to be better, and they want to be 
developed.
• Example: develop activities and processes that allow for regular feedback with-
out consequence (i.e., no negative effect on evaluations).
• Example: provide tools that will aid coaching, counseling, and mentoring of 
our sailors. (See also recommendation 6.)
• Example: alter the view of development activities to see them as an investment 
rather than a cost.
Recommendation 3: Build a Culture for Navy Ethics beyond Compliance
• Acknowledging that ethics means more than “just obey the rules” is a huge step in 
changing the way ethics is currently perceived and enacted within Navy culture.
• Example: spotlight examples of good ethical choices and behavior, as well as 
examples that favorably represent the naval profession.
• Example: institutionally reward good decisions and actions that reinforce 
Navy Core Values and the Navy Ethos.
• Tend to the moral development of our sailors—that is, help them develop habits 
for making the right ethical choices and using proper discretionary judgment.
• Example: provide opportunities for facilitated dialogues, peer discussions, and 
open roundtables around topics of motivation, reasoning, and processing of 
moral choices.
• Capitalize on existing training and education that present opportunities to instill 
ethics discussions and learning.
Recommendation 4: Engage the Command as Well as the Schoolhouse
• Ethics development goes beyond training and education. Deckplate leadership is 
still our most effective influence!
• Sailors at every level of the chain of command serve as positive influencers on 
ethical choices.
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• One-on-one engagement among sailors, peers, and leaders enables effective 
coaching, counseling, and mentorship, providing opportunities to address ethical 
decision-making prior to, during, and after ethical challenges.
• Example: continue to engage the chiefs’ mess (“the backbone of our Navy,” with 
perhaps the most direct influence) in regular, informal ethics conversations 
with junior sailors.
• The commander / commanding officer is the moral arbiter for the command and 
sets the standards of behavior and performance that contribute to esprit de corps, 
unit cohesion, mission accomplishment, and ethical climate.
• Example: foster a command climate that spotlights successes and rewards posi-
tive behavior (versus a command climate that spotlights failure and stresses 
punishment).
• Encourage the application of ethics education and training on the deckplates.
• Example: set the command climate for bystander intervention; remind sailors 
of their responsibility to step in and intervene when a situation is not right.
• Develop a view of assignment to the schoolhouse (including the service college) as 
an opportunity for personal and moral development.
• Example: build participation in and attendance at available training and edu-
cational opportunities into career progressions.
Recommendation 5: Engage Both Ethics Training and Ethics Education
• We train for compliance (and competence); we educate for knowledge and under-
standing. By engaging in knowledge development, we better address the domains 
of the unenforceable and ethical gray areas that require moral thought.
• Together, training and education produce demonstrably greater allegiance to Navy 
Core Values and the Navy Ethos than training (compliance) on its own.
• Example: use ethics training to reinforce compliance with legal rules and 
policy standards; provide ethics education that offers a broader understanding 
of ethics, self-awareness, and personal development.
Recommendation 6: Intersect Ethics Development with Leader Development
• Stand up the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC) around the existing 
functions of the Command Leadership School.
• NLEC will guide the development of leaders with a strong, abiding sense of 
their responsibility, authority, and accountability and who are committed to 
Navy Core Values and the Navy Ethos.
• NLEC will provide leadership education and training, curriculum support, 
leading-edge research, and assessment of leadership effectiveness across the 
Navy to ensure our leader-development activities remain current and relevant.
• Conduct further study on how we measure the character and integrity of our 
people. If we measure these things and hold people accountable for the results, 
cultural change will follow rapidly.
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• The attributes, behaviors, and skills expected of Navy leaders at all levels coincide 
with expected ethical standards. Leadership and ethics are inexorably intertwined.
• The Leader Development Outcomes (LDOs), which specify leader expectations 
for officers and enlisted, E-1 to O-10, provide a useful tool for both ethics and 
leader development.12
• When coupled with the other recommendations, application of the LDOs will 
influence both individual leader development and the overall culture for Navy 
leadership and ethics.
This article is intended to continue the dialogue, which will broaden our perspective 
and lead to actions necessary to improve ethics in our Navy. The overarching discussion 
drives us to a set of questions we must ask ourselves continually with regard to our cul-
ture for Navy ethics.
1. Are we doing what is required to maintain the American people’s trust in us as the 
naval profession?
2. Are we investing in the development of our people to enable them both to decide 
and to act instinctively with character and integrity?
3. Are we providing the tools to enable our senior enlisted and command leaders to 
effectively coach, counsel, and mentor their sailors?
4. Are we creating ethical climates in which good moral choices are more salient 
than bad ones?
5. Are we providing the right opportunities at the right time for personal and moral 
development?
6. Are we appropriately using policies and procedures to anticipate rather than react, 
to improve ethical decision-making for our sailors?
In the “as is” state of ethics in our Navy today, the responses to these questions 
are not a binary yes or no, but rather points that fall somewhere along a continuum. 
However, the answer to the question, “Can we do better?” is an emphatic “Absolutely!” 
Our Navy Ethos charges us as follows: “We are patriots, forged by the Navy’s Core Values 
of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. In times of war and peace, our actions reflect 
our proud heritage and tradition.” Our goal, therefore, should be to establish a culture 
for Navy ethics such that we have confidence that every sailor, in every community, will 
fully embody, uphold, and operate from Navy Core Values and the Navy Ethos.
Fortunately, we have the opportunity to build on existing foundations and draw les-
sons and examples from various communities (e.g., SEALs). Other efforts, such as the 
Navy Leader Development Strategy, the Navy Education Strategy 2025, and 21st Century 
Sailor, all align to advance the Navy’s approach to ethics development, education, and 
training. Importantly, we must engage the positive influencers in the lives of our sail-
ors—namely, the chain of command, mentors, and especially our families—to invest 
collectively in the character development of our people and build ethical behavior and 
commitment to the naval profession.
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